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ABSTRACT  
   
During the 1980s hundreds of thousands of Central American refugees streamed 
into the United States and Canada in the Central American Refugee Crisis (CARC). 
Fleeing homelands torn apart by civil war, millions of Guatemalans, Nicaraguans and 
Salvadorans fled northward seeking a safer and more secure life. This dissertation takes a 
"bottom-up" approach to policy history by focusing on the ways that "ground-level" 
actors transformed and were transformed by the CARC in Canada and the United States. 
At the Mexico-US and US-Canada borders Central American refugees encountered 
border patrol agents, immigration officials, and religious activists, all of whom had a 
powerful effect on the CARC and were deeply affected by their participation at the crisis. 
Using government archives, news media articles, legal filings and oral history this study 
examines a series of events during the CARC. Highlighting the role of "ground level" 
actors, this dissertation uses three specific case studies to look at how individuals, small 
groups, and a border town transformed and were transformed by the Central American 
Refugee Crisis. It argues that (#1) the CARC deeply affected the lives of those who 
participated in it, and (#2) the actors' interpretation and negotiation of, as well as 
resistance to, refugee policy changed the shape and outcomes of the Central American 
Refugee Crisis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A CRISIS EMERGENT 
“America perceives itself as a nation of immigrants and refugees and as a country where 
those who flee persecution elsewhere can find safety and opportunity. In recent years, 
this self image has been increasingly challenged…” – Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, 
former chair of the United State’s Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy, 19871 
 
“We are in the middle of two great powers, the U.S. and Canada. The U.S. doesn’t want 
us here. Canada doesn’t want us – now anyway. I can’t go back to Salvador. So we wait 
here.” 
– “Carlos,” March 1, 19872 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Surveying the growing conflicts in Central America, Southeast Asia, the Middle 
East, and South America, analysts began asking early in the 1980s if they were 
witnessing the “decade of the refugees.”3 Twenty years later post-colonial theorist Trinh 
T. Minh-Ha wrote of the 1980s as “the decade of refugees, and the homeless masses.”4 
The most surprising part for western countries of the “decade of the refugees” lay in the 
changing destinations of the refugee flows. For years they had treated refugee crises as 
localized issues that remained geographically contained in the region generating the 
refugees. During most of the Cold War, the United States focused its refugee relief efforts 
on Communist countries. By offering refuge to people fleeing Communist countries the 
United States made a political statement, condemning the conditions in, among others, 
                                                
1 Theodore Hesburgh in Norman L. Zucker and Naomi Flink Zucker, The Guarded Gate: The Reality of 
American Refugee Policy (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), ix. 
2 “Carlos” (pseudonym”) Quoted in Howard Witt, (Chicago Tribune) “Canada’s about face on immigration 
puts hundreds in limbo” The Orange County Register, 3/1/1987 
3 David E. Anderson, “1980s Could Become ‘Decade of Refugees’” Hartford Courant 3/9/1981. Anderson 
is referencing a study released that year by Kathleen Newland of the World Watch Institute entitled 
“Refugees: the new international politics of displacement.” 
4 Trinh T. Minh-Ha, Elsewhere, Within Here: Immigration, Refugeeism and the Boundary Event, (New 
York: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 45. 
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Hungary, Vietnam and Cuba. Most refugees who applied for status were screened and 
selected abroad by US government officials who then pushed their application through 
the appropriate channels.5 This changed dramatically in the 1980s. Gil Loescher, one of 
the leading scholars of refugee studies, identified this paradigmatic shift in an influential 
1994 article entitled, “The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the limit?”. 
Internal wars in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Central America, and Africa during the 
1970s and 1980s pushed refugees out of localized camps in or near the affected regions 
into countries far from the conflicts, creating what Loescher calls a “globalized refugee 
relief situation.”6  
This study examines the ways that refugees, social and religious activists, and 
low-level government officials in Canada and the United States transformed and were 
transformed by their nations’ policies concerning one of the decade’s largest refugee 
crises in the Western Hemisphere, the Central American Refugee Crisis (CARC).7 
Discussed in detail in section 1.2.2, the CARC grew out of a series of horrific civil wars 
in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. These wars displaced millions of Central 
Americans, hundreds of thousands of which fled the country in fear of their lives and 
immigrated to the United States and Canada. 
The United States and Canada had dealt with smaller refugee crises before with 
displaced people after World War II, and refugees from Vietnam, Chile and Uganda 
during the 1960s and 1970s, but these crises emerged thousands of miles from North 
                                                
5 John Crewdson, The Tarnished Door: The New Immigrants and the Transformation of America (New 
York: Times Books, 1983), 71, 81. 
6 Gil Loescher, “The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?,” Journal of International 
Affairs 47:2 (Winter 1994), 363. 
7 For this term I am indebted to Maria Cristina Garcia, whose invaluable work, Seeking Refuge: Central 
American Migration to Mexico, the United States and Canada (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2006) is discussed further below. 
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America, granting the two countries the ability to exert a significant amount of control 
over the character and number of refugees they welcomed. The only exceptions came 
from the United States’ response to refugees from the Caribbean, as Haitians and Cubans 
during the 1960s and 1970s made their way to the US via makeshift boats. For the most 
part, the US government welcomed Cubans fleeing Castro and communism, while 
rejecting Haitian refugees for racial and political reasons. In spite of the occasional influx 
of refugees from the Caribbean isles, the presence of a sizeable body of water separating 
them from the United States gave American officials some measure of control over which 
refugees to admit. This changed substantially during the 1980s as refugees from war torn 
Central America began streaming overland across the largely unregulated land borders 
between the United States and Mexico, and then the United States and Canada.  
Throughout this dissertation I repeatedly use the term “ground level actors” when 
referring to those most immediately involved in the Central American Refugee Crisis.  
This includes activists working directly with Central American migrants, government 
officials tasked with policing immigration, lawyers working on asylum cases, and 
religious activists lobbying for migrants. Highlighting the role of “ground level” actors, 
this dissertation uses three specific case studies to look at how individuals, small groups, 
and a border town transformed and were transformed by the Central American Refugee 
Crisis.  It argues that (#1) the CARC deeply affected the lives of those who participated 
in it, and (#2) the actors’ interpretation and negotiation of, as well as resistance to, 
refugee policy changed the shape and outcomes of the Central American Refugee Crisis. 
 
 
   4 
1.2.1 Background 
Any extended analysis of refugee issues must begin by defining exactly what the 
word “refugee” means as it is, depending on the context, loaded with a variety of 
political, social and legal meanings. Etymologically, the word comes from the French 
word refugié, referring to the Huguenots expelled from France following Louis XIV’s 
revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. The Oxford English Dictionary’s (OED) 
definition of a refugee as “(a) person who has been forced to leave his or her home and 
seek refuge elsewhere, esp. in a foreign country, from war, religious persecution, political 
troubles, the effects of a natural disaster, etc.,”8 is strikingly similar, though less specific 
than the definition codified by the United Nations in its 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. In the 1951 Convention the United Nations defined a refugee as 
someone who, prior to 1951, had a, “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is 
outside the country of his nationality or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country… [emphasis added].”9 A protocol passed by the 
United Nations’ general assembly, signed on January 31, 1967, extended this definition 
to those who became refugees (as defined by the 1951 Convention) as a result of events 
that transpired after 1951. Both Canada and the United States signed the 1967 protocol 
within a few years of its passage but neither codified the refugee provisions in domestic 
law until 1976 (Canada) and 1980 (United States). These laws use the narrower United 
                                                
8 "Refugee." Merriam-Webster.com. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/refugee. 
9 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 152, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html [accessed 28 March 2013] 
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Nations standard that does not recognize natural disasters or war, rather than the OED 
definition cited above. 
The omission of natural disasters and war from the UN definition is significant as 
it indicates a difference between who the public generally understands to be a refugee, 
and who the law understands to be a refugee. The opening quotation from Reverend 
Hesburgh reveals, in part, the consequences of this tension between public belief and 
established law. Under the UN definition it is not enough to be fleeing war, natural 
disasters or political troubles; one must have a “well-founded fear” of persecution. This 
short phrase is the bedrock upon which the international refugee regime rests. Yet, who 
determines whether a potential refugee has a “well-founded fear,” and, more importantly, 
what exactly is a “well founded fear”?  
Since the codification of the United Nations’ 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol 
into US and Canadian law, a variety of officials in the United States and Canada have 
been tasked with adjudicating whether someone is a “legitimate” refugee and has a “well-
founded fear.” These adjudicators have included immigration judges, asylum officers, 
consuls, specially created panels and high-level government dignitaries. Scholars from 
the growing field of refugee studies have demonstrated that in the United States and 
Canada, adjudicators’ definition of “well-founded fear,” so crucial to the success of a 
refugee application, has and continues to vary widely. Adjudicators based their 
definitions on everything from a prospective refugee’s country of origin, marriage status, 
level of documentation to his or her gender. One telling example regarding the 
importance of an applicant’s country of origin is that between 1983 and 1986 potential 
refugees in the United States fleeing communist Eastern Europe were over 1000 times 
   6 
more likely to receive refugee status than those fleeing similar situations in right wing 
Guatemala.10  
Scholars have demonstrated that the success of a refugee’s application often does 
not rest on the merit of his or her application, but rather is determined by the location of 
the adjudicator’s office, adjudicator’s gender and adjudicator’s previous legal career.11 
Detailed statistical analysis of asylum decisions over a seven-year period at the turn of 
the 21st century by Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Ian Schoenholtz and Philip G. Schrag 
demonstrates that a seemingly unbiased system was heavily contingent on the judges 
tasked with administering it. Female immigration judges were 44% more likely to grant 
refugee status to applicants than their male counterparts. They found similar variations 
based on the judge’s previous career and place of work.12 There is no reason to believe 
that the roulette-like nature of asylum decisions in the late 1990s differs from those of the 
1980s and early 1990s.  
The decision to award or refuse “refugee status” carries tremendous import. As 
the 1951 Convention makes clear, absent a felony conviction or national security risk, 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
                                                
10 Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture, and Agency in the Central America 
Solidarity Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 130. 
11 The most notable examination of the chaotic nature of refugee adjudication worldwide is Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Andrew Ian Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag. Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication and Proposals for Reform. (New York: New York University Press, 2009). Others include 
Susan Bibler Coutin’s Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants' Struggle for U.S. Residency.  (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Gerald E. Dirks Controversy and Complexity: Canadian 
Immigration Policy During the 1980s (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1995); and Carl Bon Tempo, 
Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
12 Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag. Refugee Roulette, 44. 
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political opinion…”13 Therefore any signatory is legally bound to not deport individuals 
found to be refugees to their “home” countries. This principle of non-refoulement is 
enormously important for the Central American Refugee Crisis. During the 1980s and 
1990s hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans and Salvadorans migrated to the United 
States and Canada, many of whom believed that they possessed a “well-founded fear” of 
persecution back in their countries of birth. Most of these migrants crossed the border 
without the state-required documentation, making them, in the eyes of the law, illegal. If 
apprehended they were in danger of being deported back to their home countries. Once 
apprehended many Central Americans applied for refugee status. An overwhelming 
majority of them never received refugee status and were, instead, labeled as illegal 
economic immigrants and subject to deportation. 
1.2.2 Background in Central America 
Central American migrants’ fears stemmed from the massive violence and 
government repression brought on by the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador. For 
decades, economic inequality, sham elections and military control characterized social 
and political life in the two countries. El Salvador’s oligarchical “Fourteen Families” had 
controlled the vast majority of land and capital in the country since independence. The 
country’s brief experiment with democracy begun in 1927 ended bloodily in 1931 when 
the military, spurred on by the “Fourteen Families,” overthrew democratically elected 
Arturo Araujo. In the next year they consolidated their power with the bloody massacre 
of tens of thousands of Salvadoran peasants in an event known as La Matanza. Among 
                                                
13 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 176. 
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the victims was Augustín Farabundo Martí, a charismatic figure whose name became a 
symbol for the guerillas of the 1980s.14   
Between 1932 and 1972 El Salvador enjoyed relatively stable governments 
dominated by military regimes with close links to the “Fourteen Families.” Growing 
urbanization in the 1950s and 60s led to the formation of a new political party, the 
Christian Democratic Party (PDC), whose base lay primarily among urban industrial 
workers. Its strength grew throughout the 60s until by 1972 its party leader, and 
presidential candidate, José Napoleon Duarte, seemed poised to win the election. Massive 
fraud awarded the presidency to the army’s candidate, Colonel Arturo Molina. Junior 
military officers, frustrated by the blatant fraud and jealous of the senior officers’ power, 
launched a military coup that Molina brutally put down. Going beyond the military 
conspiracy, Molina’s forces kidnapped, tortured and exiled Duarte, and attempted to 
eliminate the PDC through repression. Molina’s actions, coupled with a growing 
economic crisis, convinced many Salvadorans to join various guerilla groups scattered 
around the country.15  
In response, Molina launched a wave of repression enabled in part by US military 
advisers and foreign aid. Government soldiers met protests in support of workers’ rights 
or on wasteful government spending with violence. The paramilitary group Organización 
Democrática Nacionalista (National Democratic Organization or ORDEN) contributed to 
the wave by “disappearing” (kidnapping and murdering) hundreds of teachers, priests, 
and peasants suspected to be dissidents. Human rights abuses became so bad that the 
                                                
14 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1993), 73-75. 
15 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 242-243. 
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Ford administration cut off US military aid. The “election” of General Carlos Humberto 
Romero in 1977 initially brought some changes as Romero halted the worse of the 
atrocities after the new Carter administration began to pressure El Salvador on its human 
rights records. Yet by 1978 the growing power of leftist guerillas in Nicaragua prompted 
the United States’ government to deemphasize human rights in Central America, and 
place its focus on terrorism and revolutionaries.16 Romero followed course, renewing his 
suppression of leftist groups, including any members of the Catholic Church who dared 
question him. Between 1978 and 1979 more than 720 people died at the hands of death 
squads and government forces.  
In 1979 the civil war in El Salvador drew even more attention as the leftist 
Sandinistas overthrew the hard-right Somoza government in neighboring Nicaragua. For 
decades the Somoza regime had ruthlessly ruled Nicaragua while cooperating fully with 
the United States’ foreign policy. American officials worried that the success of the 
Sandinistas, who they believed to be deeply committed Communists, would lead to a 
“domino” effect in Central America, turning the region into an ally of the Soviet Union. 
Vociferously opposed to guerilla warfare against the hard-right government in El 
Salvador, the US government willingly provided military and financial aid to the 
guerillas in Nicaragua, known as “Contras,” fighting the left-leaning Nicaraguan 
government.17  
Carter sent envoys to El Salvador to try and discover a way to follow his stated 
human rights policy, while providing the necessary military aid to the government to stop 
the guerillas, and isolate the radical left and right wings. He hoped that this would keep 
                                                
16 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 244-245. 
17 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 11. 
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El Salvador from following the Nicaraguan route where the government’s failure to 
exorcise the far right contributed to its downfall. Romero resisted the United States’ 
pressure to tone down the killing and hold new elections. On October 15, 1979 a 
collection of young officers eager for US military assistance, unhappy with Romero’s 
association with ORDEN, and worried about the country’s economic conditions 
successfully overthrew the government.18 
Initially more liberal than their predecessor, the officers formed a ruling junta of 
two military officers (Colonel Jaime Gutiérrez and Colonel Adolfo Majano) and three 
civilians (Román Mayorga, Guillermo Ungo and Mario Andino). They promised to shut 
down ORDEN, free political prisoners, institute land reform, and more. For some 
members of the military the junta promised too much too soon. Gutiérrez, Majano and 
Andino listened to their complaints and slowed down the reforms. Soon any semblance of 
moderation disappeared. ORDEN reappeared in different guises as a variety of different 
death squads and soldiers resumed their paramilitary activity with even less direction 
from officers. Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero publicly begged the government to 
rein in the death squads. While he was giving mass on March 24, 1980 off-duty soldiers 
stormed the chapel and shot him through the heart. The army’s killing continued 
unabated. The Salvadoran government received even more US support, $5.7 million more 
in military aid. That same spring Salvadoran guerillas saw the growing political power of 
Ronald Reagan, and worried over his promise to increase US military support to the 
Salvadoran government. As a result various factions joined together to form the 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDM) to coordinate the political activities of sixteen 
                                                
18 William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: the United States in Central America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 38-40. 
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revolutionary organizations. In October five guerilla groups founded the Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front (FMLN) to coordinate military activities. Two months later the 
FMLN launched what it believed was the “final offensive,” a multi-pronged military 
attack that they hoped would convince soon-to-be-inaugurated President Reagan to push 
the Salvadoran military to the bargaining table. Their offensive failed as peasants did not 
join them, bought off by the government’s promises of better land reform and intimidated 
by the military’s violence. Nevertheless, the FMLN survived. For the rest of the 1980s 
the guerillas and military continued their civil war.19 
The remainder of the decade was a nightmare for El Salvador. Weakened by the 
failure of its “final offensive,” the FMLN was ready to negotiate, but Reagan and the 
Salvadoran military forbade the government from negotiating, preferring to crush the 
guerillas and provide an example for other resistance movements throughout the region. 
More economic aid poured into the country, coupled with US military advisers, 
helicopters and C-47 gunships. In spite of US money and supplies, the government was 
unable to reverse the country’s economic slide and destroy the guerilla movement. All it 
seemed to be doing was killing its own people, 300 to 500 a week in 1981. In hopes of 
siphoning off support from the guerillas, as well as silencing domestic dissent against its 
foreign policy, the Reagan government pushed the Salvadoran military to hold elections 
to replace the ruling junta. $10 million dollars in foreign aid bought the moderate Jose 
Napoleon Duarte the presidency in 1984. Duarte unsuccessfully tried to break with the 
United States by proposing peace negotiations with the FMLN but received little support 
                                                
19 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 248-254. 
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from the military. The talks collapsed and the bloodshed continued.20 The civil war 
suppressed economic development to the point that one of the country’s primary sources 
of income during the 1980s was the remittances immigrants sent back from the United 
States. 
By the late 1980s, out of a population of less than 6 million over 75,000 
Salvadorans had been murdered or “disappeared.” The civil war in El Salvador had taken 
the life of 1 out of every 80 Salvadorans. A renewed push for negotiations fell apart in 
1988 when Duarte was unable to convince the rest of his government to prosecute 
members of the death squads. Instead the government passed legislation that forbade their 
prosecution.21 In 1989 politically untested Alfredo Cristiani won the presidency but did 
little to calm the violence. The FMLN launched a second “final offensive,” that 
conquered about half the country but failed to overwhelm the government. With both 
guerilla and government forces at a stalemate, the military finally permitted the 
government to approach the bargaining table. Negotiations took nearly two years, but on 
January 1, 1992 the FMLN and the government finally agreed to a settlement that 
promised peace.22  
For the majority of the 20th century Guatemala endured a series of governments 
either completely in the hands of the military or heavily influenced by it. The one 
exception came in a brief 10 year interlude between 1944 and 1954. Known as the “10 
Years of Spring,” the period began with a coup that overthrew dictator Jorge Ubico. The 
ruling junta immediate agreed to hold a free an open election. Former university 
                                                
20 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 313-318. 
21 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 354-358. 
22 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 356-358, 
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professor Juan José Arévalo won the presidency and instituted a series of reforms 
designed to open up the government and loosen the grasp of the large landholders who 
had dominated the country’s economy and politics for over a century. His successor, 
Jacobo Arbénz, continued many of Arévalo’s programs, but fatefully decided to go 
further with a land reform that expropriated unused land from large corporations, many of 
them owned by US citizens. In the United States well-connected lobbyists and influential 
publicists portrayed land reform to the Eisenhower administration, and a gullible US 
public, as the first step towards communism, and morally, economically and politically 
wrong.23 The massive agrarian reform, led first by Arévalo, and then broadened by 
Arbenz, nationalized hundreds of thousands of acres, and then redistributed them to the 
peasants in small plots.  The government issued bonds to repay the original land owners 
according to the value the companies had placed on the land for tax purposes in the year 
before.  
The US-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO), one of the world’s largest banana 
producers, quickly decried the plan. For decades it had been consistently undervaluing its 
land to escape a high tax burden, and now did not feel that it was getting fair market 
value for its land. The UFCO, owner of approximately two-thirds of the first 337,000 
expropriated acres, did not acknowledge that this policy was less radical than the 
Mexican agrarian reform that had taken place more than a decade earlier. In fact, the 
Arbenz land reform would have fallen well within the limits outlined by the American 
                                                
23Peter H. Smith. Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 135. 
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Alliance for Progress that John F. Kennedy established less than ten years later.24 
Arbenz’s legalization of the Guatemalan Communist party in 1952 only helped UFCO 
publicists convince the American government and public that Guatemala was headed 
towards communism, and its government was worthy of overthrow. From 1951-1954 the 
CIA funded and trained Guatemalan rebels led by Castillo Armas.  On June 18, 1954 the 
Armas forces invaded Guatemala from Honduras with the support of US forces.  On June 
27th Arbenz resigned, and Armas took power. An assassin’s bullet ended Armass’ rule 
three years later. Shortly thereafter General Ydígoras Fuentes took power. 
The next two decades saw a return to the economic futility and political 
repression Guatemalans had been familiar with since the colonial era.  The Guatemalan 
government continued to be financially and politically supported by the United States, 
even while it used torture, death squads and other types of repression to suppress dissent.  
In 1960 a group of young military officers attempted a coup d’etat, and went into hiding 
shortly after its failure. They, along with other dissidents, organized a series of guerilla 
groups that fought a civil war against the official government from 1960-1996. The 
government’s response was brutal, particularly during the late 1970s and 1980s when 
violence reached its height. In six years, 1978-1984, more than 140,000 Guatemalans 
were either murdered or “disappeared” out of a population of less than 8 million in 
1985.25 These waves of violence, coupled with an oligarchic and post-colonial economic 
                                                
24 Stephen C. Schlesinger, Stephen Kinzer, and John H. Coatsworth. Bitter Fruit :The Story of the 
American Coup in Guatemala. (David Rockefeller Center Series on Latin American Studies, Harvard 
University. 2 David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies ed. Vol. 3. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2005), 55. 
25 Garcia, Seeking Refuge, 27. 
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system made development almost impossible, and most Guatemalans, particularly rural 
Maya, remained mired in desperate poverty throughout the decade. 
Much of the government’s ire focused on impoverished Mayan villages. The 
Guatemalan government saw the rural highlands as the center of the guerilla movement 
and its primary source of support. In a desperate attempt to suppress dissent the 
Guatemalan government engaged in “relocation” campaigns, airborne assaults, and 
village “re-education” in what the United Nations eventually deemed a genocide against 
the rural indigenous people.26 In the cities death squads targeted “dissidents” who dared 
to speak out against the government, join a trade union or express sympathy for the 
guerillas. Those picked up by the death squads often “disappeared” into mysterious 
prisons where they were tortured and killed, and their bodies dumped in the ocean or 
somewhere within the city to serve as an example. The total human cost of Guatemala’s 
civil war is impossible to pinpoint, but low estimates place the total at 190,000.27 
Spurred north by government sponsored death squads, a UN recognized genocide 
in the Guatemalan highlands, massive human rights violations, and economic strife 
hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans, and Salvadorans fled to the United States, and 
Canada during the 1980s. This massive exodus, known academically in the United States 
as the Central American Refugee Crisis (CARC), meant that by 1987 approximately 
600,000 to 1.1 million Guatemalans, and Salvadorans lived in the United States and 
29,000 in Canada.28 Thousands more followed throughout the rest of the decade. Upon 
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arrival in North America, Central Americans found that their presence highlighted 
foreign, and domestic policy tensions in their new homes. 
1.2.3 Background in North America 
In the United States, the Reagan administration’s foreign policy in Central 
America had become a symbol of how it intended to approach the Cold War. Reagan's 
influential foreign policy adviser Jeane Kirkpatrick believed Central America to be "the 
most important place in the world for the United States."29 Geographically close to the 
United States, many Cold War warriors feared a domino effect that would turn the region, 
and then Mexico, communist. Kirkpatrick, and the rest of the Reagan administration, 
were particularly irked at President Carter’s perceived weakness exemplified through his 
government’s "failed" response to the Nicaraguan revolution, signature of the Panama 
Canal Treaties, and general emphasis on human rights at the expense of hard right 
governments.30 The Reagan administration loudly proclaimed that this failure had 
resulted in an increasingly threatening Soviet presence in Central America.  Less than a 
month following Ronald Reagan's inauguration the State Department released a white 
paper that enumerated the ways that the Soviet Union and "Sandinista" Nicaragua 
funneled arms to the guerillas in El Salvador.31  Almost immediately journalists and 
former State Department officials attacked the paper, accusing its authors of creating a 
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reality that justified the government’s preconceptions about El Salvador, and its hoped-
for approach to solve Salvador's "problems."32   
While Reagan’s foreign policy team focused on the need to prevent further Soviet 
encroachment into America's "backyard," they also saw another opportunity in the civil 
wars in Central America. Still experiencing the aftershocks of the Vietnam War, the 
public remained opposed to military interventions that were not driven by crisis.33 Thus, 
members of the Reagan administration hoped to use Central America as an opportunity to 
restore the American public's faith in a robust and militarily active foreign policy.34 They 
firmly believed that the United States was obligated to actively and unapologetically use 
its power to advance its interests. Unwilling to acknowledge that the hard right Central 
American governments funded by the US government were generating refugees, the 
Reagan administration dismissed the stories of Central American migrants. Appealing to 
nativist sentiment, they labeled Central Americans in the United States as undeserving 
migrants who sought American jobs and the American safety net. 
In spite of the strength and reach of the Reagan message machine, it did not 
provide the only view of Central America to the US public. Social and religious activists, 
as well as Democratic politicians, offered a different perspective. Activists condemned 
Reagan as a warmonger, ignorer of human rights, and hypocrite. Many worried that El 
Salvador was simply a repeat of Vietnam, as they saw patterns between the introductory 
stages of Vietnam and US involvement in El Salvador. Religious groups emphasized the 
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immorality of Reagan’s foreign policy. The most famous came in the form of the 
Sanctuary Movement, further discussed below, and in detail in chapter 2. Churches, 
synagogues, and private individuals from across the country banded together to house, 
shelter, and provide public platforms to Central American refugees. By bringing the 
moral authority of religion to the support of Central Americans, members of the 
Sanctuary Movement staked their credibility on the fact that the refugees were not mere 
economic migrants.  
Other religious organizations sent observers to Central American countries to 
bring back reports of human rights violations. Still others placed American citizens in 
Central American villages as “living shields” against governmental violence. The 
widespread involvement of religious organizations as the leaders of opposition to the 
United States’ foreign policy was novel as the leaders of previous anti-war movements 
had often been secular.35 Left-wing churches and synagogues provided a counterbalance 
to the growing ascendancy of the religious right. In addition to their public and private 
protests, left-leaning social and religious activists pressured politicians, particularly those 
of the Democratic Party, through telephone and letter-writing campaigns to oppose the 
administration’s approach to Central America. 
Throughout the 1980s Congressional Democrats strove to place a variety of 
checks on Reagan’s foreign policy. Unable to secure a mandate for active military 
intervention in Central America, the Reagan administration funneled economic and 
military aid towards the governments in Guatemala and El Salvador, and Contras in 
Nicaragua during the 1980s. Though Congress threatened to use its “power of the purse” 
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to cut off Central American aid, the Reagan administration was able to cajole, manipulate 
or simply steamroll over most opposition. Nonetheless, Congress’ hesitance to provide 
sufficient military aid to the Contras did lead to several years during the 1980s where the 
US government could not provide them with military aid. This resulted in the 
administration’s greatest scandal, the Iran-Contra affair. In 1986 the US Attorney General 
uncovered evidence that US officials had used the profits from illegal arms sales to Iran 
to purchase weapons for the Contras. On a legal technicality a federal judge dismissed the 
charges against the primary forces behind the arms sales, Admiral John Poindexter and 
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. Nonetheless, Congress’ investigation of the scandal had 
revealed that the administration had been, at the very least, partially involved. In spite of 
the clear illegality of the arms sales and the fact that the architects of the Iran-Contra 
Affair had violated their direct order, Congress was unable to successfully prosecute 
them or the upper echelons of the Reagan administration.36 
As William LeoGrande observes in regard to Central America “Congress largely 
failed in its institutional responsibility to serve as a check on executive behavior.”37 The 
most successful resistance to Reagan’s foreign policy came through social and religious 
activists, where “(s)ignificant organized grassroots opposition to Reagan’s policy from 
the religious community and the peace movement foreshadowed what might happen if 
direct involvement produced significant U.S. casualties.”38 US social and political 
activists concerned about Reagan’s ruthless anti-communism saw in Central Americans’ 
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tortured bodies living proof of the immorality of the administration’s foreign policy, and 
felt the moral obligation to oppose it. 
The debate over Central American migration in Canada played out in a markedly 
different context than that of the United States. Buffered by the United States and 
Mexico, Canada did not see large levels of Central American migration until the mid 
1980s, and even then it was nowhere near the numbers of the other two North American 
countries. Therefore for much of the decade the Canadian public and government viewed 
Central American refugees similar to the Tamils, Refuseniks (Soviet Jews), and 
Vietnamese. In addition, the Canadian government had less ties to the right-wing Central 
American dictatorships than its US counterpart. During the early 1980s successive 
Canadian governments tried to initiate negotiations between the belligerent groups in 
Central America, using their foreign policy towards the varying crises in Central America 
as a chance to differentiate themselves from the United States. Much to the chagrin of the 
Reagan administration, they encouraged conversations between leftist guerillas and hard 
right governments.39 This meant that the government’s response to Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran refugees was driven by domestic, rather than foreign concerns. Therefore the 
Canadian conversation regarding Central American migration centered on the larger 
ongoing debates over immigration, and refugee policy, rather than being sidetracked by 
foreign policy concerns. The debate in Canada over refugee and asylum policy during the 
1980s is discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
 In sum, the concept of “refugee,” and the legal complexities it engendered, 
remained largely in dispute leading up to and during the Central American Refugee 
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Crisis. Ongoing chaos in Central America generated massive waves of refugees to North 
America in numbers that the receiving countries were unprepared for. In the United 
States, Central Americans were, for varying political constituencies, either “undeserving” 
economic migrants breaking immigration laws, or living proof of the immorality of the 
Republican government’s foreign policy. Most Canadians viewed the situation 
differently, seeing the CARC as a chance for Canada to distinguish itself from its 
southern neighbor.  
1.3 Research Goals 
 This dissertation will use three case studies to examine the ways that the Central 
American Refugee Crisis, and the North American response to it, transformed and was 
transformed by individual and small groups of “ground-level” actors. I argue that the 
political actions of “ground-level” actors intentionally and unintentionally transformed 
the crisis and themselves. Here I use Susan Bibler Coutin’s definition of political action 
during the CARC. She contends that:  
Religious activists formed the sanctuary movement and filed the ABC [American 
Baptist Churches] lawsuit, attorneys represented individual asylum applicants and 
worked on class-action suits, refugees sought political asylum, activists worked to 
counter U.S. foreign and refugee policy while supporting political struggles in 
Central America, immigrants opted to come to the United States despite laws 
forbidding their presence…Like everyone else, attorneys and political activists 
must maneuver within particular sets of conditions. Such maneuverings 
occasionally result in social change or transformative visions of social existence.40 
 
I aim to further demonstrate that the “ground-level” actors Coutin addresses found ways 
to dramatically affect asylum policy while operating within a system that constrained 
their ability to make wholesale changes. To do this I focus on how these “ground-level” 
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actors brought varying amounts of public pressure on their respective governments, and 
how that pressure affected their governments’ refugee/asylum policies.  
1.4 Significance of Dissertation and Historiographical Context 
During the Central American Refugee Crisis a significant number of sociologists, 
cultural anthropologists and ethnographers studied the CARC and the Sanctuary 
Movement.  Simultaneously, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw the formalization of 
refugee studies as an academic field dedicated to the documentation and analysis of 
various refugee crises.  Thus over the past twenty-five years, academics, government 
officials, and NGOs have expended an enormous amount of energy on refugee crises.41 
This dissertation builds on these studies by using the CARC, a significant refugee crisis, 
to stress the role of “ground-level” actors and placing them in historical perspective.  
The best holistic study of the CARC is Maria Cristina Garcia’s 2006 monograph 
Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada. 
Garcia traces the evolution of the crisis, highlighting the interactions between the three 
North American countries. Outside of her work and Susan Bibler Coutin’s Legalizing 
Moves (2000) the three primary groups of actors in the CARC (migrants, activists and the 
government) have largely been analyzed in isolation. Some important studies of Central 
Americans are Cecilia Menjivar’s Fragmented Ties (2000), James Loucky and Marilyn 
Moors’ edited collection The Maya Diaspora (2000) and Jacqueline Hagan’s Deciding to 
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be Legal (1994).  These studies, authored by sociologists and anthropologists, focus on 
the interaction between migrants within their communities, and the relationship between 
Central Americans and the government. Their fine-grained examination of migrants’ 
lives shines a revealing light on migrants’ experiences, illuminating the effects of a 
confusing refugee policy on their lives. My research adds to these studies by emphasizing 
the powerful and interdependent relationship between migrants, activists and 
government. I combine an analysis of the ways that migrants’ actions transformed the 
CARC while the crisis transformed them.  
During the late 1980s and early 1990s a variety of sociologists and 
anthropologists authored a number of studies on the Sanctuary Movement. Hilary 
Cunningham’s God and Caesar at the Rio Grande (1995) focuses on Sanctuary work in 
Tucson, AZ. Susan Bibler Coutin’s Culture of Protest (1993) examines the Movement in 
San Francisco and Tucson. In Women in the Sanctuary Movement (1993) Robin 
Lorentzen analyzes women’s activism in the Sanctuary Movement in Tucson and 
Chicago. Both Christian Smith’s Resisting Reagan (1996), and Sharon Erickson 
Nepstad’s Convictions of the Soul (2004) expanded the study of activists during the 
CARC by looking at a variety of national movements against US asylum and foreign 
policy regarding Central America. Randy Lippert’s Sanctuary, Sovereignty and Sacrifice 
(2005) traces the development of the idea of Sanctuary in Canada with a particular focus 
on Ontario. The majority of these works are heavily informed by fieldwork and 
interviews with the activists studied. Valuable for their discussion on the effects of 
activism on their subjects, few examine the consequences of activism on US asylum and 
foreign policy. None of these studies place activist activity in an international context that 
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involves all three groups of “ground-level” actors discussed in this study. They either 
focus exclusively on activists or activists and one of the two other groups. 
While scholars have separately examined the actions of Central American 
migrants and social justice activists in detail, the actions of low-level government 
officials in the CARC remain largely unstudied. To date there is no study exclusively on 
the experiences and effect of government officials of any level during the CARC. Studies 
on government policies concerning immigration and refugees are largely confined to the 
upper levels of the federal government. Examples include Daniel Tichenor’s Dividing 
Lines (2002), Valerie Knowles’ Strangers at Our Gate (2007), Gil Loescher’s and John 
Scanlon’s Calculated Kindness (1998), and Naomi and Norman Zucker’s The Guarded 
Gate (1987).  
A few studies deviate from this top down approach. Americans at the Gate (2008) 
by Carl Bon Tempo and The Uneasy Alliance (1988) by J. Bruce Nichols focus on mid-
level bureaucrats in the US and Canada. Recently scholars have begun to examine the 
lives and work of the US Border Patrol. Kelly Lytle Hernandez’s Migra! (2010) is the 
first comprehensive history of the United State Border Patrol’s first fifty years of 
existence. An important look at the ways that the Border Patrol fashioned American 
perceptions of race along the US-Mexico border, most of her analysis ends prior to the 
Central American Refugee Crisis at the Border Patrol’s fifty year anniversary in 1974.42 
Timothy Dunn’s The Militarization of the US-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low Intensity 
Conflict Doctrine Comes Home (1996) documents the evolution of the policing of the 
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US-Mexico border, but he is more concerned with the macro-changes in border policy, 
rather than those specifically related to the CARC.  
My analysis of government activity joins with this growing examination of 
ground-level government actors by emphasizing how Immigration and Naturalization 
officers shaped the Sanctuary Movement investigation, the decisive role a federal judge 
played in the American Baptist Churches case, and the individual agency of US and 
Canadian immigration officers along the US/Canada border. Through their actions, this 
disparate group of government officials played a large part in determining the effect of 
the CARC on thousands of Central Americans. At the same time, many were deeply 
affected by their participation in the crisis. Unrest over the extra workload, and 
uneasiness concerning the ethics of Central American refugee policy are just two of the 
ways that participation in the CARC affected government officials. 
Finally, two of my three case studies fill important gaps in the study of the Central 
American Refugee Crisis. Since the conclusion of the American Baptist Churches court 
case in 1991 scholars have extensively studied the ABC settlement and its effects. Susan 
Bibler Coutin has been at the forefront of research into the ways that Central Americans 
negotiated the legal complexities of the ABC settlement. Coutin and other scholars reveal 
the immense effect that the ABC settlement had on the asylum policy of the United 
States.43 Comparatively little scholarly analysis has been done on the evolution of the 
case itself. Carolyn Patty Blum, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, wrote a short law review 
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article, while Coutin and Menjívar’s discussion of the case is mainly to set up their 
examination of the settlement. 44 Using legal filings and oral histories, chapter 3 provides 
a step-by-step analysis of the court case, revealing the critical role of the overseeing 
judge and a small cadre of lawyers on the case’s result. 
While lawyers argued the ABC case, changes in US and Canadian asylum policy 
in 1986 and 1987 created the Plattsburgh Border Crisis. A comparative analysis of North 
American asylum policies and the short-term crisis management needed to cope with 
their consequences, further reveals the transformative effect of individuals on the CARC. 
The Plattsburgh Border Crisis grew out of the Canadian government’s abrupt decision in 
February 1987 to change its refugee admission policy. Responding to public and private 
concern over its overwhelmed refugee and immigration system, the Canadian 
government ended its policy of allowing refugee applicants from a select group of 
countries into Canada while their applications were being processed.  
This decision took thousands of prospective refugees, fleeing the United States’ 
newly passed Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), by surprise. Fearing IRCA’s 
strict new immigration enforcement policies, undocumented prospective refugees 
streamed towards the US/Canada border in early 1987. Most expected to enter the 
country and claim asylum. Unaware of Canada’s change in policy they were turned away 
at the border, and told to wait just south of the line until their asylum case could be heard. 
Those making their way from New York to Montreal were stranded in the tiny border 
town of Plattsburgh, NY, where they quickly overwhelmed the area’s social services. 
This case study traces the lead up and aftermath of this refugee influx, which prompted 
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the formation of a wide variety of local, regional and transnational private/public 
partnerships, and dramatically transformed Plattsburgh. 
Therefore, my dissertation will serve as an important but currently missing part of 
our understanding of the CARC.  Drawing on the rich body of research on religious 
activists in the Sanctuary Movement and Central Americans in the United States, while 
breaking new ground with its detailed examination of the ABC case and the Plattsburgh 
Border Crisis, it will examine the ways that refugees, activists, and government officials 
affected each other, and the outcome of the CARC.  
1.5 Methodology 
This dissertation’s examination of “ground-level” actors’ experiences during the 
CARC as a “whole way of life in family networks and community relationships, 
embedded in hierarchically structured power relationships and in the complex unifying 
institutions of many-cultured states” stems from Dirk Hoerder’s formulation of a new 
approach to area studies known as Transcultural Societal Studies (TSS). 45 The CARC, as 
experienced by government officials, migrants, and religious activists, was a complex and 
ever shifting crisis that they shaped extensively with their actions.  The inclusive model 
outlined by Hoerder necessitates an analytical approach that takes into mind both the 
historical evolution of the crisis and the individual specificity of actors’ experiences. 
Like refugee studies, this dissertation uses a multi-disciplinary approach that 
incorporates methodologies from anthropology, sociology and history. It privileges the 
voice of “ground-level” actors in a manner consistent with my firm belief that the 
experiences of ordinary people, regardless of their social status, have a powerful effect on 
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history. A technique common in anthropology and sociology, while growing much more 
common in history, oral interviews add context by giving “ground-level” actors the 
ability to speak for themselves. Over the course of my research I interviewed over 20 
different ground-level actors, many of which are cited in the following pages. I conducted 
these oral interviews in Toronto, Tucson, Phoenix and Plattsburgh, with phone interviews 
reaching out to Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York City, Philadelphia and El Paso.  
In addition, I use a wide variety of traditional historical sources. The heavy 
newspaper coverage of the Sanctuary Movement Trial and the Plattsburgh Border Crisis 
generated an abundance of articles from local and national newspapers. The Refugee 
Research Library at York University’s Centre for Refugee Studies archived many 
Canadian governmental reports, as well as activists’ papers. University of Arizona’s 
Special Collections holds the papers of John Fife, a prominent activist in the Sanctuary 
Movement. Over 63 cubic feet of documents, the holdings include transcripts of activist 
meetings, interviews with Sanctuary Movement activists, court filings and more. I 
worked with the court clerk at the Northern District Court of California to obtain copies 
of most of the filings in the American Baptist Church case (or ABC). A research trip to 
Montreal and Plattsburgh opened up new archives, and put me in contact with CARC 
activists in Quebec and northern New York. I believe that, taken together, these sources 
and methodologies allow me to explore the CARC in ways that have not been done in the 
past, contributing a unique perspective emphasizing the importance of “ground-level” 
actors while highlighting some important, but understudied, parts of the crisis.  
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1.6 Assumptions and Limitations 
 This dissertation is subject to a number of assumptions and limitations. In 
addition, I have, out of necessity, limited its scope. I will address each in turn. My first 
assumption is that case studies of specific events of the Central American Refugee Crisis 
are important to the study of the Crisis itself. I do not make the claim that each of the 
experiences of the “ground-level” actors studied here and their effects on the CARC are 
identical to everyone involved in the CARC. Rather, I believe that their study can reveal 
larger patterns within the Crisis. I use the multiple case studies approach outlined by 
Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack to analyze the Central American Crisis “within each 
setting and across settings.”46 
My second assumption stems from my belief in the validity of oral history to 
providing a fuller account of the past. As discussed above, oral interviews CARC 
participants conducted decades after the crisis are a crucial set of sources for my 
dissertation. I use them to add context and extra detail to my writing, while pairing them 
with the more traditional archival and secondary sources that are fundamental to a 
historian’s trade. 
The main limitation surrounding my dissertation lies in sourcing difficulties. A 
number of governmental archives remain closed, particularly those regarding the 
American Baptist Churches case and the INS’s covert investigation into the Sanctuary 
Movement known as “Operation Sojourner.” Exacerbating these is the general reluctance 
by government officials, particularly government lawyers, to discuss their experiences 
during the Central American Refugee Crisis. I have sought to overcome these difficulties 
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through Freedom of Information Act Requests, use of governmental quotes from 
newspaper articles, and a few interviews with responsive governmental participants. 
Refugee interviewees have proved similarly difficult to locate. Many of the refugees 
involved used, out of fear for their and their families’ lives, pseudonyms during the 
CARC. Locating them has proved enormously difficult. Much like governmental 
officials, I have relied on published interviews conducted during the CARC and accounts 
from activists I have interviewed. 
The other limitation lies in my lack of fluency in French. My fourth chapter 
examines the border crisis along the New York/Quebec border and a knowledge of 
French would have been useful when in the archives at the Bibliothéque et Archives du 
Québec. Therefore I relied on Quebec’s English-language newspapers, Canadian 
governmental reports generated in English and translations of other archival sources. 
 When selecting my case studies I was careful to operate within the scope of my 
dissertation. All three of my case studies deal with the Central American Refugee Crisis 
in North America. They focus on the formation, effects, and reactions to asylum policy 
during the 1980s and early 1990s in Canada and the United States. I made a conscious 
decision to focus on the asylum policies of the North American countries of Canada and 
the United States at the expense of Mexico. Mexico’s immediate border and cultural ties 
with Guatemala, and close geographic proximity to El Salvador, meant that its asylum 
policy was formulated in response to very different social, economic and political 
realities than Canada and the United States.  
My case studies take a social approach to policy history, emphasizing the ways 
that policy could be transformed from the “bottom-up.” I did not attempt a social history 
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of the Central American Refugee Crisis. Therefore my examination of the ways that the 
Central American Crisis transformed individuals and groups largely takes place within 
the confines of my case studies. Proceeding within the scope laid out and with these 
assumptions and limitations, I am able demonstrate that during the 1980s and early 1990s 
individuals and small groups in Canada and the United States were able to transform, and 
were transformed by, asylum policy during the Central American Refugee Crisis. 
 1.7 Summary and Preview 
 The following chapters of this dissertation examines the Central American 
Refugee Crisis through three different case studies, discussing the ways that “ground-
level” actors transformed and were transformed by the CARC. Two of the case studies 
examine court cases in the US that sprung from the government’s response to the 
Sanctuary Movement, a collection of churches and synagogues that offered sanctuary to 
undocumented Central American migrants. The US government’s decision to infiltrate 
the Movement and bring felony immigration charges against 13 priests, nuns, pastors and 
lay workers backfired. The case generated enormous amounts of publicity for Central 
American refugees, and prompted a number of countersuits against the government. 
Chapter 2 looks at the main court case (United States v. Aguilar et. al.) brought against 
Sanctuary Movement workers, while chapter 3 analyzes the countersuit of over 70 
different religious and refugee aid organizations (American Baptist Churches et al v. 
Thornburgh). It began largely as a suit brought against the government for its violation of 
1st and 5th amendment rights and evolved into an equal protection case that resulted in a 
groundbreaking settlement that changed US asylum policy forever. My final case study, 
chapter 4, goes beyond the Sanctuary Movement to look at the immediate effects of the 
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dramatic changes in Canadian asylum policy in February 1987 on “ground-level” actors 
in the US, highlighting the ways that Canada’s policies affected and were affected by the 
United States. It then uses the consequences of these changes on the small border town of 
Plattsburgh, New York to demonstrate the short and long-term effects of asylum policy 
on individuals and the Plattsburgh community.  
Together, these three case studies reveal the importance of “ground-level” actors 
in the CARC, and how they experienced and affected the crisis and the policies 
surrounding it. Finally, in my conclusion I summarize my findings and discuss directions 
for future research. In this chapter’s second quotation, “Carlos,” a refugee from El 
Salvador, is trapped along the US-Canada border in February 1987. He observes that he 
is “stuck between two great powers.” This study is an analysis of how refugees, activists 
and government officials resisted, negotiated and implemented the asylum and refugee 
policies of the “great powers.” 
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CHAPTER 2 
SANCTUARY ON TRIAL 
"The drafters of the Constitution (and) the law of this land do not permit people to engage 
in criminal acts and then say it was a religious exercise… " – Donald M. Reno Jr., U.S. 
Assistant Attorney General47 
 
“No, I have no regrets. There have been other cases in history where people had to stand 
up to be a Christian.“ Sister Darlene Nicgorski, Sanctuary defendant48 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
Harold Ezell was furious. The newly minted commissioner of the western region 
for the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) had just watched a re-run of an old 
episode of 60 Minutes that vividly demonstrated that for years a group of religious 
activists had publicly and proudly flouted the immigration laws of the United States. The 
program explained that a diverse array of Protestants, Catholics and Jewish clergy and 
laity had come together to form a nationwide organization of houses of worship, known 
as the Sanctuary Movement. For the better half of the decade they had smuggled 
hundreds of Guatemalans and Salvadorans across the border. During that time they 
provided shelter to thousands, hid them from government agents, and encouraged many 
to make asylum claims. Sanctuary Movement activists claimed that civil wars and 
genocides in their home countries forced Central Americans to flee northward, and by 
breaking immigration laws activists chose to obey the commandments of God rather than 
man. Ezell, a deeply religious man, thought the Movement’s rationale blasphemous and 
blatantly partisan, and he vowed to do something about it. Gathering his staff in San 
Pedro, California in early 1984, Ezell demanded action. Ezell’s demand took the form of 
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a nine-month covert investigation codenamed “Operation Sojourner.”49 Implemented 
under the auspices of the Phoenix office’s anti-smuggling division, the investigation 
culminated in felony immigration charges for sixteen clergy and lay workers. The 
government either dropped the charges or settled with five of the defendants. The trial of 
the remaining eleven defendants, popularly known as the “Sanctuary Trial,” became one 
of the INS’ most high profile cases of the decade. Begun October 22, 1985, the trial 
lasted nearly eight months and went on appeal throughout the rest of the decade. After the 
9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of eight of the defendants Ezell 
declared that the ruling “vindicates the government’s position that no one is above the 
law.”50 
Mary Espinosa, one of the eleven defendants in the Sanctuary Trial, felt 
differently about her aid to Central Americans. As she recalls, "I didn't know I was in the 
Sanctuary Movement until I became indicted. Then I was told so by INS. What I thought 
I was doing was what any Christian would do."51 Unaware that her pursuit of the 
religious imperative conflicted with the law, Espinoza thought she was simply following 
her conscience. While she was one of the three exonerated defendants, her participation 
in the Movement did not escape public notice. Shortly after the Trial, someone set fire to 
her home. The police never solved the crime, but they suspected arson. Espinosa was 
convinced that it was due to her Sanctuary activities, noting that she received 17 
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threatening phone calls and letters after her acquittal.52 Looking back on the Sanctuary 
Trial, she called it legally confusing and religiously clarifying. 
Elba Lopez found the situation even more confusing. The widow of a Salvadoran 
union organizer, Sanctuary Movement activists helped her cross the border in October 
1984 with her son, daughter, niece and nephew. She and the children moved to Seattle 
and joined her sister, Pilar Martinez, in sanctuary at University Baptist Church. 
Unbeknownst to her or any of the members of the Sanctuary Movement, her border 
crossing had been the final chapter in Operation Sojourner, for it provided the crucial 
“smoking gun” to incriminate Jim Corbett in the Sanctuary Movement’s illegal activity. 
Less than three months after she crossed the border, INS agents arrested Elba Teresa on 
January of 1985 and named her an unindicted co-conspirator in the Sanctuary Trial. Her 
refusal to take the stand and testify of her border crossing denied the government of the 
crucial evidence it needed to convict defendant Peggy Hutchinson on the charges of 
transporting an illegal alien.53  
These three individuals, a government official, a religious activist, and a Central 
American refugee are representative of the three different groups involved in the 
Sanctuary Trial. Their participation in the Trial dramatically affected its outcome and the 
Trial dramatically affected their lives. One of the most public spectacles of the Central 
American Refugee Crisis, the Trial introduced millions to the Sanctuary Movement and 
the Central American Refugee Crisis. This chapter argues that the actions of individuals 
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and small groups had a range of effects on the investigation of the Sanctuary Movement 
and the Trial, and that the two, as an investigation, court case and public spectacle, had 
dramatic effects on the CARC in Canada and the United States.  
2.2 Sources and Historiographical Context: 
  A contemporary and fascinating example of the confrontation between church and 
state, the Sanctuary Trial has been the subject of an impressive array of academic and 
journalistic studies from a variety of different angles over the past twenty-five years.  
These include in-depth media coverage of the Trial’s events,54 legal discourse analyses,55 
examinations of social movement activism,56 and law articles on the struggle between 
church and state.57 I draw on this sizeable body of work, but differentiate myself by 
focusing on a range of individuals, from government official to activist to migrant, who 
transformed and were transformed by the Trial.  My primary sources come from archives 
at the University of Arizona, University of Washington and Claremont Theological 
Union, oral interviews conducted by myself and others, a variety of newspaper and 
magazine articles, and court transcripts. This rich collection of primary and secondary 
sources offers me the opportunity to probe the personal and public motivations for 
participants’ actions. Also, it helps me explore the ways that their actions affected each 
other and the crisis. 
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2.3 Outline: 
 The remainder of this chapter will be divided into five sections. The first three 
will chronologically cover the formation of the Sanctuary Movement and Operation 
Sojourner (2.4), the six-month period between the indictments and the Trial (2.5) and the 
Trial itself (2.6). Each of these sections will highlight how one or two migrants, activists 
or government officials affected the Sanctuary Movement and the Sanctuary Trial. The 
next section (2.7) examines the ways that the Sanctuary Trial affected the lives of 
defendant Darlene Nicgorski, government prosecutor Donald Reno and Alejandro 
Gomez,58 one of the Central American witnesses. The next section (2.8) analyzes how 
Operation Sojourner, the Trial, and its aftermath affected the CARC locally and 
nationally. Finally, the conclusion (2.9) brings together the material discussed in the 
chapter and looks at the event’s effects on the CARC internationally.  
2.4 The Movement and the Operation: 
The traditional narrative on the beginnings of the Sanctuary Movement relies on 
two pivotal figures from southern Arizona, Jim Corbett and John Fife. Corbett, a Quaker 
goat herder and Fife, a Presbyterian minister, had extensive backgrounds in activism. An 
avid believer in social justice, Corbett’s first brush with activism came at the age of 13. 
Working as a store clerk in Yellowstone during the summer of 1947, Corbett objected to 
the unjust firing of a fellow camp worker and threatened to quit unless his coworker’s job 
was restored. Initially the rest of the staff joined him, but they ultimately decided to stay 
quiet and resume work. Corbett did not. His activism cost him his job, revealing a 
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stubbornness that manifested itself decades later in the Sanctuary Movement.59 Fife, who 
had assumed the ministry of Tucson’s Southside Presbyterian in 1970, had marched with 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in Selma and after moving to Tucson quickly became a fixture 
in the social justice community.60 Most accounts of the Sanctuary Movement privilege 
the growing awareness of these two individuals over the course of the first two years of 
the 1980s and place the Movement’s start on March 24, 1982, the date of Southside’s 
formal declaration of Sanctuary. 61 While Fife and Corbett worked closely together to 
create the Movement, these accounts gloss over the centrality of Central Americans to the 
creation and endurance of the Movement. It was not until Fife and Corbett had come into 
close and repeated contact with Central Americans during the early 1980s and heard their 
horror stories, that they began to think of a nationwide Movement. William Westerman in 
his “Life Histories in the Sanctuary Movement” states that the Sanctuary Movement’s 
success “in converting the skeptical and the ‘apolitical’ to a politicized stance… was 
largely due to the strength of a few individuals who learnt to speak out, to bear witness to 
the injustice they had known and were committed to end.”62 Whether it was the few 
Central Americans whose recounting of their lives prompted Corbett, Fife and others to 
formally commence the Movement, or the many Central Americans testimonies during 
the Movement’s operation prompted action, it is clear that individual migrants had an 
enormous effect on the Movement. The Movement, in turn, had an enormous effect on 
US practice and policy towards refugees during the CARC. 
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In addition, recent scholarship on the Movement has uncovered the contributions 
of Central Americans to the very idea of cooperation between North American churches 
and Central American organizations. Susan Bibler Coutin and Hector Perla Jr.’s article 
“Legacies and Origins of the 1980s US-Central American Sanctuary Movement” 
examines the ways that differing Central American organizations in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco “pioneered the strategy of immigrants approaching members of religious 
organizations to collaborate with them in an effort to mobilize the religious 
communities.”63 By the middle of the 1970s, years before Southside Presbyterian 
declared Sanctuary, Central Americans across the country formed organizations like Casa 
El Salvador-Farabundo Martí, Central American Resource Center (CARECEN) and 
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). Some of these 
organizations began giving shelter to recently arrived migrants and encouraging them to 
give public testimonials about the torture, assassinations and genocide in El Salvador and 
Guatemala. This method proved enormously successful in mobilizing support, 
particularly from progressive and religious individuals.  
Following Tucson’s declaration of Sanctuary, many of these Central American 
organizations partnered with interfaith coalitions to encourage more churches to enter the 
Movement.  Central American organizations saw the value in working through churches 
to affect change. They knew that because of their economic, social and political status, 
white middle-class organizations had more influence with policy makers than the oft-
impoverished and sometimes undocumented Salvadorans living in the United States.64 
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 The Movement’s growth included churches, synagogues and individuals of all 
political persuasions. The ideological and regional diversity of the Movement brought a 
new set of problems as participants debated the Movement’s character, purpose and 
goals. In late 1984 the Movement began to split into two factions, identified with the 
cities of Tucson and Chicago.65 Home to the first church to formally declare sanctuary 
and less than seventy miles from the U.S.-Mexico border, many people, especially those 
in the national media, saw Tucson as the epicenter of the Movement. On the front lines of 
the refugee crisis, activists in Tucson smuggled countless numbers of refugees across the 
border and sent them to Canada and other parts of the United States. Also, Tucson 
activists certainly received the most media attention from national and international 
journalists interested in the Movement.  
 Yet Chicago, while far from the border, had become another important center of 
Sanctuary activity. Shortly after the Movement’s founding in 1982 the Tucson 
Ecumenical Council that had taken a leading role in establishing the Sanctuary 
Movement, asked the more politically oriented Chicago Religious Task Force on Central 
America (CRTF) to take over coordination of the Movement. The CRTF approached the 
task with gusto, throwing their well-coordinated political and organizational 
infrastructure behind the task of coordinating hundreds of churches, synagogues, cities 
and private homes across the country. Consistent with its political outlook, Chicago’s 
approach to Sanctuary emphasized the Movement’s potential to influence U.S. foreign 
policy in Central America. When receiving refugees into sanctuary they looked for 
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“politically useful” refugees who could demonstrate the inhumanity of the United States’ 
foreign policy. They believed that only opposition leading to an end of US funding of 
oppressive Central American governments could end the refugee crisis. During the fall 
and winter of 1984 a bitter exchange of letters between leaders in Tucson and Chicago 
were made public, and it seemed that the Movement was on the verge of a permanent 
rupture. Against this background of tension sixteen Sanctuary activists received 
indictments in January 1985. The government hoped that the indictments would stifle the 
Movement, but they actually had the opposite effect. Months before the indictments 
Movement leaders called for a national symposium in Tucson to discuss the theological 
underpinnings of Sanctuary and “to have a ‘come-to-Jesus’ meeting with the Chicago 
Religious Task Force about the deep divisions between [Tucson and Chicago] about the 
very essence of sanctuary.”66 The meeting, set to begin on January 23rd, promised to be 
divisive. The government’s indictments, handed down in early January, changed the 
symposium’s purpose. With the Movement under attack from the outside, the various 
sides rallied together and the symposium transformed into a revival. Originally conceived 
as a small gathering of less than 150 Sanctuary leaders, the symposium ended up hosting 
more than 1200 members. Sanctuary activists from around the country came together to 
lay aside divisions and face the government’s challenge.67 
 Few outsiders knew of the ideological tensions within the Movement. A religious 
community defying the government as a matter of conscience, combined with the riveting 
testimonials given by Central Americans during Sanctuary declarations, proved to be an 
intoxicating mix for reporters from local and national media outlets like The Arizona 
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Daily Star, The Arizona Republic, The New York Times and 60 Minutes. Following the 
indictments in January 1985, the Movement received even more publicity. This will be 
discussed in section 2.7.  
 As mentioned in the opening vignette, INS District Director Harold Ezell learned 
of the Movement in 1984 after viewing a re-run of a 60 Minutes segment on Corbett and 
the Movement. While Ezell remained unaware of Sanctuary’s existence until 1984, 
Border Patrol Agent James Rayburn had observed the Movement’s activities since 1982. 
A highly accomplished investigator and Vietnam War veteran, Rayburn started working 
for the Border Patrol in 1969 and in the anti-smuggling division since 1978. By the mid-
1980s he was a legend and his coworkers were in awe of him. Lee Morgan, an operative 
who was also involved in Operation Sojourner, wrote in his memoir, that “Jim Rayburn 
taught me more about undercover and criminal investigations than I would ever learn in 
all of the combined federal law enforcement academies I attended over the next twenty 
years.”68 In a June 1983 memorandum to the Phoenix INS District Director, Rayburn 
presciently predicted that, “It is now clear that they plan to force U.S. Immigration to take 
them to Court on either harboring charges or transportation charges. The [Sanctuary 
Movement] will then use the trial as their stage to challenge both U.S. policy on Central 
America and Immigration’s policy.”69 Rayburn next sketched out the potential outline of 
an investigation. The memo met with little response, and Rayburn decided to wait for 
more institutional support. Experience had taught him that long-term support for 
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politically sensitive investigations was a fleeting thing without documented requests for 
investigation from highly-placed individuals. Thus while Rayburn kept an eye on the 
Movement and thought of possible strategies to infiltrate it, he busied himself with other 
anti-smuggling cases until Harold Ezell demanded that the INS take action regarding the 
Sanctuary Movement. 
 Ezell’s demand came during a weekly INS staff meeting in late January or early 
February 1984. At that meeting, attended by Harold Ezell, Associate Regional 
Commissioner for Operations Robert Moschorak, Assistant Regional Commissioner for 
Anti-Smuggling, and others, the group resolved to give the go-ahead to Rayburn’s 
investigation.70 A few days later Reed called Robert S. Coffin, the Phoenix area 
supervisor of criminal investigation of alien smuggling. Coffin told Rayburn to find 
someone to infiltrate the Movement. Rayburn already had a man in mind, Jesus Cruz, a 
Mexican citizen and former smuggler, who, after becoming an informant rather than 
being deported, had proved useful to Rayburn in the past. Cruz began his infiltration of 
the Movement in March of 1984 by approaching Father Ramón Quinones of Sacred 
Heart Church in Nogales, Mexico and offering his assistance in any way possible. 
Initially Cruz was only authorized to meet with members of the Movement and establish 
a relationship. It was not until Rayburn received formal authorization under the new 
undercover investigative rules in April 1984 that he granted Cruz permission to further 
infiltrate the Movement, wear a body bug and participate in the border runs that brought 
Central Americans from Mexico to the United States. Also, Rayburn explicitly forbade 
Cruz from recording any religious meetings. In spite of these warnings, Cruz recorded a 
                                                
70 “Pre-Trial Interview with Mark Reed,” 15. Sanctuary Movement Trial Papers, 1982-1988 MS 362, Box 1 
Folder 26, University of Arizona Library, Tucson, AZ. 
   44 
series of conversations prior to the April authorization and a number of Sanctuary prayer 
meetings throughout the year. Rayburn ran the investigation, codenamed “Operation 
Sojourner,” in concert with Donald Reno, a newly appointed special assistant to the US 
attorney whose portfolio exclusively focused on alien smuggling cases. Both had an 
enormous effect on the case. 
As the supervisor, Rayburn oversaw the activities of what became a team of five 
infiltrators. Solomon Graham, another criminal informant, later joined Cruz. Like Cruz, 
Graham was a Mexican citizen who had been involved in a for-profit human smuggling 
ring in the past. Also similar to Cruz, he turned informant after being caught and had 
worked with Rayburn in the past. Neither Cruz nor Graham could be construed as model 
citizens. Indeed, the defense attacked their credibility repeatedly before and during the 
trial. The defense’s investigation of Cruz and Graham turned up allegations of pimping 
on Graham’s part and gun smuggling and parole violations (due to violation of gun laws) 
by Cruz. In spite of, or maybe in part due to, their unsavory pasts, both Cruz and Graham 
proved capable informants. The two of them managed to secretly recorded hundreds of 
hours of Sanctuary Movement conversations.71 Border Patrol agents John Nixon and Lee 
Morgan helped in the investigation, but were not present for the most incriminating 
recordings. While Rayburn had earned a well-deserved reputation as a crack investigator, 
his management of Cruz and Graham opened up the government to a variety of charges 
during the trial. His inability to keep Cruz from violating his parole and recording 
religious services presented problems for Cruz as a witness, but Cruz’s problems were 
nothing compared to Graham’s past. Graham’s odious history completely disqualified 
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him as a witness as no jury would convict a group of religious workers on the words of a 
former pimp. Discussed in section 2.5, the government, by default, turned to Cruz when it 
needed a witness on the stand.72 
 Special Assistant to the US Attorney Donald Reno passionately believed in the 
merits of the investigation and pushed tirelessly for the government to bring charges. A 
number of attorneys in the district office expressed a fair amount of skepticism, 
wondering if the prosecution of Sanctuary workers would serve the government’s 
purpose. They worried that the trial would be turned into a political sideshow and 
questioned the ethics of infiltrating churches to gather evidence against lay and clerical 
workers. Reno pushed ahead and won the support of Mel McDonald, the US attorney for 
Arizona. By the beginning of December 1984, Reno had the political backing to bring a 
series of charges in front of a grand jury. As the framer of the charges, Reno held the 
power over who to prosecute and who to leave as an unindicted co-conspirator. He 
decided to compose a highly varied set of defendants that included some key figures like 
John Fife, Jim Corbett, Darlene Nicgorski and Phil Willis-Conger. Other indicted 
activists included two nuns (Ana Priester and Mary Wadell) who had participated in a 
few runs but were not deeply involved in the Movement. He excluded a variety of logical 
targets including Phil Willis-Conger’s highly involved wife, fearing that together the 
young and attractive married couple would elicit sympathy from the jury.73 The final 
indictment, handed down January 10, 1985, charged 16 individuals with a litany of 
smuggling offenses and named over 50 co-conspirators. Operation Sojourner 
accomplished what Harold Ezell demanded. Ezell had wanted something done, but the 
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meaning of that “something” would be vigorously contested in the coming months as the 
government’s struggle with the Sanctuary Movement transitioned from a covert 
investigation to an open battle in court. 
2.5 From Indictment to Trial 
On January 14th, 1985 a series of well-coordinated raids rocked the Sanctuary 
Movement across the nation from Seattle to Tucson to Rochester. In Seattle, WA two 
border patrol agents and their female secretary knocked on the door of an apartment on 
2900 S. King Street. Maria Teresa Lopez, a Salvadoran who had been in sanctuary with 
University Baptist Church for two years answered the door, after which she, along with 
her sister Elba Teresa Lopez, and five of their children were taken into custody.74 Similar 
arrests took place in Phoenix, Philadelphia and Rochester, NY as the government 
rounded up over 60 migrants to testify against the 16 indicted members of the Sanctuary 
Movement. 
While arresting more than 60 Central Americans, the government sent summons 
to 16 Sanctuary activists to appear in court on January 23rd, coincidentally the first day of 
the Sanctuary Movement symposium. Unlike the Central Americans arrested on January 
14th, none of the activists of them were taken into custody. The government decided they 
were not flight risks and asked the activists to appear before a federal judge on January 
23rd. There the government charged them with 70 counts including smuggling, 
harboring/shielding, concealing and encouraging the entry of illegal aliens. The 
government added the charges of conspiracy to commit these acts and aiding/abetting 
                                                
74 Criminal Investigator Ronald R. Straub. Memorandum on Maria Teresa Lopez and Elba Teresa Lopez, 
January 15, 1985. Sanctuary Movement Trial Papers, 1982-1988 MS 362, Box 6 Folder 8, University of 
Arizona Library, Tucson, AZ. 
   47 
unlawful entry.75 The indicted were: Maria Socorro Aguilar, Father Tony Clark, James 
Corbett, Phillip Conger, Cecilia del Carmen Juarez de Emery, Mary Espinoza, Pastor 
John Fife, Katherine Flaherty, Peggy Hutchinson, Wendy Le Win, Nena MacDonald, 
Bertha Martel-Benavidez, Sister Darlene Nicgorski, Father Ramon Dagoberto Quinones, 
Sister Ana Priester and Sister Mary Waddell. An eclectic group, the indicted included 
two Mexican citizens, a Presbyterian minister, three Catholic nuns, a Catholic priest, a 
resident alien and six private American citizens.  
By the time the trial started, the government had settled or dropped its charges 
against five of the sixteen activists. Juarez de Emery’s case was separated from the others 
as it soon became clear that she was using the Sanctuary Movement as a way to reduce 
the costs of smuggling immigrants to the United States. Charging the equivalent of 
approximately $800 to smuggle people from El Salvador to Phoenix, Emery was included 
in the original indictment to emphasize the Movement’s criminality. She quickly settled 
her case.76 Similarly, Martel-Benavidez’s case was quickly settled. A Salvadoran whose 
involvement with the Sanctuary Movement primarily rested on her friendship with 
Socorro Aguilar, during Operation Sojourner she used government agent Jesus Cruz to 
smuggle in members of her family.77 After lead prosecutor Donald Reno learned of Sister 
Ana Priester’s Hodgkin’s Disease he asked the court to drop charges against Priester and 
Sister Mary Waddell, as she would be Priester’s primary caregiver. Neither of the nuns 
wanted their charges dropped as both wanted to stand trial with the others. Nonetheless, 
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the government dropped the charges.78 When the trial began on October 23, 1985 the 
remaining defendants chose to be tried together. They were Aguilar, Clark, Corbett, 
Conger, Espinoza, Fife, Flaherty, Hutchinson, Le Win, Nicgorski and Quinones. Rather 
than listing all the defendants, the court recorder and public followed precedent by 
arranging the defendants alphabetically and using the last name of the first defendant. 
The case became United States v. Aguilar et. al or, as more popularly known, the 
“Sanctuary Trial.”79 
During the nine months separating the indictments and the defendants’ first day in 
court, the defense, prosecution and judge wrestled over the nature of the trial. Was it a 
simple anti-smuggling case, as the government argued, or was it a trial of 
humanitarianism vs. legalism, as the defense argued? In addition, what type of evidence 
would be allowed and what types of defenses could the defense use? After debating these 
topics for weeks the judge assigned to the case, the Honorable Earl H. Carroll, made a 
series of decisions that had a dramatic effect on the case and, in turn, the Central 
American Refugee Crisis.  
 The bulk of these decisions emanated from motions filed by lead prosecutor 
Donald Reno, the most important of which was the motion in limine. Though used 
sporadically throughout the twentieth century, government prosecutors had recently 
recognized the value of this legal strategy.80 Originally created for defendants, the motion 
in limine is a pretrial motion that asks the sitting judge to exclude any evidence that 
would be prejudicial to the jury. Prosecutors found it an effective strategy for preventing 
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defendants from using evidence and defenses that might keep the government from 
winning its case. In the Sanctuary Trial Reno asked the judge to exclude any legal 
defenses that would allow the Sanctuary lawyers to argue for the innocence of their 
clients based on what Reno thought to be illegitimate grounds. This included evidence on 
the legitimacy of Central Americans as refugees (and international law concerning the 
treatment of refugees), evidence on the religious beliefs of the defendants and evidence 
on the defendants’ lack of knowledge that the people they were transporting were illegal. 
Reno’s believed that without these exclusions the court proceedings would be an 
opportunity for the Sanctuary Movement to place the government’s Central American 
policy on trial.81 
 Carroll concurred and went further than Reno’s original proposal. Whereas Reno 
had only asked that the court preclude any defenses based on free exercise of religion, 
ignorance of the law, or personal conscience, Carroll ruled that any evidence in support 
of these defenses was inadmissible. Not only were the defendants forbidden from 
discussing how their religious and personal convictions led them to help immigrants, they 
could not use any evidence that referenced these beliefs or the conditions in Central 
America that led to refugees fleeing north.82 Carroll expressed concern that the trial could 
easily take on a “circus… or a carnival atmosphere” and therefore decided to set strict 
boundaries regarding what would and would not be permitted in his courtroom.83 While 
Carroll’s concern regarding the attention and passion the case would attract was 
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legitimate, his solution did not result in a composed court. Rather, his decision to 
preclude a whole range of defenses, arguments and a substantial amount of evidence 
dramatically affected the trial in two ways: #1 By forcing the defense to scramble to 
create a coherent defense and #2 by setting up the conditions for a series of dramatic 
confrontations between the judge, defense and prosecution that lasted throughout the 
trial. 
 Worse yet for the defendants, Carroll’s decisions regarding evidence came in two 
waves. His first decision, made relatively early during pretrial motions, precluded 
defenses based on the defendants’ religious beliefs and that enforcement of immigration 
laws would impinge on the defendants’ religious freedom. Three days before jury 
empanelment, Carroll further excluded defenses based on international law, defendants’ 
belief that those they were helping were legitimate refugees, defendants’ understanding 
of US immigration laws and necessity or duress.84 On top of this decision, days before 
the Trial began prosecutor Donald Reno chose to shift his legal strategy from a reliance 
on the use of the hundreds of hours of covert surveillance garnered during Operation 
Sojourner to one that relied on the courtroom testimony of government operatives and the 
Central Americans who had been helped by the Sanctuary Movement. Therefore, he 
decided not to submit the tapes as evidence, fearing that they could be used to educate the 
jury on the religious and humanitarian reasons for Sanctuary. The defense had counted on 
using these tapes when preparing their defense.85 These two decisions, coming so close to 
the beginning of the trial, forced the defendants’ lawyers to reformulate the majority of 
their legal strategy. Michael Altman, attorney for Darlene Nicgorski, stated that “(w)ith 
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this ruling, much defense preparation was rendered useless. Worse yet, because Carroll’s 
rulings denuded the defendants’ lawyers of their substantive defenses, they relied, almost 
entirely, on jury selection and legal cunning for their deliverance.”86  
The rapid change in legal strategy, coupled with Carroll’s extensive motions, 
crippled the defense from the start. Some of the defense lawyers, like Karen Snell, 
believe to this day that the case was lost during the pretrial motions.87 Prior to her 
participation in the Sanctuary Trial, Snell worked on the appeal of another sanctuary 
case. In May 1984 Stacey Lynn Merkt, a Sanctuary Movement worker in Texas, had been 
convicted of transporting two undocumented Salvadorans. Snell appealed Merkt’s case, 
arguing that Merkt did not know the migrants were illegal because she thought them to be 
legitimate refugees.88 In June 1985, during the Sanctuary Trial’s pre-trial period, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Merkt’s conviction. Carroll’s pretrial 
motions squashed any hope of using this defense. Throughout the pretrial period the 
defense unsuccessfully filed motions for a mistrial or dismissal of the case on the grounds 
of Carroll’s bias, the unfairness of his rulings or the selective prosecution of the 
Sanctuary Movement. During the actual Trial the defense repeated this tactic to no avail. 
Carroll denied each of these motions.89 
 Both Judge Carroll and Donald Reno had a dramatic effect on the case through 
their actions during the pre-trial period. Carroll’s decision to go further than Reno’s 
motions and exclude any evidence relating to religious freedom, international law, 
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mistaken assumption and ignorance of the law kept the defense from using a legal 
technique that had worked for an earlier Sanctuary case. By deciding to forego the use of 
the investigation’s tapes and introducing the pre-trial motions to exclude evidence, Reno 
put the defense off-balance from the start and effectively prevented Sanctuary activists 
from using the tapes to present their reasons for breaking the law. Finally, as discussed in 
the following section, Carroll’s decisions had a domino-like effect on the case, effectively 
muzzling Sanctuary activists and Central American witnesses from testifying about the 
conditions in Central America and their reasons for granting Sanctuary. 
2.6 The Trial 
 Though the motion in limine dramatically affected the defense’s strategy pre-trial, 
the full effects of Carroll’s actions did not become apparent until the defense and 
prosecution attempted operate within the constraints Carroll set up in his pretrial rulings. 
As the defense began its opening statements, it quickly became clear that in spite of 
Carroll’s desire to harshly delineate the shape of the trial, the defense was committed to 
introducing the conditions in Central America and the defendants’ religious beliefs 
whenever possible. During the defense’s opening statements, Carroll interrupted the 
lawyers a number of times, reminding them of his rulings and warning them not to violate 
them. The defense complained, arguing that Carroll’s interruption of the defense but not 
the prosecution demonstrated his bias towards the prosecution.90 Carroll ignored their 
complaints and the trial proceeded. The court transformed into a battleground as the 
defense skirted the line between Carroll’s pretrial rulings and their desire to discuss the 
Sanctuary Movement’s motivations. Observers noted that the combination of defense 
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lawyers convinced of the righteousness of their clients, a crusading prosecuting attorney 
and a feisty judge led to a combative courtroom.91  
Others picked up on the tension in the courtroom as well. As the atmosphere grew 
more poisonous and confrontational, the media’s coverage morphed from covering the 
issues of the Trial to obsessing over who “won” particular days. Though this increased 
media coverage, many activists worried that the media’s day-to-day scoring of the case 
obscured the Trial’s larger issues: the contest over the refugee and immigration policy of 
the United States. As discussed in section 2.8 others found a way to use the media’s 
interest to their advantage. 
In the midst of the media firestorm the Trial continued. The government called a 
variety of witnesses to the stand in hopes of demonstrating the guilt of the accused 
Sanctuary activists. These witnesses included Central American refugees, INS agents and 
Jesus Cruz. For 23 days Cruz, government informant and the prosecution’s star witness, 
took the stand. Reno’s decision to forego any use of the Operation Sojourner tapes meant 
that the government’s case depended heavily on Cruz’s testimony of his conversations, 
meetings and border crossings with the Sanctuary Trial defendants. First, Donald Reno 
examined him, asking him to recount step by step his dealings with the defendants, as the 
prosecution used Cruz’s testimony to sketch out the movement of Central Americans 
across the U.S.- Mexico border. Reno’s interview of the star witness did not go as 
planned. The defense demanded that Cruz use English, his second language, in any 
testimony concerning meetings and conversations conducted in English. Surprisingly, 
Carroll agreed with the defense.  
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Cruz had difficulty on the stand, speaking a broken and stumbling English. The 
defense aggressively cross-examined him, attacking his credibility as a witness. First, 
they asked Cruz to go over his testimony again, demonstrating that when pushed Cruz 
often had difficulty recalling the most basic facts about his meetings with the Sanctuary 
Movement. They next forced Cruz to discuss the financial and political incentives for his 
participation in Operation Sojourner, revealing that he received nearly $18,000 for his 
role and insinuating that his participation meant Cruz would be protected from 
deportation. The defense continued its attempt to impeach Cruz, highlighting his criminal 
background as a human smuggler from 1977-1980. Finally, the defense emphasized the 
differences between Cruz’s memory of Operation Sojourner and the investigation’s 
documentary record.92 The defense ended its cross examination confident that it had 
severely undermined, if not destroyed, Cruz’s credibility. In the end, Cruz’s flawed 
nonetheless lay the foundation for the eventual conviction of the eight defendants, even 
though Cruz failed to impress either the jury or the press.93 Though few jurors viewed 
Cruz with sympathy, his testimony provided the essential outlines of the intentions of the 
Sanctuary Movement. As discussed in 2.6 the jurors, in the end, decided that the very 
concept of Sanctuary was illegal.  
While Cruz offered the grounds to convict the Sanctuary activists, his cross-
examination gave the defense the opportunity to lead him into answers that discussed the 
conditions in Central America and the religious motivations of Sanctuary workers. 
Similarly, the defense’s cross-examination of the 15 Central Americans that the 
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government called to the stand gave them the opportunity to discuss the background to 
the case. It helped that many of the Central Americans who testified were quite 
sympathetic to the Sanctuary workers.  
 A dramatic example of this is the testimony of Alejandro Gomez. A 46 year-old 
Salvadoran former labor leader, Gomez had entered the United States with the help of the 
Sanctuary Movement. On January 14, 1985 the INS arrested Gomez in Rochester, NY 
where he was in Sanctuary. As he testified under cross-examination, Gomez stated that 
he left El Salvador “because I could be killed.”94 Immediately, prosecutor Donald Reno 
objected that Gomez’s statement fell outside the bounds carefully proscribed by Carroll. 
The judge agreed and had the statement stricken from the record. Gomez’s reference to 
the conditions in Central America was only one of many that the defense managed to 
have voiced in the courtroom, even if they were ruled to be inadmissible. The fact that the 
court consistently proscribed testimony about the circumstances of migrants’ entry into 
the United States troubled and confused the jury. In addition, many reported to be 
unhappy with the unruly atmosphere in the courtroom as disputes between the judge, 
defense and prosecutor erupted up in court. Even when sent out before the fireworks 
began, the jury anticipated what was about to happen. One juror, Dennis Davis, 
commented that the jury was sent out to such an extent that “we would joke, ‘Here we go, 
we’re getting our exercise…’ Sometimes it felt like they could hardly get the door closed 
before there was going to be a donnybrook. The electricity was there.”95 
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Gomez and many of the other Central American witnesses did their best to derail 
Reno’s strategy of denying the jury evidence of what was happening in Central America. 
The refugees’ testimonies proved frustrating for Reno, who claimed repeatedly that the 
witnesses were intentionally sabotaging the case as they sympathized with the 
defendants.96 Nonetheless, these testimonies proved crucial for conviction as they shored 
up the inconsistencies in Cruz’s testimony and gave Reno the material necessary to make 
a sweeping closing statement. 
Reno ended up making that statement much earlier than he expected due to a 
difficult decision by the defense in March 1986. A series of intense meetings during the 
government’s presentation of its case between the defendants and their lawyers resulted 
in an radical decision. During the meetings the lawyers argued that testimony by the 
defendants would result in nothing more than providing the government with the 
evidence it needed to convict. The defendants were split. Most of them sided with the 
lawyers. Others, including Darlene Nicgorski and Peggy Hutchinson, desperately wanted 
to take the stand. Outraged at what they saw as Carroll and Reno’s willful obfuscation of 
the truth about the Sanctuary Movement and Central American migrants, Nicgorski and 
Hutchinson wanted to testify directly on their motivations for helping migrants and the 
conditions in Central America. They were less concerned about their eventual fate and 
more concerned about having an opportunity to tell their story. The lawyers countered 
that Carroll’s restrictions would muzzle the defendants and the actions of the few 
defendants who wanted to take the stand would endanger the others. In addition, those 
who took the stand and continued to try to testify on subjects Carroll had excluded would 
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be found in contempt of court.97 After substantial conversation, the defense decided that 
presenting a case would do more harm than good. On March 14, 1986, days after the 
government had finished its presentation, the defense lawyers for each client rose one by 
one and rested their case.98 Shocked, Judge Carroll adjourned the court, stating that 
“There is no Sanctuary Defense,” a statement that earned another round of futile attempts 
by the defense to have Carroll withdraw from the case or declare a mistrial.99 After the 
defense left the court, lawyer Michael Altman spoke to the press, saying, “Why attend the 
football game when the score is 27-0”?100 
The Trial moved on to the next stage as the defense and prosecution offered 
suggestions to the judge over instructions for the jury’s deliberation. The instructions 
were critical in a case like this, as they would direct the jury what were the correct 
grounds for conviction for over 70 counts. For a few days the mood in the courtroom 
lightened as the judge, prosecution and defense engaged in very little of the fireworks 
that had characterized the trial for the past few months. Controversy erupted once again 
after Carroll announced his rulings on jury instructions. Of the 126 suggestions that the 
defense had provided, Carroll had only taken two of them. Defense lawyers Bates Butler 
and Jim Brosnahan could barely contain themselves as they skirted the line between 
expressing their unhappiness and contempt of court.101 In one telling exchange between 
Brosnahan and Carroll long-simmering tempers exploded: 
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Mr. Brosnahan:… I cannot understand why Your Honor would fashion the last 
paragraph of Instruction 38 (change to 11496) unless Your Honor has, as I believe 
you do, a strong desire in this case to see a conviction, which is inconsistent with 
your function as a judge. 
And I determine that sadly. I determined it in an unhappy fashion, because I have 
a lot of respect for the federal courts and what they are supposed to do. But I did 
want Your Honor to know, that I, at least, understand what Your Honor is trying 
to do in this courtroom. And on behalf of my client I object to it. I have not seen 
anything like this in all my days of practice. 
The Court: Perhaps none of us are too old to learn, Mr. Brosnahan. 
Mr. Brosnahan: I'm not too old to fight, I'll tell you that. 
The Court: Well, maybe you are too weak. 
Mr. Brosnahan: No, I'm not too weak either. 
The Court: Maybe it is too late. 
Mr. Walker: I take exception-- 
Mr. Brosnahan: Not too late, either.102  
 
In their analysis of Carroll’s influence on the trial, communication scholars Kathryn and 
Clark Olson argue that the content and the form of “(t)he judge’s instructions virtually 
foreclosed any verdict other than conviction.”103 In his instructions Carroll carefully 
reminded the jury of their solemn oath to follow the law rather than their own prejudices, 
sympathies or opinions. Carroll gave each juror a written copy of his instructions, telling 
them that they should avoid writing on them. Throughout the two week deliberation the 
jurors referred to these notes time and time again to the point that to many of the jurors 
the notes became a part of the law, rather than instructions on how to refer to the law. 
When looking back on their reliance on the judge’s notes, juror Lynn Cobb states that “I 
just think we went overboard by following them too closely.”104 Only the closing 
arguments for the prosecution and defense remained. The defense hoped that in spite of 
the less than advantageous instructions they could plant a seed of doubt in the mind of the 
jury during closing arguments. 
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As is traditional, the prosecution went first. Meticulously detailing each 
government charge, Reno’s closing argument lasted three days. Reno did his utmost to 
ensure that his closing argument was a thorough but dry recitation of facts, stressing that 
the case was a matter of law and not of emotion. In contrast, the defense poured the 
passion pent up over the course of nearly a year of trying to negotiate Carroll’s 
restrictions into their closing arguments. Each lawyer came before the court, presenting 
the reasons, both moral and legal, that his or her client should be acquitted. Chief among 
their strategies was to contrast the character of each of the defendants with that of Jesus 
Cruz, asking the jury if they would rely on Jesus Cruz to make the most important 
decision of the defendants’ lives.105 Following the defenses’ arguments, Reno gave a 
rebuttal dramatically different than his closing. While his closing argument dryly outlined 
the legal arguments for conviction, Reno’s rebuttal passionately defended the supremacy 
of the law of the United States, imploring the jury “to have the courage to come out, look 
these people in the eye as I have done and tell them there is no higher law than that 
passed by Congress...”106 
At 1 PM on Thursday April 17, 1986, the jury began its deliberations. They lasted 
fourteen days. As its first order of business the jury selected Catherine Shaeffer as its 
forewoman, the woman whose political affiliation had been mistakenly identified as 
Democrat, rather than Republican. This turned out to be pivotal as Ms. Shaeffer 
repeatedly used her position during the deliberations to stress the precedence of the law 
over emotions.107 Many of the jurors found the decision to convict a difficult one. Some 
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jurors, like Janice Estes, wondered aloud if this was the correct decision, “So we’re going 
to hang these people for helping other people?”108 Nonetheless, after persistent cajoling 
by Shaeffer, the jurors reached a series of decisions that led to convictions. They returned 
again and again to Carroll’s instructions and decided to forego their emotions. Referring 
back to their notes, they looked for specific evidence of illegal actions and decided to let 
their respect for the law overrule their disgust with Jesus Cruz. On May 1, 1986 the judge 
called the defense back into court and the jury announced its verdict. After days of 
deliberation the jurors decided that they had enough evidence of illegality to convict eight 
of the eleven defendants: Maria Socorro Aguilar, John Fife, Darlene Nicgorski, Ramon 
Dagoberto Quinones, Peggy Hutchinson, Wendy Le Win, Tony Clark and Phillip 
Conger.109 
The convicted defendants returned to court one month after the verdict for 
sentencing. During the intervening month concerned priests, nuns, veterans, lawyers, 
doctors and others, as well as 47 members of Congress, wrote to Judge Carroll. They 
pleaded leniency in his sentencing and Carroll listened.110 Before he could deliver the 
sentences each defendants had the right to make a final statement free of Carroll’s 
restrictions right before sentencing. In turn, each defendant rose and gave a stinging 
rebuke to the judge’s behavior, the United States’ foreign policy and the INS’s 
inhumanity towards Central American migrants. Their statements lasted so long that 
Carroll pushed sentencing for the final three defendants to the next day. Carroll listened 
dispassionately to each defendant and issued his sentences. Their leniency surprised the 
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defendants. Each sentenced called for suspended probation for a period ranging from 
three to five years. The terms of their probation primarily focused on immigration law, 
and Carroll threatened prolonged jail sentences to any defendant convicted of similar 
violations of immigration law. Carroll received the last word in sentencing where he told 
the defendants to pursue their objectives within the constraints of the law and an 
immigration system that had, to his mind, worked for 200 years.111 
Maria Socorro Aguilar, John Fife, Darlene Nicgorski, Ramon Dagoberto 
Quinones, Peggy Hutchinson, Wendy Le Win, Tony Clark and Phillip Conger did not 
believe that the system worked. Neither did their acquitted co-defendants, other members 
of the Sanctuary Movement or many of the Americans who, as a result of the Sanctuary 
Trial, learned of the Central American Refugee Crisis for the first time. As discussed in 
sections 2.7 and 2.8, the Sanctuary Movement Trial led to massive changes in the lives of 
the participants and the CARC that belied Carroll’s belief in the system. 
2.7 The Effect of the Trial on Participants 
 On June 2, 1986 eight of the Sanctuary defendants emerged from the courtroom 
with a new label, felons. The year and a half ordeal of the Trial, as well as the verdict, 
changed them forever. Using a representative member of each of the three groups of 
ground-level actors, the following section examines the way that the Sanctuary Trial 
affected the lives of those who participated in it. They are activist Darlene Nicgorski, 
Central American migrant Alejandro Gomez and government prosecutor Donald Reno. 
Unlike Jim Corbett or John Fife, Sister Darlene Nicgorski did not need the stories 
of Central American migrants to learn of the horrific violence in Guatemala and El 
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Salvador. She had lived it. In the summer of 1980 Nicgorski arrived in Guatemala where 
she served as a missionary for a little over a year. Her work came to an abrupt end after 
the assassination of Father Tulio Maruzzo, the local parish priest. Braving the death 
threats directed at her, Sister Nicgorski waited until Maruzzo’s funeral to leave 
Guatemala. She spent a year working with refugees along the Mexico-Guatemala border 
until she returned to the United States in 1982.112 During her convalescence in Phoenix 
from an illness caught while working along the border, Nicgorski started working with 
the Central Americans in the United States. Her work brought her in contact with 
members of the Sanctuary Movement, and by 1983 she worked full-time as a paid 
coordinator for the Movement. On January 14, 1985, the day the government handed 
down the indictments, Nicgorski was at a retreat in Michigan. She recalls that upon 
returning from a hike a small group ushered her into a conference room. There they told 
her that she had been charged with a variety of smuggling crimes and, if convicted, 
would face years of jail.113 
After a few days of prayer and reflection, Nicgorski returned to Tucson and began 
the year and a half long ordeal of pretrial, trial, deliberations and sentencing. Passionate 
about the conditions in Central America and eager to use the trial as an opportunity to 
publicize them, she found the time in the courtroom infuriating. Due to Carroll’s 
restrictions, any comments regarding Central America or the Movement’s 
religious/humanitarian basis were verboten. In response she began to work outside. Using 
every opportunity she could in the midst of a busy court schedule, Nicgorski gave 
hundreds of interviews and community speeches concerning the Central America 
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Refugee Crisis around the country.114 When the jury came back with a guilty verdict on 
May 1, 1986, Nicgorski was unsurprised. Based on the behavior of the judge and the 
draconian restrictions on evidence, she expected nothing else. Yet, the verdict caused her 
to reflect:  “The next two months I tried to prepare myself for the prospect of prison, 
however one does that. Prison is supposed to be the ultimate unfreedom, the worst curse 
of society. What I experienced was a sense of great inner freedom that I had never known 
before... I sensed that I had to begin to deal with my own oppression- I needed to pick up 
my own struggle...”115 
Sister Nicgorski soon realized that part of the oppression in her own life came 
from the patriarchal structure of the Catholic Church. A little over one year after the 
verdict she made the difficult decision to seek dispensation from her vows. Nicgorski felt 
that it was impossible to speak out against the injustice she had seen while in Guatemala 
and during the Trial, within the constraints of the church. She left the church with only 
$1,000 to her name. Her felony conviction made it difficult to secure work, but Nicgorski 
used her Spanish skills to become an English as a Second Language teacher. Soon she 
began independent consulting with businesses that hired a substantial number of Spanish-
speaking workers, trying to bridge the cultural gaps between employers and employees. 
This led to a career in human resources, a field she worked in until her retirement on July 
1, 2011.116  
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As Nicgorski and the other defendants dealt with the aftereffects of the Trial, the 
arrest of the more than 60 Central Americans as a result of Operation Sojourner 
immediately placed them in danger of deportation. Most of the refugees had entered the 
country illegally and now had to apply for asylum. Due to privacy laws, the dizzying 
array of pseudonyms used by those involved and the routine destruction of records, it is 
impossible to determine the fate of all of those involved. Nonetheless, the experience of 
Alejandro Gomez, who remained in the public record following the trial, is instructive. 
Gomez and his wife were first taken into custody in the original round of arrests 
on January 14, 1985. The same day an anonymous donor posted the $3,000 bail needed 
for his release, and his wife was released on her own recognizance. They had been living 
in sanctuary in Rochester, NY’s Downtown United Presbyterian since June of 1984. 
Shortly after their release from custody, Gomez and his wife applied for asylum. As the 
typical asylum process took more than a year, they reentered sanctuary at Downtown 
United and waited for a subpoena for the Sanctuary Trial.117 A little more than a year 
after his arrest, the government called Gomez and his wife to the stand in the Sanctuary 
Trial. His testimony and cross-examination, discussed in section 2.6, caused an uproar. 
Carroll immediately sent the jury out after Gomez stated that he did not want to go back 
to El Salvador because he feared that he could be killed. In addition, Gomez elicited 
strong emotions from the defendants, as when he personally thanked Maria Soccoro 
Aguilar while on the stand for giving him and his family shelter when they needed it 
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most.118  After his and his wife’s testimony he returned to sanctuary in Rochester and 
waited for his asylum hearing. 
On May 23, 1986, less than six months after his testimony and two weeks after 
the guilty verdict, the INS arrested Gomez and his wife once again. Though the Gomez’s 
were still waiting for their asylum hearing, federal authorities justified their arrest on 
national security grounds, stating that they had received new information that indicated 
Alejandro had serious communist ties. These included trips to Cuba, Moscow and various 
Eastern-bloc countries. The arrests galvanized Rochester’s sanctuary committee as they 
tried to raise the $50,000 bail. The city’s main newspaper, the Democrat and Chronicle, 
accorded the arrests front-page coverage and continued to follow Gomez’s case for the 
next two months. The Democrat and Chronicle continued its coverage of Gomez 
throughout the next two months, devoting front page space to Gomez’s case on May 24, 
26 and 28, and July 15 and 16 with a number of other articles scattered throughout the 
paper.119 The stories reveal that Gomez enjoyed substantial support among the Rochester 
religious community as they raised a $50,000 bail within two days of his arrest. He had 
not revealed his former communist ties to Sanctuary workers or his lawyer prior to the 
government’s accusations, stating that his ties did not extend beyond the 1960s and were 
far in the past. The government alleged that he had returned to Cuba for training in 1972, 
a claim that he denied. 
Following two months of legal wrangling, Gomez and his family fled to Canada 
as it became evident that neither he nor his family would receive asylum. In Canada they 
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lived in Fort Erie and volunteered in support of refugees along the New York/Ontario 
border during the border crisis that developed in early 1987 (the subject of chapter 4). 
Gomez and Rochester Sanctuary providers noted the timing of his second arrest: it came 
less than 15 days after the verdict in the Sanctuary Trial and alleged that once the 
government secured the result it was looking for in the Trial, they felt free to move 
against the migrants the Movement helped. Gomez’s original arrest as part of Operation 
Sojourner made him a much more public figure and an easier target for subsequent 
prosecution. As a result of a 15-20 year old affiliation with the Communist Party in Cuba, 
he was arrested and on the verge of being denied asylum, thus forcing him to flee to 
Canada. Though other Central Americans like Maria Teresa Lopez picked up in 
Operation Sojourner were successful in their bid for asylum, others, like Alejandro 
Gomez, found the heightened profile dangerous and were forced to make drastic changes 
in their lives.120 
As would be expected, government prosecutor Donald Reno’s thoughts on the 
Movement and the Trial differed from those of Nicgorski and Gomez. Where the activist 
and refugee saw a group of religious people trying to follow their conscience, Reno saw a 
dangerous conspiracy to subvert the law of the United States. In his opening statement 
Reno argued that the foundation of the case rested on the question, “are we going to have 
two Immigration Services? Are we going to have one that has been duly constituted, 
controlled and funded by the federal government or are we going to have a secondary and 
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perhaps a third and a fourth immigration service funded and controlled and created by the 
defendants here and their colleagues across the country?”121 Reno’s work prosecuting the 
Sanctuary Movement led him to question his membership in the Methodist church. After 
hearing of the denomination leadership’s condoning of Sanctuary, Reno publicly 
speculated on whether he needed to “rethink my Methodist heritage.”122 
While Reno deeply believed in the righteousness of his cause, to the point of 
questioning his church membership, he found the burden of Operation Sojourner and the 
Sanctuary Trial quite heavy. The secretive nature of the investigation and lack of support 
from his superiors made the process of conducting Operation Sojourner an exhausting 
one. Reno found the Trial even more taxing. Due to the defendants’ varied roles in the 
Movement and their decision to stand trial together, Reno had to weave together a 
common narrative that tied together eleven very different individuals in the face of a 
ferocious legal team themselves convinced of the righteousness of their clients. He called 
the entire process, from the beginning  “a very grueling experience… a tremendous 
imposition on me and my family personally for two years.”123 Shortly after the trial he 
left his position in Phoenix and accepted a transfer to Seattle, stating that he was excited 
to leave the Trial behind. There Reno continued working on anti-smuggling cases for the 
next 25 years, receiving in 2009 the Department of Homeland Security’s “Trial Attorney 
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of the Year Award” for his prosecution of a business that employed undocumented 
workers.124 
The experience of the trial was a significant factor in leading a nun to renounce 
her vows; a Central American to flee to Canada; and a prosecution lawyer to question his 
faith and move from Phoenix to Seattle. This is only a small sample of the people 
involved in Operation Sojourner and the Sanctuary Trial. Some of the defense lawyers 
interviewed for this project called it the high point and most significant aspect of their 
legal careers,125 eight of the defendants received felony convictions that affected 
everything from their voting rights to their ability to rent an apartment, and the more than 
sixty Central Americans arrested as a result of Operation Sojourner’s success were placed 
in federal custody and in danger of being deported. 
2.8 The Effect of the Trial on the CARC 
 There is no doubt that the Trial deeply influenced the individuals involved in it, 
but it also affected the Central American Refugee Crisis. While the government 
attempted to paint it as a simple “anti-smuggling case,” the Trial was much more than 
that. By the conclusion of the Trial in Tucson, the Sanctuary Movement had been 
transformed, the government was tied up in another court case over its approach to 
asylum adjudication that began in part as a countersuit to Sanctuary prosecution, the 
American public was more informed of the issues in Central America, and the 
international community had a new view of America and its relationship with refugee 
issues. 
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 In the less than three years between the public declaration of the Sanctuary 
Movement on March 24, 1982 to the unsealing of the indictments against 13 Sanctuary 
workers on January 7, 1985, the Sanctuary Movement grew from a handful of houses of 
worship in Tucson, Phoenix and San Francisco to an international movement with 
religious groups in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom proclaiming 
Sanctuary or declaring their support. It captured the imagination of liberal theologians 
like Elie Wiesel and Paul Weller, prompted international symposiums and sparked a 
debate in editorial pages throughout the United States.126 As mentioned in section 2.4, 
this rapid growth was not without its problems. Sanctuary communities across the 
country hotly contested the theological nature and political goals of the Sanctuary 
Movement. In early January 1985 Movement leaders braced themselves for a permanent 
split at the upcoming national symposium. Yet they quickly set aside their differences 
after the government’s indictment of many of the Tucson wing’s leading figures two 
weeks before the symposium. Sanctuary leaders throughout the country turned their focus 
to the Trial. For a year and a half most ideological and theological issues disappeared as 
Sanctuary churches and synagogues mobilized massive public relations and fundraising 
campaigns in support of the 11 defendants. 
Both campaigns turned out to be enormously effective and influential. From its 
very beginning, the Sanctuary Movement saw the press as an invaluable tool. The 
Movement wanted to publicize the plight of Central Americans, and the Sanctuary Trial 
gave it a better opportunity than it had ever had before to alert the American public to US 
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support for Central American human rights violations. Between January 14, 1985, the 
day the government unsealed the indictments, to July 1, 1986, the day Carroll sentenced 
the Sanctuary workers, The New York Times published 75 articles on the Sanctuary 
Movement, an average of nearly one every week. In comparison, during an equivalent 
span of dates beginning July 29, 1983 to January 13, 1985, the day of the indictments, 
The New York Times published only nine articles on the Movement, an average of less 
than one article every two months. The coverage of the Movement in other publications 
increased in much the same manner, from six articles in the Washington Post to 51 
articles during the Trial, and from 11 articles in the Los Angeles Times to 233 articles.127 
Coverage of the Movement did not stop after the conclusion of the Trial. In a way the 
prosecution of Corbett, Fife, Nicgoski and the others gave the defendants an added moral 
authority on refugee issues. The government transformed them into martyrs. The 
defendants’ opinions on developments in refugee policy in the United States and Canada, 
as well as conditions in Central America, continued to be sought for years after the 
Trial.128 This meant that the prosecution of the Sanctuary Movement, which Operation 
Sojourner had meant to destroy, had strengthened its position and authority in the minds 
of the media. 
Acutely aware of the increase in publicity, the defendants did their best to use that 
coverage to educate the public about the situation in Central America and the United 
States’ policy towards Central American migrants. Most of the defendants’ press 
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conferences took place in front of a church, synagogue or strategically placed cross.129 In 
addition, the defendants made constant references to US refugee policy and practice 
towards Central Americans in trial-related interviews and profiles. Jim Corbett used his 
newfound celebrity to invite a news crew from NBC to film a border crossing. This 
segment, which aired nationally on August 25, 1985, included an interview with Corbett, 
a conversation with a Salvadoran refugee and a counter by the INS.130 As a result of the 
explosion in publicity, the Sanctuary Movement put an immense amount of political 
pressure on the United States government. Though the US government did not stop 
deportations, political pressure did have some effect on the United States’ role in Central 
America. Sociologist Christian Smith has demonstrated that the Sanctuary Movement, 
coupled with two other organizations involved in Central American activism, Witness for 
Peace and Pledge of Resistance, heavily influenced congressional opposition to US 
funding of the Guatemalan and Salvadoran militaries, the two forces that generated most 
of the refugees from Central America.131 
In addition, the Sanctuary Movement’s public relations campaign helped to nearly 
double the number of Sanctuary sites between the spring of 1985 and summer of 1987.132 
During the Trial letters from churches and synagogues across the country poured into the 
Sanctuary offices in Tucson, Chicago and Los Angeles, asking how they could join the 
Movement.133 The original arrests in January of 1985 raised the public profile of both 
defendants and migrants. Shock over Alejandro Gomez’s second arrest helped push 
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through a city council resolution in Rochester that designated it a Sanctuary city.134 As 
the number of sites proliferated, the opportunities for Central Americans to take 
advantage of them increased. While the Movement never kept full records on the number 
of Central Americans who lived in Sanctuary, activists estimated the number to be near 
3,000.135 This number does not account for those refugees who took advantage of 
Sanctuary services, but did not stay in Sanctuary. 
The services provided to those refugees who lived in Sanctuary varied 
dramatically depending on the site. Some sanctuaries provided outstanding legal, 
educational and political assistance to the Central Americans living there. Other 
Sanctuary sites were wholly unprepared for the difficulties inherent in helping refugees 
bearing the deep physical, emotional and psychological scars of living through civil war 
and torture. Still others lacked the resources to provide a complete and consistent set of 
services. Nevertheless, every Sanctuary site was, at minimum, a safe space from 
deportation. While in Sanctuary, migrants could take advantage of legal assistance for 
preparing their asylum applications. If the site was unable to provide legal assistance, 
Central Americans could at least use the safe space of Sanctuary to access other social 
services and thereby educate themselves about asylum law. After the 1986 passage of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act, Central Americans in Sanctuary prepared amnesty 
applications that would allow them to bypass the corrupt asylum system entirely. Finally, 
Central Americans in Sanctuary in 1991 received new asylum hearings as a result of the 
settlement of American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh (the subject of chapter 3).  
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While Movement activists spent much of their energy publicizing Sanctuary 
during the Trial, they also increased their fundraising efforts as they struggled to pay for 
the services required for an adequate defense. Through the National Sanctuary Defense 
Fund, an organization set up for the defense of two other Sanctuary workers arrested in 
1984 and expanded as a result of the Sanctuary Trial, the Movement raised over $1.8 
million dollars. Much of the fundraising came through direct mail campaigns. Bernie 
Mazel, an experienced direct mail compiler, and one of the chief fundraisers in the 
National Sanctuary Defense Fund, recalls the unusually large response to Sanctuary 
fundraising. From an initial fundraising drive of 127,000 letters, the Fund received nearly 
$900,000 in profit and a list of 38,000 contributors. The list expanded dramatically over 
the course of the Trial and became a valuable resource for other activist responses to the 
Central American Refugee Crisis. The National Sanctuary Defense Fund had an effect on 
the CARC far beyond the Trial, as it continued to offer Central Americans in danger of 
deportation legal assistance and shared its fundraising list with the organization that 
supported American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh.136  
Some activists saw the Movement’s success in its publicity and fundraising 
campaigns as a mixed blessing. In the midst of the Sanctuary Movement Trial Jim 
Corbett noted that “(b)y diverting awareness from and funding away from legal services 
for refugees, the Arizona Sanctuary Trial may have already had an adverse impact on 
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refugee advocacy.”137 He worried that resources that could have been spent on helping 
refugees in the Sanctuary Movement were being diverted into the Trial’s defense. 
Counteracting Corbett’s fears, financial resources poured into the Movement like never 
before. The Sanctuary Movement expanded its services for refugees in terms of support 
and staff. Following the end of the Trial the flow of donations slowed considerably. The 
drama of a collection of religious workers fighting the government appealed to donors 
much more than the seemingly mundane tasks of providing social services for refugees 
already in the United States. This led to staff layoffs and the shuttering or partial running 
of services established during the Trial.138 These changes had a significant impact on the 
morale of Sanctuary workers, as the remaining staff members redoubled their efforts to 
maintain what services they could.  
In addition, the staffing of the Sanctuary Movement in southern Arizona changed 
as many of the defendants halted their participation during the Trial. This left space for 
new members of the Movement to take leadership roles, particularly in the Tucson 
Refugee Support Group (TRSG). Founded in 1981, the TRSG was one of the primary 
organizations for crossing Central Americans across the border.139 As the Trial wore on, 
the character of the TRSG changed as it became younger, feminized and more fearful of 
government infiltration. After the Trial many of the defendants, particularly the men, 
began to reassert their traditional positions of leadership, sparking conflict among TRSG 
participants who thought they were being pushed aside as patriarchal attitudes took 
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over.140 Some of the defendants and their ideological allies in TRSG grew more cautious 
over border transportation, demanding a standardization of procedure to minimize 
participants’ legal risk. While they wanted to continue helping Central Americans and 
refused to be stopped by Carroll’s orders, they still feared violation of their parole.141 
Based off the acquittal of Sanctuary worker Stacey Merkt, the male-dominated former 
leadership wanted to send letters to the INS before every border run, informing the 
government of their intentions to transport refugees to a safe spot to claim asylum. They 
thought this provided the legal cover necessary to secure future Sanctuary acquittals. 
Other members of TRSG were wary of this strategy, arguing that providing too much 
information to the INS risked the safety of the refugees in the United States, as well as 
that of their families back in Central America.142  
Two separate incidents further contributed to a split within the TRSG, leading the 
more radical and political members to form another organization to help refugees across 
the border called El Puente (The Bridge). The first of the two incidents involved a family 
of Salvadorans living in Mexico City who possessed what most TRSG members believed 
to be a legitimate claim to refugee status. At the same time, some of the more 
conservative members of the TRSG were reluctant to bring the family north into the 
United States, saying that they had lived in Mexico City for quite a while and were thus 
resettled. They believed that bringing the family north would be an unnecessary risk for 
the Movement. 143 
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The second incident involved a family of Salvadorans, some of who had been 
involved with Mano Blanco (the paramilitary group associated with the death squads in 
El Salvador). Some of the younger and more radical members of TRSG felt that helping 
former Mano Blanco members was politically, spiritually and morally wrong. Mano 
Blanco and its fellow travelers had created the refugee crisis and were guilty of countless 
human rights violations. They viewed the Sanctuary Movement as, in part, a political 
Movement that stood against the US government’s aid to El Salvador’s military and 
death squads. Helping a former member would contradict that. Corbett and Fife simply 
saw people in need and wanted to help, regardless of the political, moral and spiritual 
implications. 
Kathy Padilla, one of the founding members of El Puente, describes the debate: 
“Jim (Corbett) and John (Fife)’s take on it was that this was not a political thing, this was 
a humanitarian thing. Mine was that this was a spiritual and political thing, because you 
cannot separate one’s spirituality from one’s politics.”144 Eventually, the TRSG did 
decide to move them, but it was not without considerable debate. These two incidents, 
combined with the growing reliance of TRSG leaders like Fife and Corbett on legal 
means led to the split within the TRSG and the creation of El Puente. While there 
remained some overlap between the two groups, the relationship between the two groups 
descended into name-calling and personal attacks that deeply discouraged the participants 
of both groups.145 In many ways, this debate on the Movement’s political and 
humanitarian goals echoed the issues that had nearly split the Movement in the months 
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before the Trial. The Trial had temporarily patched over the splits within the Movement, 
but they re-emerged in Tucson within two years of the Trial’s conclusion. 
Thus the Sanctuary Trial had a variety of temporary and long lasting effects on 
the Sanctuary Movement and, in turn, the CARC. The Trial’s direct effect on government 
policy and practice is more difficult to measure. The clearest link is a countersuit filed 
against the INS in May of 1985 in response to the Sanctuary Movement prosecutions. 
Among other things, this lawsuit alleged that the government’s attempt to police their 
assistance to Central American migrants violated the right to free exercise of religion as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.146 The subject of the next chapter, this case, 
American Baptist Churches vs. Thornburgh (ABC case), resulted in a sweeping 
settlement that dramatically altered the United States’ approach to asylum adjudication. It 
granted new asylum hearings to Salvadorans who had already been denied a fair hearing, 
offered work permits to Salvadorans waiting for asylum hearings and stayed deportation 
of Salvadorans until they had been processed under the new asylum regulations.147 The 
settlement also mandated new training for asylum officers devised by refugee advocates. 
Finally, it overloaded the asylum system and led to massive backlogs. 
A second lawsuit emerged out of the Sanctuary prosecutions. This case, 
Presbyterian Churches v. United States was brought in January of 1986 by four Lutheran 
and Presbyterian churches in Arizona (including Southside Presbyterian) and their 
national denominations. The lawsuit was against the United Sates, INS, Department of 
Justice and the INS officers involved in the case. It charged that during Operation 
Sojourner the government violated the churches’ first and fourth amendment rights by 
                                                
146 Blum, “The Settlement of American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh,” 351.  
147 Ibid., 354. 
   78 
covertly recording church services. Dismissed by the US District Court on October 30, 
1986, on the grounds that the churches lacked standing to prosecute the claim, the 
churches appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court.  The Ninth Circuit heard the case 
on July 14, 1987, but did not file a decision until March 15, 1989. The decision found 
that the churches did have standing and remanded the case back to the district court. The 
district court revisited the case and issued a new ruling on December 10, 1990. The new 
ruling affirmed the government’s right to infiltrate churches and record services, but 
instructed government officials that they must only do so “in good faith; i.e., not for the 
purpose of abridging first amendment freedoms… (and) undercover informers [must] 
adhere scrupulously to the scope of the defendant’s invitation to participation in the 
organization.”148 Further appeals by the churches failed. While not a total victory for 
Sanctuary Movement activists, it did clarify the ability of government agents to interfere 
with Sanctuary work and keep the Movement and its goals in the news into the next 
decade. 
In addition to prompting the ABC and Presbyterian Churches cases, the negative 
publicity engendered by the Trial and the monumental costs of the investigation and 
prosecution largely convinced government officials that future prosecution of the 
Sanctuary Movement was neither good politics nor as it cost-effective. While government 
officials may have claimed victory by gaining the conviction of 8 of the 11 defendants, 
they largely avoided future prosecutions of Sanctuary.149 This is in spite of the harsher 
and more explicit penalties and powers that Congress granted the INS related to the 
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harboring, concealing or inducing entrance of undocumented aliens through the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.150 The government’s failure to zealously 
prosecute meant that Sanctuary activists could continue their work largely unmolested, 
though many remained wary of future government infiltration. 
Finally, there is one last effect that the Trial had on the Central American Refugee 
Crisis that is easy to overlook. Though the Trial led to successful PR and fundraising 
campaigns for the Sanctuary Movement, an important lawsuit in American Baptist 
Churches v. Thornburgh, increased political pressure on refugee policy makers and 
changes in the ideological makeup of the Sanctuary Movement, perhaps the most 
important outcome of the Sanctuary Trial was the continued operation of the Sanctuary 
Movement. For Central Americans crossing the border and the Sanctuary activists who 
worked with them, this was an extremely personal and important consequence. As Susan 
Bibler Coutin notes, “(t)hose who brought refugees across the border assessed 
sanctuary’s effectiveness not only by its ultimate objectives but also according to the 
lives that participants saved on a daily and weekly basis.”151 Through the publicity 
generated by the Trial more sites joined the Movement and more individuals volunteered 
to help save Central Americans from deportation. For those given shelter in Sanctuary 
churches and synagogues, incremental changes in policy and practice were less important 
than the fact that they safely crossed the border and avoided the threat of deportation. Too 
often, policy historians get caught up in a macro-analysis of events with national or 
international importance. While the macro issues of refugee policy and practice remained 
important to all those involved in the Movement, the Movement itself meant much more. 
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The things that mattered most to them were the hundreds of hurried midnight crossings of 
a dusty river gulch from Mexico to the United States, the security of a warm blanket, or 
the chance to provide for someone truly in need. 
2.9 Conclusion 
 Throughout the creation of the Sanctuary Movement, Operation Sojourner, the 
Sanctuary Movement Trial and its aftermath a variety of individuals affected and were 
affected by the Central American Refugee Crisis. The work and stories of Central 
Americans provided the impetus and foundation for Sanctuary. Two religious Americans 
in Tucson were moved enough by these stories that they started a Movement that spread 
throughout the nation. Unhappy with activists’ interpretation of religion and immigration 
policy, a collection of government officials began an investigation of the Movement that 
culminated in a nine-month long Trial and eight newly convicted felons. Though muzzled 
in the courtroom by the preliminary motions granted by Judge Carroll, Central American 
witnesses and religious activists worked tirelessly to publicize the conditions in Central 
America and their reasons for defying the government. As a result, the public profile of 
the Sanctuary Movement increased dramatically during the Trial. Wary of the increased 
costs in time, money and credibility, the government avoided further covert investigation 
and prosecutions of the Movement. A countersuit filed by a collection of churches 
became a part of the ABC case (chapter 3), the settlement of which resulted in far ranging 
official and unofficial changes in refugee policy. Though the Trial temporarily closed a 
growing rift in the Movement, the division between various political factions within the 
Sanctuary Movement reappeared after the verdicts. The rift even developed among 
Sanctuary workers in Tucson, as members of the TRSG and El Puente grew apart. 
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Finally, the Trial’s failure in shuttering the Movement meant that Sanctuary’s work 
continued. 
Just as the investigation and Trial had significant effects on the Central American 
Refugee Crisis, it had dramatic effects on the individuals involved. Both a defendant, 
Darlene Nicgorski, and government official, Donald Reno, questioned their participation 
in their respective churches as a result of the Trial. Alejandro Gomez’s increased public 
profile invited more scrutiny, resulting in his arrest after the Trial, threat of deportation 
and eventual immigration to Canada. Other refugees arrested because of Operation 
Sojourner received new refugee hearings, some receiving asylum, while others did not.152 
The Trial did not end the Movement, and the consequences of participation in the 
Movement carried on. As Coutin notes, for workers this meant constructing new 
relationships with the law, reexamining their religious beliefs and forming deep and 
lasting relationships.153 
Finally, it is worth noting that the effects of the Trial went beyond national 
borders. As activists and Central Americans in the United States spent months in trial, 
their counterparts in Canada looked on with concern. Recent events in their own country 
indicated that Canada’s more liberal asylum policies, which had largely precluded the 
need for a Canadian Sanctuary Movement, were coming to an end. For over four years 
religious groups and the Canadian press had monitored the Movement’s rise. Many 
Canadian churches offered aid to Movement affiliated sites in the United States and some 
                                                
152 Neither Alejandro Gomez nor Elba Lopez received asylum, but Lopez’s sister, Pilar Martinez, did: 
James Yuenger, “Passage to Freedom” Chicago Tribune January 27, 1989 < 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-01-27/features/8902280835_1_refugees-brownsville-bandits> 
(accessed 1/25/2014).  
153 Coutin, Culture of Protest, 223-226. 
   82 
helped transport refugees from US churches across the US-Canada border where they 
could apply for asylum in Canada. During the application process churches offered legal 
and financial assistance as refugees navigated the complex maze of Canadian asylum 
adjudication.154 The arrest of the Sanctuary workers in January 1985 seemed to only 
further convince Canadian activists of the importance of their work in support of Central 
Americans as they pledged their support to their counterparts in the US. David Matas, an 
influential Canadian immigration lawyer, attended the entirety of the Trial and made 
frequent reports back home. Following the Trial he released numerous articles relating to 
the case, as well as a book-length report on its effects on US and potentially Canadian 
immigration policy.155  
As the Trial progressed the Conservative government in Canada passed the first 
major legislative change to refugee law since 1976. In May of 1987 it introduced a 
second law that proposed to fully retool the refugee determination process in a way that 
the government hoped would both stream line the adjudication of refugee applications 
and cut down on false claims. Bill C-55 is discussed in more detail in chapter 4. Canadian 
activists saw the changes as a way to keep refugees at bay and shut Canada’s previously 
open doors.156 They drew connections between US prosecution of Sanctuary activists and 
Canada’s new asylum policy and promised that:  “whatever the latest policy, church 
people, among others, are committed to welcoming refugees and offering sanctuary. They 
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would prefer to do that with the co-operation of the government. Failing that… count on 
the emergence of sanctuary churches in Canada.”157  
In spite of the changes, Canada’s policy remained relatively liberal and the 
Sanctuary Movement never achieved the level of prominence or organization in Canada 
as it did in the United Sates. Neither was it ever infiltrated to the extent the Movement 
was in the US. Yet, the threat of Sanctuary remained a powerful tool for activists to use 
when discussing individual cases with Canadian officials.158 As indicated by the quote 
above, and the fact that various Sanctuary incidents occurred throughout the rest of the 
decade and still continue today in the face of even harsher laws, the threat carried weight.  
In sum, the actions of a few activists, migrants and government officials 
dramatically changed the shape of Operation Sojourner and the Sanctuary Trial. These 
two events gave the Sanctuary Movement a public platform to educate an ignorant public, 
initiated a countersuit that transformed US refugee policy towards Central Americans, 
sparked condemnations from the international religious community and changed the lives 
of its participants forever. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SIX YEARS TO SETTLEMENT: THE AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCHES V. 
THORNBURGH LAWSUIT 
“This settlement is a major victory for all Salvadorans and Guatemalans in this country 
whose claims for political asylum were being summarily denied for purely foreign policy 
reasons.” – Marc Van Der Hout, Lawyer for the Plaintiffs, December 19, 1990.159 
 
“It was a fair agreement. That’s why we agreed to it.” – Joe Krovisky, Justice Department 
Spokesman, January 31, 1991.160 
 
3.1 Introduction 
On January 31, 1991 lawyers representing over seventy different religious and lay 
organizations, as well as six Central Americans, reached a sweeping settlement with 
lawyers from the US Department of State and US Immigration and Naturalization Service 
that radically altered the shape of US asylum policy and changed the fate of the hundreds 
of thousands of Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the United States.161 The settlement, a 
result of the landmark case American Baptist Churches et. al. v. Richard Thornburgh et. 
al. (popularly known as ABC), mandated new asylum hearings for thousands, and 
reshaped asylum adjudication procedures. It was filed on May 7, 1985 in response to the 
US government’s decision to prosecute 16 Sanctuary Movement activists on immigration 
and smuggling charges (discussed in chapter 2). The case lasted for nearly 6 years before 
it was settled in January 1991. Originally focused on preserving religious freedom, the 
case eventually became a lawsuit based on the government’s discriminatory treatment of 
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Central American refugee applicants, ending in an out of court settlement. This chapter 
shows how the actions of a small collection of individuals composed of Central 
Americans, activist lawyers, government officials and an influential judge reshaped the 
US response to the Central American Refugee Crisis through a landmark settlement 
reached in the winter of 1990 and formalized in early 1991. It pays particular attention to 
the evolution of the lawsuit, emphasizing the ways that a handful of individuals tirelessly 
worked to keep the case alive. As discussed below, the intense legal negotiations of this 
case have never been studied before and deserve a close examination and discussion. 
Although the legal complexities of this particular case are the focus of the majority of this 
chapter, the importance of the individuals involved should not be forgotten. Six years of 
dedication, negotiation and guidance by the activist attorneys, government lawyers and 
presiding judge shaped the case into the landmark ABC settlement. 
3.2 Sources and Historiographical Context: 
Since the conclusion of the ABC case in 1991, scholars have extensively studied 
the ABC settlement and its effects. Anthropologist Susan Bibler Coutin has been at the 
forefront of research into the ways that Central Americans negotiated the legal 
complexities of the ABC settlement with Nations of Emigrants: Shifting Boundaries of 
Citizenship in El Salvador and the United States, and Legalizing Moves: Salvadorans 
Struggle for U.S. Residency.162 Coutin and other scholars reveal the immense effect that 
the ABC settlement had on the asylum policy of the United States. In Fragmented Ties: 
Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America, and articles like “Liminal Legality: 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States” sociologist Cecilía 
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Menjívar examines the ways that the ABC settlement affected the lives Central American 
in the United States.163 Comparatively little scholarly analysis has been done on the 
evolution of the case itself. Carolyn Patty Blum, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, wrote a short 
law review article, while Coutin and Menjívar mention the case in passing.164 Blum’s 
article, published shorty after the settlement, provides an important overview of the case, 
but was never intended as a detailed examination of the case.  Therefore, the focus of this 
chapter is on the case’s legal history. This chapter’s primary contribution is an account of 
how the lawsuit transformed from a retaliation for the Sanctuary Movement Trial into a 
landmark equal opportunity settlement. 
Unfortunately most of the materials generated by the activists’ lawyers during the 
ABC are held by the Center for Constitutional Rights and remain unavailable while 
awaiting compilation. In the future, their opening will make further research into the ABC 
trial possible. Similar difficulties arise when trying to access the work of government 
lawyers. Under the attorney work product exclusion they are protected from Freedom of 
Information Act Requests. Though all the archives may not be available, some of the 
lawyers and government officials who participated in the case have consented to oral 
histories. Their memories of the case, combined with publicly available court filings, 
personal letters and newspaper articles are enough to demonstrate the powerful effect that 
individuals and small groups had on American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh. This 
                                                
163 Cecilía Menjívar, Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America, (Berkeley: University 
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164 Carolyn Patty Blum,  “The Settlement of ‘American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh:’ Landmark 
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analysis reveals the importance of individuals and small groups to the ABC lawsuit and, 
subsequently, the asylum policy of the United States. 
3.3 Outline: 
 This chapter analyzes the nearly six years from the initial filing of the lawsuit 
(May 1, 1985) to the announcement of the final settlement (January 31, 1991). Much of 
this transformation stemmed from seemingly arcane legal dealings between activist 
lawyers, government lawyers, and the judge. As a result, there is a heavy emphasis on 
specific legal documents and issues, as well as extensive use of legal jargon. As much as 
possible, without breaking the narrative flow, the meaning of a legal term is explained 
following its first usage. Occasionally further explanation is provided in footnotes. 
Cornell University Law School’s online legal dictionary and encyclopedia proved to be 
an invaluable tool when researching and writing this chapter.165 
The remainder of the chapter traces the chronological evolution of the case. By 
never going to trial, this case followed a different trajectory than many readers may be 
familiar with. The activists (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against the government (defendant), 
alleging in their complaint that the defendant violated the plaintiffs’ first amendment 
right to freely exercise their religion by infiltrating churches during Operation Sojourner. 
In addition, they charged the governments with disregarding its responsibilities to Central 
American refugees as set out under the Refugee Act of 1980.166 For the next six years, the 
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government repeatedly filed motions to dismiss167 the case. Three times the presiding 
judge ruled on the motions to dismiss, each time dismissing some of the claims while 
upholding others and granting the plaintiffs the chance to amend their complaint. Finally, 
the activists and government reached a settlement agreement in December 1990 that the 
court made official on January 31, 1991.  
This chapter breaks up each of these steps into separate sections. It begins (3.4) 
with the Center for Constitutional Rights’ reaction to the Sanctuary prosecutions 
(discussed in chapter 2) and analyzes the ways that activists Ellen Yaroshefsky, Morton 
Stavis and Marc Van Der Hout formed and filed the initial complaint on May 7, 1985. It 
then proceeds (3.5) to examine the two years from the initial filing through the first 
formal ruling on the motion to dismiss (March 24, 1987). Next (3.6), the two-year span 
between the March 1987 and the March 1989 rulings are analyzed. During this crucial 
period the case evolved from a complaint primarily concerned with the government’s 
violation of the “free exercise clause” to a complaint based on the government’s refusal 
to provide “equal protection under the law,” as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, 
to Central American refugees. Here the role of Judge Robert Peckham is particularly 
emphasized. The final chronological period (3.7) looks at the last two years of the case. 
After examining the evolution of the case, the chapter concludes with a discussion on 
how the participants were transformed by the case (3.8) and how the lawsuit transformed 
the Central American Refugee Crisis (3.9). 
                                                
167 A motion to dismiss asks the judge to dismiss some or all of the complaints listed in the lawsuit for any 
of a variety of reasons including lack of standing (plaintiffs must not just disagree with the government’s 
actions, they must have been either directly affected by the action or related to it), lack of jurisdiction (court 
does not have the authority over the defendant, area of law or region in which the complaint was brought) 
and frivolity (the lawsuit is a waste of the court’s and defendant’s time).  
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3.4 Filing the Lawsuit: 
While the catalyst for the ABC lawsuit was the Sanctuary case, its roots lie in the 
years of litigation on Central American issues by the Center for Constitutional Rights 
(CCR), and immigrant/refugee advocacy by the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) and its 
affiliates. In his recent history of the CCR, Albert Ruben defines the Center as “a not-for-
profit law office dedicated to using the law creatively to effect social change and to 
advance and defend rights guaranteed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”168 
Founded in 1966 by William Kunstler, Arthur Kinoy, Morton Stavis and Benjamin Smith 
in the American South during the throes of the Civil Rights Movement, the Center’s 
original rationale was to “function as people’s lawyers for the movement.”169 During the 
first decade of its existence the CCR defended African-American and white civil rights 
activists, including the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Commission (SNCC). In their 
first annual report the founders explained the need for an organization like the CCR:  
“It seemed to [the founders] that there was a need for creative experimentation in 
the development of new legal approaches whose major thesis would be that 
litigation, besides its obvious defensive purpose, could also, and perhaps 
primarily, become an affirmative means of preserving individual liberties and 
freedom.”170  
 
In short, the CCR hoped that the impact of its litigation would extend far beyond the 
original case and serve as a bulwark against the encroachment of civil liberties and 
freedoms by the government and individuals. To do this they approached litigation as test 
cases for new approaches and new methods, often employing widespread publicity and 
                                                
168 Albert Ruben, The People’s Lawyer: The Center for Constitutional Rights and the Fight for Social 
Justice, from Civil Rights to Guantánamo, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011), 8. 
169 Arthur Kinoy, Quoted in People’s Lawyer, 19. 
170 Docket Report Quoted in People’s Lawyer, 28. 
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innovative legal arguments. They used both of these approaches to tremendous effect in 
the ABC case. 
Since the start of the 1980s, the CCR litigated a number of cases surrounding the 
Reagan administration’s involvement in Central America. Both the CCR and the Reagan 
administration saw Central America as a proving ground for US foreign policy and 
imperialism.171 In 1981 Michael Ratner, President of the CCR, and Peter Weiss, a CCR 
lawyer, met with Congressman George Crockett of Michigan. Crockett wanted to sue the 
Reagan administration for violating the War Powers resolution, a 1973 resolution that set 
a sixty-day limit on the executive’s ability to place US soldiers into war zones or places 
where hostilities were imminent without express consent from Congress.172 Ratner saw 
this as an opportunity to not only set limits on the executive’s ability to start quasi-wars, 
but a chance to prevent the United States from giving military and economic aid to 
countries who grossly violated human rights. The case, filed on May 1, 1981 as Crockett 
v. Reagan, was dismissed at the district and appeals level and denied certiorari173 to the 
Supreme Court. Nonetheless, it helped publicize the conditions in El Salvador and 
established the CCR as one of the leading organizations for litigation surrounding El 
Salvador. 
The other national legal organization that aided activists during ABC was the 
National Lawyers Guild (NLG). On December 1, 1936 a number of progressive lawyers 
                                                
171 In 1981 Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, stated that “Central America is 
the most important place in the world for the United States today.” Quoted in Walter LaFeber, “The Reagan 
Administration and Revolutions in Central America,” Political Science Quarterly 99: 1 (Spring 1984), 1. 
For the CCR see Jules Lobel, Success Without Victory: Lost Legal Battles and the Long Road to Justice in 
America (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 187. 
172 Lobel, Success Without Victory, 191. 
173 Either the plaintiffs or defendants can appeal their case to a higher court (in this case the US Supreme 
Court, the highest court in the land). If the court agrees to hear the case it grants a “writ of certiorari.” If it 
declines to hear the case it denies certiorari. 
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met to examine the need for an alternative to the American Bar Association, an 
organization they saw as exclusive and hostile to the New Deal. This meeting resulted in 
a call for a convention, which, on February 20, 1937, founded the National Lawyers 
Guild.174 They quickly formed a constitution that set out the goals for the NLG: 
“The National Lawyers Guild aims to unite the lawyers of America in a 
professional organization which shall function as an effective social force in the 
service of the people to the end that human rights shall be regarded as more 
sacred than property rights.”175 
 
Over the course of the next fifty years the NLG became the leading association of 
progressive lawyers. Its members operated low-cost legal services for impoverished 
individuals during the Great Depression and beyond. They defended civil rights and 
antiwar activists during the 1960s and 1970s. NLG members continued to fight for civil 
rights into the 1980s, but as the Vietnam War wound to a close in the mid 1970s its 
internationally minded members shifted their attention to apartheid in South Africa and 
the Reagan administration’s interest in Central America. Members of the Guild also 
fought extensively for immigrant rights. In 1971 it began publishing the Immigration 
Newsletter and released a guidance pamphlet in 1979 titled “Immigration Law and 
Defense.” By the 1980s its struggle over immigrant rights was closely tied to the Guild’s 
interests on Central America and South Africa.176 The ABC case became a signature 
accomplishment of Guild lawyers: a victory for immigrant rights and a clear antiwar 
protest. 
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The indictment of sixteen Sanctuary workers in January 1985 presented lawyers 
from the CCR another chance to challenge US policy concerning Central America on 
explicitly constitutional grounds. Morton Stavis, co-founder of the CCR and the original 
force behind the case, saw the indictments as a clear violation of the activists’ religious 
liberties. He asked Ellen Yaroshefsky, then serving pro-bono as attorney to Wendy 
LeWin (one of the Sanctuary defendants), to join him. In addition, he invited Marc Van 
Der Hout, then president of the NLG, as well as a prominent immigration and refugee 
attorney, to come in as co-counsel. Van Der Hout, who had worked with the CCR on a 
number of Central American cases prior to the ABC case, recalls: 
We talked about a lot of possible theories. When the government started to 
prosecute sanctuary workers then we decided that the CCR would bring a case to 
enjoin the prosecutions or stop them from going after them. That was the initial 
impetus of the case. I said that if we were going to bring a case we should bring in 
the refugee part of it too. Not just the religious workers part of this, not just the 
church people. So we added causes of actions for the denial of what was called 
extended voluntary departure… We added a cause of action on the refusal of 
extended voluntary departure and we added the claim that ultimately became the 
most important part of the case ironically that didn’t start out that way, the part of 
the case that we actually won on, challenging the discrimination and adjudication 
of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum cases based on foreign policy grounds 
rather than what it was supposed to by the statute. So, that became ultimately the 
other two causes of actions got thrown out and that’s the part of the case that 
survived.177 
 
After Stavis, Yaroshefsky and Van Der Hout chose the causes of action, they 
needed to compile an appropriate client list. As lead plaintiff they selected American 
Baptist Churches in the U.S.A., a national organization headquartered in New York that 
coordinated activities and ministries between local American Baptist churches. They 
were joined by more than seventy other individuals, religious organizations and refugee 
aid groups, including the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, Bishop John 
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Fitzpatrick of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brownsville, Texas, the Committee of 
Central American Refugees, San Francisco Friends Meeting, Casa Oscar Romero and 
Southside Presbyterian of Tucson, AZ. The eclectic set of plaintiffs included 
representatives from 22 states and more than 10 different denominations.  
With this extensive list Morton Stavis, Sarah Wunsch, Ellen Yaroshefsky, Marc 
Van Der Hout and Teresa Bright, on May 7, 1985, filed a complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. 
Close to Van Der Hout, who practiced in San Francisco and took the lead on the case’s 
litigation, the Northern District of California had a liberal reputation. Judge Robert F. 
Peckham, a well-respected jurist appointed to the federal bench in 1966 by President 
Lyndon Johnson, drew the case. 
The complaint began with an introductory statement that asked for the court “to 
protect the rights of plaintiff religious institutions and their constituent bodies, agencies 
and members who offer sanctuary to refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala and to 
protect the rights of refugees themselves.”178 Next, it established the jurisdiction of the 
court by citing the statute that gave US district courts jurisdiction over all claims arising 
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States and the statute that gave 
courts the right to enforce relief. The complaint listed the 77 plaintiff parties and named 
the defendants, Edwin E. Meese and Alan Nelson in their official positions as Attorney 
General of the United States and Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service respectively. It followed with a twenty-two page long “statement of facts.” The 
“statement of facts” gave the plaintiffs’ version of the case’s background and need for a 
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suit on religious liberty grounds (for Sanctuary activists) and equal protection claims (for 
Central American refugees). Drawing from NGO and United Nations reports, it painted a 
grim portrait of conditions in Central America. The complaint proceeded to cite asylum 
approval statistics, quote verses from the Old and New Testament and list prosecutions of 
Sanctuary activists in an attempt to demonstrate both the injustice of US asylum approval 
rates and the religious desire of activists to help Central American refugees. After 
establishing a solid background, the lawyers transitioned to laying out the “causes of 
action.”  
The four “causes of action” formed the heart of the complaint. They used the 
preceding statement of facts to specifically elucidate why legal action was necessary. The 
first, pertaining to religious organizations, alleged that the defendants, by prosecuting 
Sanctuary workers who aided undocumented Central American refugees, had violated the 
plaintiffs’ first amendment right to freely exercise their religion. Their religiously 
motivated attempts to help Central American refugees did not break the law. The 
activists’ religion encouraged them to aid the needy, and their actions did not break the 
law because the defendants had misinterpreted the statute (8 U.S.C. §1324) they used to 
charge Sanctuary workers. The statute under which workers were charged only 
prosecuted individuals who harbored or transported aliens who they knew to be without a 
lawful basis to be in the United States. The plaintiffs argued that due to US (Refugee Act 
of 1980) and international law (Geneva Conventions of 1949, 1951 UN Convention on 
the Status of Refugees and the 1967 UN Protocol) Central American refugees had a 
lawful basis to be in the country. Therefore any prosecution of Sanctuary workers for 
aiding Central American refugees was a misapplication of the law and infringed 
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“plaintiff’s performance of their religious duties and the exercise of their rights under the 
first amendment.”179 
The second cause of action placed the named Central American refugee 
organizations as representatives of Guatemalans and Salvadorans fleeing civil war, 
violence and human rights violations in their home countries. The plaintiffs argued that 
due to the conditions in their home countries, Guatemalans and Salvadorans fit the 
conditions necessary for refugee status outlined in US and international law. Thus the 
government’s actions, through the arrest, denial of asylum and subsequent deportation of 
Central Americans were unlawful.  
Third, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants “engage in a practice of generally 
granting asylum, refugee status, extended voluntary departure or other relief providing 
refuge to persons who are fleeing unrest or disorder in countries they consider to be 
‘communist’ or dominated by the Soviet Union.”180 Simultaneously, the defendants 
routinely denied refuge to those fleeing governments allied or affiliated with the United 
States. This violated the fifth amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law. 
The final cause of action alleged that the defendants “knowingly, willfully and 
recklessly engage in a policy and practice of deporting Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
refugees back to those countries where they are threatened by war, persecution and the 
systematic and widespread denial of fundamental human rights.”181 This cause of action 
further described the danger and devastation in these two countries where residents were 
subject to government sponsored torture, disappearance, execution and more. Therefore 
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by deporting Central Americans in the United States back to their home countries the 
defendants recklessly placed refugees in danger. 
After listing the causes of action, the complaints final section, “relief,” asked the 
court to take specific actions in response to the “causes of action.” In the initial complaint 
the plaintiffs asked for six forms of relief. First, they asked the court to bar any present 
and future prosecutions of Sanctuary Movement workers for hiding or smuggling Central 
American refugees. Second, they requested the court issue a declaratory judgment182 that 
grants Sanctuary workers the legal right to provide aid to refugees from El Salvador and 
Guatemala.183 Third, the plaintiffs asked the Court to bar the INS and State Department 
from apprehending and deporting Central Americans until after the civil wars and human 
rights violations ceased in Guatemala and El Salvador. Fourth, they petitioned the court 
to issue a second declaratory judgment that states all Guatemalans and Salvadorans 
fleeing conflict in their home countries are entitled to temporary refuge in the United 
States. Fifth, they asked the court to charge the defendants for plaintiffs’ legal fees (a 
standard practice in pro bono cases, as this one was). Finally, they requested that the 
“court award such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.”184 
The day they filed the complaint, the churches, refugee organizations and plaintiff 
lawyers held a news conference. Attended by local and national news outlets, it resulted 
in articles the next day in The New York Times, The San Francisco Chronicle, Torrance  
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183 ABC “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,” May 7, 1985, p. 51. 
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Breeze, Sacramento Bee, and other regional and national newspapers. As Marc Van Der  
Hout, one of the lead lawyers for the plaintiffs, explained:  
“In a political case, it is multifaceted… what happens in the courtroom is very 
important, what happens in the court of public opinion, the plaintiffs, and giving 
them a voice is very important, bringing this lawsuit was also viewed by the 
plaintiffs as a means to expose the hypocrisy in US foreign policy of Central 
America.185  
 
In articles published the next day reporters first mentioned the lawsuit’s affiliation 
with the recent Sanctuary prosecutions (the subject of chapter 2).186 Less than four 
months before the suit’s filing the media had given Sanctuary activists generally 
sympathetic coverage following their indictment and arrests in January. Present, but less 
emphasized in the articles covering the lawsuit was the complaint’s attempt to remedy the 
treatment of Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees. This was fitting, as the original 
impetus for the case was the treatment of Sanctuary Movement workers. Yet, as Marc 
Van Der Hout noted above, ironically the case ultimately focused exclusively on the 
treatment of Central American refugees. This came from a series of complex legal 
maneuverings analyzed in the following sections. 
3.5 Depositions, Motions to Dismiss and the First Ruling 
After filing a complaint the next step in the case was discovery, a process where 
plaintiff and defendant lawyers gather information necessary to strengthen their case. 
Both groups may take depositions,187 request documents, make a variety of motions on 
the inclusion/exclusion of evidence (similar to the motion in limine in the preceding 
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187 Depositions are sworn testimonies most often taken prior to trial to assist the parties in gaining the 
relevant information necessary for the case. The opposite party may file a “motion for a protective order” to 
stop the deposition. 
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chapter) or move that the case be dismissed entirely. The case never left this stage as the 
plaintiffs, defendants and judge spent five years arguing in court over what parts (if any) 
of the complaint were legitimate, who could be deposed (interviewed) and what 
documents needed to be produced. Throughout this half-decade long process the 
plaintiffs amended their complaint three times, the defendants filed three motions to 
dismiss, and Judge Peckham issued four formal rulings. 
The process began with the plaintiffs’ lawyers attempting to gather more 
information to strengthen their complaint. In addition, as a political case, they wanted to 
keep the spotlight on US foreign policy in Central America. Therefore, they decided to 
strengthen their case by deposing several high-ranking government officials. They hoped 
that by taking depositions from Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and Alan Nelson, Commissioner of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Services, they would uncover information on US asylum procedures 
and US knowledge of human rights crimes in Central America that would prove legally 
and politically useful. The lawyers mailed out the deposition notices to Abrams and 
Nelson on June 12, 1985. 
The government immediately tried to stymie the plaintiffs by preparing a motion 
for a protective order that would bar the requested depositions. They filed the motion on 
July 8, 1985 and provided two justifications. First, they argued that any depositions 
should be halted until after they had filed their motion for dismissal. Second, they argued 
that the depositions were an attempt to discover the “mental processes” of government 
officials, something that is protected under US law. 
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On September 16th Judge Peckham called lawyers from both parties into his 
chambers to discuss the deposition requests and the motion for a protective order. Similar 
to many of his other cases, Peckham called a variety of semi-informal meetings between 
himself and the participating lawyers over the course of the case that demonstrated that 
he possessed a flexible legal mind willing to engage lawyers in a debate free of the 
trappings of standard legal procedures. Frank Deale, a CCR staff attorney from New 
York who was unfamiliar with Peckham’s style, was involved early on in the discovery 
process. He recalls the following about the meetings: 
Normally [judicial proceedings are] very formal… What struck me was that I 
thought Peckham was so different in that regard. I remember being there... He 
comes in, I don’t even know if he had his robe on… and he essentially ran a 
dialogue. He came in with a series of questions… and he put the questions to both 
sides. And that was basically it… That was very memorable. That so called oral 
argument because it wasn’t an argument at all.188 
 
 Eleven days after the “oral arguments” over the depositions Peckham issued a 
ruling addressing both of the government’s arguments for a protective order. The 
government first asked to stay the depositions as it was on the verge of filing a notion to 
dismiss. Peckham ruled against the government, stating that preventing the plaintiffs 
from interviewing officials “might prejudice their ability to develop sufficient facts to 
survive the forthcoming motion to dismiss…”189 Peckham ruled in partial favor of the 
government regarding its second argument (“mental processes”) for a protective order. 
On August 2nd plaintiffs had filed a response to the motion for protective order where 
they stated that their depositions were only for specific information, and Peckham ruled 
that these questions could be answered through written communication, rather than 
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through face-to-face interviews. While the plaintiffs sought in-person interviews, the 
government wanted to protect INS officials and complained that this would be too 
burdensome. In the hopes of getting a speedy response, the plaintiffs agreed to pose the 
questions to the INS and State Department through interrogatories (questions submitted 
in writing), a compromise that the defendants’ lawyers had assured the Court would be 
acceptable during the September 16th meeting. Finally, Peckham cautioned the 
defendants that insufficient answers to the interrogatories could very well result in future 
depositions, a warning that proved prescient.190 
 The plaintiffs quickly submitted a set of broad interrogatories that sought 
information on a host of subjects related to US policy in Central America and US policy 
towards asylum seekers from around the world. These included requests to “Identify each 
government employee within and without the Department of Justice who has taken part 
in any… approval or denial of grants of extended voluntary departure. For each 
individual so named please state the particular decision…. Identify in particular any 
office or individual whose positive or negative decision in consideration of extended 
voluntary departure may be determinative,” and to “Identify all documents and other 
information in the possession… of defendants or any of their representatives which refer 
or relate to conditions or events in El Salvador and Guatemala since January 1, 1979.”191 
 Unsurprisingly, the government did not take this request well. While they 
answered in part most of the interrogatories on January 31st, they filed a fifteen page set 
of objections as well as a motion to dismiss the same day. The challenges included three 
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general objections192 and thirteen specific objections. The bulk of the specific objections 
related to the breadth of the requests and the burden answering them would place on the 
government. As an example, the government objected to the plaintiffs’ request for 
information concerning the conditions or events in El Salvador and Guatemala by 
writing: 
Plaintiffs request all documentary or nondocumentary information about any 
condition or even in El Salvador and Guatemala since January 1, 1979. As 
drafted, the interrogatory encompasses every telegram, memorandum, or 
document prepared in or obtained by the defendants that mentions El Salvador or 
Guatemala throughout a seven-year period. Indeed, plaintiffs’ request broadly 
encompasses every scrap of paper pertaining to El Salvador or Guatemala without 
regard to its relevance to extended voluntary departure or asylum. 
 
Clearly, not only was the breadth and burden of the requests a problem to the 
government, but they also sensed that the plaintiffs’ requests went beyond a case built 
around denial of asylum and violations of religious freedom. As Van Der Hout stated, the 
plaintiffs also intended to make this a case on the government’s hypocrisy in Central 
America. 
 Recognizing the gravity of the case, the government moved to dismiss on the 
grounds that #1: the plaintiffs lack standing, #2: the claims in the complaint are political 
issues and not subject to legal action, and #3: the complaint does not give a claim for 
which relief can be granted.193 In addition to the motion to dismiss, the government filed 
a 28-page supplemental memorandum elaborating on its arguments for dismissal. The 
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supplemental memorandum attacked the complaint on all fronts. Notable is its 
exploration of plaintiffs’ lack of standing.  
 Standing is an important legal doctrine used to determine who may bring suit in a 
federal court. It is meant to limit the number of lawsuits to only plaintiffs who are 
directly affected by the actions taken by defendants. The courts have developed two sets 
of requirements for standing, constitutional and prudential, both of which typically must 
be met in order to bring suit in a federal court.194 In order to meet the constitutional 
requirements for standing (taken from Article III of the US Constitution) the plaintiffs 
must have suffered or been threatened injury that can be traced to the defendants that the 
court may either resolve or offer relief for. Prudential standing, a doctrine evolved over 
decades of case law, requires three tests: #1: plaintiffs must be arguing in their behalf and 
not on the rights/interests of third parties #2: injury to plaintiffs must be specific to them 
or to a small group #3: the grounds for the plaintiff’s complaint must be something 
protected by federal law.195 The government’s motion to dismiss argued that the plaintiffs 
failed to meet these requirements and tests for standing. For example, the government 
pointed out that the majority of the plaintiffs have never been prosecuted for violations of 
immigration law. Since they have never suffered injury they fail the first part of 
constitutional standing. The plaintiffs later countered counter with the argument that their 
participation in the Sanctuary Movement left them open to the potential to suffer injury. 
Similarly, the government argued that the plaintiffs fail the first test of prudential 
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standing as they lack the standing necessary to bring suit on behalf of refugees. This was 
a thorny issue, and repeatedly caused the plaintiffs issues throughout the case as the 
refugee aid organizations were not themselves refugees. The plaintiffs later solved this 
problem by adding refugees to their complaint.196 
 Next, the memorandum argued that aiding undocumented immigrants was not a 
constitutionally protected religious activity, citing a variety of cases to argue that not all 
religious activity is constitutionally protected. The first case they cited was Reynolds v. 
United States, an 1878 Supreme Court case where George Reynolds, a member of the 
Church of Latter-day Saints, argued that bigamy convictions illegally violated his right to 
freely exercise his religion. The Supreme Court denied Reynolds’ claim, stating that 
religious belief must be subject to the government’s laws. Subsequent cases further 
refined this doctrine, exploring the tension between religious freedom and the state’s 
laws. In 1982 the Ninth Circuit Court established a three-pronged test designed to test 
religious freedom claims.197 
 The first prong of the test examined the extent of the law’s affect on the exercise 
of a particular religious belief. The government argued that enforcement of immigration 
law had no impact on religious belief as anyone is free to believe that undocumented 
Central Americans should remain in this country. Yet they cannot aid those people in 
illegally crossing the border.198 
 The second prong measures how compelling the state’s interest is in enforcing the 
law that violates someone’s free exercise. On this count the government argued that the 
                                                
196 ABC, “Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss,”(1986), pp. 4-5, 12-13. 
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control of one’s own borders and immigration policy is among the most pressing of 
government concerns. They quoted a variety of Supreme Court justices discussing the 
magnitude of the immigration issue in preceding cases (examples include “titanic” from 
Justice William Brennan, “staggering” from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and “a tide of 
illegal aliens... massive lawlessness” from Chief Justice William Burger).199 
 The final prong of the test asks if an exemption from the statute/law would 
obstruct the state’s goals for the statute. Here the government stated that the plaintiffs’ 
desire for an exemption from laws relating to those fleeing war and human rights 
violations in Guatemala and El Salvador was overly broad as it would apply to all 
immigrants from those countries. In addition, the government argued that if the court 
granted the exemption in this case, it would set precedent for the same exemption to be 
granted to all immigrants fleeing war and human rights violations in any country. The 
government believed that this would place undue stress on the nation’s immigration 
system. The argument concluded by stating that any religious interest plaintiffs might 
have in aiding undocumented Central Americans in the United States “is overbalanced by 
the government’s interest in enforcing its immigration laws.”200 
 The supplemental memorandum continued through the remaining counts in the 
complaint relating to INS treatment of Central Americans, arguing that each should also 
be dropped. It stated that the plaintiffs lacked the standing needed to make claims for 
Central Americans as they are not themselves Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. In 
addition, the requested claims were not suitable for a judge to decide as they were 
political issues. Finally, even if the clients were granted standing and the claims were 
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found to be suitable for a judge to decide, the case should be dismissed as the claims were 
wrong according to the law.   
While the government prepared its motions to dismiss, Sanctuary activists in 
Phoenix filed a new lawsuit in retaliation to the Sanctuary prosecutions, a court in 
Washington, DC issued a ruling on a similar case, and President Reagan signed a new 
immigration bill into law. Each of these events had an effect on the case. Judge Peckham 
asked both parties to submit memorandums discussing the impact of the Washington, DC 
case and the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) on the ABC 
case. 
The Presbyterian Church and American Lutheran Church, in conjunction with 
their members and two churches infiltrated by INS agents during Operation Sojourner, 
filed a lawsuit on January 14, 1986 in the US District Court of Arizona that bore many 
similarities to the ABC case. This lawsuit, The Presbyterian Church et. al. v United 
States, mirrored the first half of the ABC complaint (free exercise claims). Dismissed at 
the district court level, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit told 
the district court to hear the case. After hearing the case the district court decided in favor 
of the government, but warned it to be careful when recording religious activities.201 This 
case offers an interesting comparison to the ABC case. A significant reason for the 
durability of the ABC case was the plaintiffs’ ability and the judge’s willingness to shift 
the focus of the complaint back and forth from religious freedom to refugee rights. This 
kept the ABC case alive whereas the plaintiffs in Presbyterian Church v United States 
lost their case because they kept their focus on one issue.  
                                                
201 Barbara Bezdek, “Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen Interpretation,” 
Tennessee Law Review 62:899 (1994-1995), 981. 
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On October 31 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
issued a decision in the case of Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith.202 The 
case was first brought in 1984 by the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union in 
Washington, DC and appealed in 1986. The union, primarily made up of Salvadoran 
workers, challenged the INS’s asylum procedures and the Attorney General’s decision 
not to grant Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD) to Salvadorans. EVD was a status the 
Attorney General could grant that allowed a specific group of foreign nationals to remain 
in the country until the conditions in their countries of birth stabilized. Prior to the Hotel 
decision EVD had been granted to, among others, Polish, Iranian and Nicaraguan 
citizens. The plaintiffs in the Hotel case argued that the Attorney General abused his own 
privileges and only granted EVD status to nationals for political purposes.  
Like the ABC case, the government tried to dismiss the case on three grounds: that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the case was on a political question, and that the 
plaintiffs failed to state a claim. In 1984 the district court denied the government’s 
motions to dismiss, but made a summary judgment that denied the plaintiffs’ asylum 
claims and found granting EVD was within the discretion of the Attorney General and 
not subject to judicial review. In 1986 the Circuit Court both affirmed in part and 
reversed in part the decision. It found that the plaintiffs had standing and that EVD was 
solely within the Attorney General’s discretion.203 Though not binding on the District 
Court of Northern California, the decision benefitted both parties in the ABC case. It 
supported the plaintiffs’ arguments in support of standing, while strengthening the 
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government’s case that this was a political issue not subject by judicial review. In his first 
ruling on the government’s motion to dismiss Peckham relied heavily on the Hotel 
decision in regard to the all-important grounds of standing. 
The second event Peckham asked to be addressed was the passage of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This extensive transformation of 
immigration policy, signed into law on November 6, 1986, had a number of provisions 
significant to the case. Most significantly, it revised the statute (8 U.S.C. §1324) under 
which Sanctuary workers had been prosecuted. Prior to the passage of the IRCA section 
274(a) made it a crime to (#1) bring into the United States anyone who is not legally 
permitted, (#2) knowingly transport an alien within the United States, (#3) willfully 
harbor, conceal or shield an alien from detection, or (#4) knowingly encourage or attempt 
to encourage entry into the United States of an alien.  
Partly in response to Sanctuary Movement lawyers’ arguments that international 
and domestic law gave refugees (even if they were undocumented) legal rights to reside 
in the United States, Section 112 of IRCA amended that statute to clarify the illegality of 
transporting undocumented immigrants. It made significant revisions to each of the four 
provisions cited above. For the first, it made it clear that it was illegal to bring an 
undocumented immigrant into the United States in any place other than at a designated 
port of entry “regardless of whether such alien has received prior official authorization to 
come, enter, or reside in the United States…” On the second provision, it put “reckless 
disregard” on par with “knowing,” as a response to some arguments by Sanctuary 
lawyers that activists had transported refugees without being aware that the refugees were 
undocumented. For the same reason IRCA also added “reckless disregard” to the third 
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and fourth provisions.204 In response to the passage of IRCA the plaintiffs told Peckham 
that they were “prepared to limit their request for relief to halt prosecutions for sanctuary 
activities to be considered to be illegal by the defendants up to and including November 
6, 1986 the date that the new statute was promulgated.”205 Two months after the 
plaintiffs’ submission of the memorandum on the IRCA Judge Peckham issued a split 
ruling on the government’s all-important motions to dismiss. The ruling dismissed some 
of the plaintiffs’ claims and allowed others to proceed. 
 The government had asked the court to dismiss the case as #1: the plaintiffs 
lacked standing, #2: the complaint was not justiciable (able to be tried in a court of law) 
as it addressed political issues, and #3: the complaint lacked relief for the claim it 
addressed. Peckham structured his ruling by sketching out a brief background to the 
complaint. He proceeded to address first the standing and merits of the religious 
organizations’ claims and then those of the refugee organizations.  
He found that the plaintiff religious organizations had standing to sue based on 
the fact that the government’s actions had “interfere(d) with their own religious missions, 
because they have alleged the threat of prosecutions has a deterrent effect on persons who 
would otherwise be willing to participate in the Sanctuary Movement.”206 Thus they met 
the constitutional requirements for standing. They also met the prudential requirements 
for standing as the limitations on religious freedom they alleged was on their own behalf 
and particular to the organizations, and the claim rested on religious freedom, which is 
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protected under the first amendment. Crucially, Peckham added that, “if the plaintiff 
religious organizations are unable to prove the existence of such a deterrent effect at trial, 
the court will be compelled to conclude that they lack standing to assert their claims.” 207 
The recent passage of the IRCA made this a difficult task that, as we will see, proved 
impossible for the plaintiffs. 
While he had found that the plaintiffs had standing to assert their first amendment 
rights and ask for protection for those already prosecuted, Peckham was suspect of the 
request by the plaintiffs for an injunction against prosecution of anyone affiliated with 
Sanctuary. Here he ruled that deciding the merits of that request would require every 
member of the religious organizations to take the stand and testify that his or her actions 
were the product of religious, and not secular, belief.208 Therefore he allowed the 
plaintiffs to continue their suit asking for protection for those already being prosecuted, 
but dismissed the request for protection from prosecution for all those affiliated with the 
Movement.  
 He also ruled on the merits of the religious organizations’ first amendment claims 
in response to the government’s motion to dismiss on the basis of non-justiciable issues. 
Using the EEOC test discussed above, he found that #1: the government’s actions had the 
potential to impede the free exercise of religion and were worth arguing over in court, #2: 
the state did have a compelling interest but not an overriding one that would make the 
claim non-justiciable, and #3: plaintiffs’ argument that they had statements from top-
ranking government officials that said Sanctuary was not that big of an issue was worth 
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discussing in court. Therefore, he declined the government’s motion to dismiss the suit as 
non-justiciable.209 
 Peckham then turned to the refugee organizations that requested temporary refuge 
for their members and claimed the government had violated the equal protection clause in 
its treatment of Salvadorans and Guatemalans asylum applicants. He primarily discussed 
the government’s argument that the organizations lacked standing. First, he examined 
whether the organizations met the constitutional requirements for standing and found that 
they were able to allege sufficient injures to themselves and their members to confer 
standing. Yet, he found that they lacked prudential standing. The claim the organizations 
were trying to make (violation of international refugee law by the government against 
Central Americans), and the relief they were seeking (temporary refuge for Salvadorans 
and Guatemalans) was neither a claim based on the organization nor a relief for the 
organization. Instead, it was a claim based on injuries to individual refugees and best 
brought by refugees themselves.210  
In anticipation of that ruling, the organizations had argued in a supplemental 
memorandum that even if they were denied standing to sue in their own right, they 
possessed something called “associational standing” to sue on behalf of Central 
Americans as members of a group. Associational standing can be conferred on an 
organization if it meets the three requirements laid out in the landmark case Hunt v. 
Washington Apple Advertising Commission. There are three requirements: “(a) its 
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it 
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim 
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asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.”211 Peckham found that the refugee organizations did not meet the first 
requirement as he was unsure whether the refugees themselves had standing as there was 
no mention in the complaint that they had “exhausted administrative remedies,” meaning 
that they had taken every available legal recourse to gain asylum. Since they failed the 
first prong he did not go any further. As the refugee aid organizations lacked standing and 
their claims were dismissed, Peckham did not discuss the merits of their claims like he 
did for the religious organizations. 
 Almost two years after filing their complaint and with hundreds of hours invested 
in motions, court dates and more, the plaintiffs saw all but one of their claims dismissed. 
This had the potential to be an enormously discouraging ruling, but Peckham 
significantly added one small phrase at the end of his ruling: “The court grants the motion 
to dismiss the remaining claims with thirty days leave to amend to state facts in support 
of their argument for associational standing.”212 This sentence left the door open for a 
massive overhaul of the plaintiffs’ complaint, particularly in the area that became the 
lawsuit’s lasting legacy. Without the permission to amend the complaint, the suit would 
have continued only on the grounds of religious freedom, claims that the court ultimately 
dismissed. By leaving room to amend the complaint, Peckham gave the plaintiffs the 
opportunity to present a more refined argument on how the government discriminated 
against Guatemalan and Salvadoran asylum seekers. This argument led to a massive 
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asylum settlement that transformed US asylum policy towards refugees from Central 
America and around the world. 
3.6 First and Second Amended Complaint and Class Certification: 
The plaintiffs’ first amended complaint,213 submitted twenty nine days after 
Peckham’s memorandum and order, directly addressed the judge’s ruling by widening the 
list of plaintiffs and asking for additional relief. The amended complaint also 
significantly transformed the case from one brought by disparate religious and refugee 
aid organizations into a class action lawsuit.  
First, the amended complaint subtracted three plaintiffs and added twelve new 
ones to the suit. Most notable among the omissions was Southside Presbyterian, the 
church that had been the main target of “Operation Sojourner.” The plaintiffs had actually 
removed Southside six months before filing the amended complaint, as it was 
participating in the Presbyterian Churches v. U.S.A. case discussed in section six.214 The 
new plaintiffs included both religious organizations and individual refugees. The new 
religious organizations broadened the geographic scope of the case, with new churches 
and houses of worship from Washington, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Ohio. The new 
refugee plaintiffs, John Doe and Marvyn Perez, were the most important additions. 
John Doe (pseudonym), a Salvadoran citizen in his early 30s, fled his country in 
January of 1985 in fear for his life after he had been arrested and beaten for two and a 
half days for his activity in a trade union, as well as the activities of his family in student 
and teacher groups. Accused of being a “subversive” (and thus in danger of the far-right 
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death squads roaming the country), Doe migrated to Mexico. In Mexico the police abused 
Doe, and he subsequently moved north to the United States. Once in the US, Doe asked 
an immigration lawyer about applying for asylum who advised him that applying for 
asylum would be fruitless and only result in deportation. 
In May 1982 the Guatemalan National Police arrested, beat and tortured Marvyn 
Perez, a 14 year old Guatemalan child, for his participation in student activism. Two 
months later a local newspaper published his photo and Perez was forced to make a 
public confession that he was a former guerilla. Shortly afterwards he fled north and 
entered the United States in October of 1982. Like Doe, Perez never applied for asylum. 
Less than two years after entering the country, Perez and other young people who lived 
through conflicts went on a lecture tour around the United States trying to raise 
awareness of the consequences of war and violence on children. This lecture further 
heightened his profile and made it all the more dangerous for him to return to Guatemala. 
The inclusion of John Doe and Marvyn Perez served a number of important 
purposes for the plaintiffs. First, it responded to Peckham’s dismissal of the claims of the 
refugee organizations. His ruling had determined that while the organizations had 
constitutional standing, they lacked “prudential standing” because individual refugees 
could bring their claims to court. Thus the plaintiffs assumed that Doe and Perez 
possessed both constitutional and prudential standing as individual refugees for their 
temporary refuge and equal protection claims.   
Second, incorporating Doe and Perez allowed the plaintiffs to add class action 
allegations to their complaint. Class actions suits are commonly used when it is 
logistically impossible for courts to hear the complaints of all the members of a broad 
   114 
class of people. Class actions must meet four criteria in order to be considered. There 
must be a substantial number of members whose claims can be folded into one class; 
there must be commonality between members of the class in issues of law and fact; there 
must be representatives of the class in the complaint; and the representatives of the class 
must be able to protect the interests of the class.215 The plaintiffs divided up their class 
action into two sub classes, one for Salvadorans in the US and one for Guatemalans in the 
US. They further divided the sub classes into Salvadorans and Guatemalans who: #1: 
“fled their countries because of internal armed conflict, war, and gross violations of 
human rights and have not nor will be granted temporary refuge in the U.S…” or #2: 
“meet the eligibility requirements for refugee status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1101(42)… 
whose status has not been and will not be recognized by the defendants.“216 
Doe and Perez helped the plaintiffs meet each criteria for a class action. First, the 
hundreds of thousands of Guatemalan and Salvadoran citizens in the United States who 
had fled strife in their home countries met the numerical requirement. Second, the people 
included in the class all had a common injury, being denied or potentially denied 
asylum/temporary refuge. Third, Doe (Salvadoran) and Perez (Guatemalan) represented 
both subclasses. Finally, they could successfully represent the entire class as neither had a 
criminal history or serious history of moral failings. 
The addition of Doe and Perez did present one problem for the plaintiffs. As 
neither had applied for asylum, they were open to accusation that they failed to exhaust 
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administrative remedies. As discussed below, the government took this line of attack, 
among others, in its motions to dismiss. 
Furthermore, the amended complaint added some information when listing the 
plaintiffs, particularly when discussing the refugee aid organizations. In his ruling 
Peckham had faulted the plaintiffs for not making the refugee aid organizations’ 
affiliation with refugees clear. The amended complaint emphasized the membership of 
plaintiff Centro Presente (80% Salvadoran and Guatemalan citizens, many of whom were 
refugees) and plaintiff Committee of Central American Refugees (which required that its 
members be Central Americans fleeing conflict). 
 The complaint then transitioned to the statement of facts and the causes of action. 
It added to the first cause of action the accusation that “(t)he defendants cannot 
demonstrate a compelling state interest in prosecuting sanctuary workers which 
outweighs the religious sanctuaries’ and their members’ sincerely held religious 
beliefs.”217 It expanded the second cause of action to state that applying for asylum was 
not only futile but also dangerous as a result of the defendants’ actions. This was a direct 
response to Peckham’s dismissal of the refugee organizations’ claims on the basis that 
their members had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. On the third cause of action 
the amended complaint explicitly added that the discriminatory treatment of Guatemalans 
and Salvadorans during asylum procedures violated the guarantee of equal protection of 
the law. It made no change to the fourth and final cause of action regarding deportations. 
Though these additions were notable for the expansion of the complaint’s allegations, the 
most significant addition (outside of the inclusion of Doe and Perez) was the new relief 
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the plaintiffs requested. Specifically, they asked that: “this court issue an order to require 
defendants to propose a plan for the orderly, non-discriminatory and procedurally fair 
reprocessing of all denied political asylum applications of Salvadorans and Guatemalans 
filed subsequent to 1980.”218 This request presaged, almost exactly, one of the most 
substantial sections of the settlement agreement. 
 A month after submitting the first amended complaint the plaintiffs filed a 
deposition notice for Raymond Kisor, associate commissioner for enforcement for the 
INS.  One of the case’s main goals at the beginning was the deposition of high-ranking 
INS officials to gather more information and perhaps uncover material embarrassing to 
the government. While Peckham denied plaintiffs access to the highest ranking officials 
in September 1986, activists hoped that Kisor would be an important enough official to 
supply the information they wanted but not important enough to justify an exclusion of 
him on the grounds that he was too busy. They requested a wide-ranging array of 
documents from the government related to its policies in Central America, prosecution of 
the Sanctuary Movement, and treatment of Central American refugees and refugee 
claims. 
On July 1, 1987, two weeks after the notice to depose Mr. Kisor, the government 
filed a series of answers to the first amended complaint.219 The first three (court lacks 
jurisdiction, plaintiffs do not have standing, complaint does not state a relievable claim) 
reiterated in a single sentence per claim the arguments laid out in the government’s 
motions to dismiss. The fourth went step by step through the complaint, attacking the 
plaintiff list, statement of facts, causes of actions and requests. The response either denied 
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the plaintiffs’ statements, partially admitted them, attacked them as characterizations or 
claimed to have insufficient knowledge about them to make a firm denial (which has the 
effect of a denial). The final defense was a blanket request to deny the plaintiffs any form 
of relief, and remunerate the defense for expenses or any relief the court may see fit. 
 In addition, the defense filed another series of motions, asking the court to dismiss 
the case, issue summary judgment and/or place a stay on the depositions.220 First, the 
government moved for summary judgment221 on the religious organizations’ first 
amendment claims, attempting to end the case immediately. Then if summary judgment 
was not granted, they asked the court to dismiss the religious organizations’ claims for 
lack of standing and/or legal insufficiency (insufficient evidence available to prove the 
claim). The government also moved for dismissal of the refugee organizations’ claims, 
arguing that they lacked standing, had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and were 
also legally insufficient. As for the individual refugees, the government moved that the 
individual refugees had both failed to exhaust available administrative remedies and that 
their claims were legally insufficient. Finally, the government asked that the court stay 
Mr. Kisor’s deposition while it considered the motions.  
 Like before, Peckham followed a slow and methodical approach to the competing 
motions. First he called lawyers from both parties into his chambers to discuss the 
motions to dismiss. Peckham again issued a stay on formal depositions but granted the 
plaintiffs leave to send written questions to Mr. Kisor.222 For nearly 14 months the case 
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proceeded in a similar fashion to its first year. The plaintiffs requested a widening array 
of documents and attempted to depose INS officials. The government rebuffed their 
requests and requested the judge dismiss the complaint. 
 On October 6, 1988, Peckham granted a measure of clarity to the muddled legal 
issues with a major ruling on the government’s motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment, and the plaintiffs’ motions to compel the government to produce the 
documents they requested.223 Similar to his previous ruling in March 1987, it was a split 
decision that granted some of the government’s motions and denied others. The inclusion 
of Doe and Perez proved crucial for the plaintiffs. Unlike his previous ruling Peckham 
dismissed all of the religious organizations’ claims. In addition, he dismissed all of the 
claims from the refugee aid organizations. Only those from Doe and Perez survived. 
 Peckham’s dismissal of the religious organizations’ first amendment claims 
stemmed from the changes to immigration law that came from the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). As noted above, a series of modifications to the laws on 
transporting and harboring of aliens in the IRCA more clearly criminalized Sanctuary 
activities. The plaintiffs therefore changed their request for relief to a retroactive one that 
was only applicable to prosecutions of Sanctuary activities prior to IRCA’s passage. Yet, 
when Peckham denied the government’s motion to dismiss the religious organizations’ 
claims in 1987 he stressed that in order to have standing the plaintiffs must be able to 
prove that the government’s actions affected their religious beliefs. Peckham found that 
as the plaintiffs were only requesting relief for actions taken in the past, the government’s 
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activities were not affecting their religious beliefs. Thus they lacked standing and their 
claims were dismissed. 
 The second claim made by the religious organizations was of religious 
harassment. Peckham found that the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that they had 
been selectively targeted for their religious belief as they were unable to demonstrate 
“that others are generally not prosecuted for the same conduct.”224 When confronted with 
this argument, the plaintiffs had argued that agricultural companies were rarely 
prosecuted for immigration law violations. Yet this was not enough for Peckham. A 
selective enforcement claim requires that the majority of potential violators of the law be 
ignored while the plaintiffs are targeted specifically. Peckham pointed out that there the 
government convicted over 4,000 people for violations of the harboring/transporting 
provision between 1984 and 1986 and during that time brought only five cases against 
Sanctuary workers. Thus Peckham issued summary judgment on the selective 
enforcement claim in favor of the government, ending any real legal hope for the 
religious organizations’ claims in ABC.  
 Next, Peckham turned to the refugee organizations to see if they had standing. In 
his previous ruling he had found they lacked standing but granted them the ability to 
amend their complaint. The amended complaint explicitly answered a number of 
Peckham’s critiques, addressing each prong of the Hunt test. Peckham found that the 
plaintiffs had satisfactorily met the first prong of the Hunt test as they had proved that 
their members had standing to sue in their own right. This was important for a variety of 
reasons. First, Peckham had ruled in 1987 that the organizations failed the first prong and 
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then declined to go any further in his examination of their claims. Second, Peckham 
found that while traditionally people must show they have exhausted all administrative 
remedies in order to have standing, it was unnecessary in this case as exhausting 
administrative remedies (applying for asylum etc) was not only futile (due to the 
abysmally low acceptance rate) but also dangerous. This meant that the claims of Doe 
and Perez, neither of whom had applied for asylum, would not be dismissed due to a 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Peckham also found that the organizations met 
the second prong of the Hunt test, that the cause the organization sued over was relevant 
to its purpose. Yet, Peckham found that they failed the third prong as the claims they 
brought would still best be brought by the refugees themselves and not by the refugee 
organizations. Therefore, he dismissed all of the claims made by the refugee 
organizations on the basis of their lacking standing. 
Fortunately for the plaintiffs, they had included individual refugees in the 
complaint. This saved the complaint from outright dismissal, something that would have 
ended the chance for the landmark settlement in 1991. Peckham turned to the individual 
refugees’ claims. First, pursuant to his ruling on refugee aid organizations he declined to 
dismiss individual refugees’ claims on the grounds of failing to exhaust administrative 
remedies. 225 Then, he undertook a detailed examination of their claims for temporary 
refuge. Doe and Perez had asked for the court to grant temporary refuge to Salvadorans 
and Guatemalans in the US until the civil wars and human rights abuses had ended in 
their countries. They asserted that they were entitled to this due to international law 
(Articles 1, 3, 45 and 49 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary international 
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law) and the Refugee Act of 1980. The government wanted to dismiss this on the grounds 
of legal insufficiency. Peckham was sympathetic to the government’s motion on a variety 
of fronts. First, he found that the cited portions of the Geneva Conventions were not 
wholly relevant to the case as they predominantly pertain to civilians IN countries where 
conflict is taking place. Article 45 of the Geneva Conventions forbids forced repatriation 
of civilians to places where international armed conflict is taking place, not where 
internal civil strife is taking place.226 Second, Peckham followed precedent regarding the 
relationship between international law and laws of the United States, finding that those of 
the US take precedence. In the case of refugee law, Congress passed a number of laws 
that superseded international law including the Refugee Act of 1980 and various 
immigration reforms (1967, IRCA etc). In addition, Congress had explicitly argued over 
giving temporary refuge to Central Americans and decided against it. Thus, Peckham 
ruled that “Congress has specifically rejected the norm of temporary refuge relied upon 
here. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the temporary refugee claim is granted.” 227  
Penultimately, Peckham turned to Doe and Perez’s equal protection claim, where 
the plaintiffs argued that Central Americans fleeing right-leaning regimes are not 
afforded protection equal to those fleeing Communist regimes (Poland, Cuba etc) are. 
They argued this violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws. The government argued that aliens were not afforded equal rights as citizens. 
Peckham cited a variety of past cases, including the aforementioned Hotel case, to 
establish the Executive must have a “rational basis” for denying rights to aliens that are 
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afforded to citizens. 228  He paid particular attention to the Hotel case, referring to the 
court’s decision withholding EVD to a specific group lay within the Attorney General’s 
discretion and passed the “rational basis” test. At the same time, he faulted both the 
plaintiffs and defendants for failing to address the rational basis test and therefore 
decided to deny the government’s motion to dismiss the individual refugees’ claims. 
In addition, Peckham denied the government’s motion for summary judgment on 
the equal protection claim due to the request for relief added to the amended complaint. 
The plaintiffs had asked for the court to order the government to establish “a plan for the 
orderly, non-discriminatory and procedurally fair reprocessing of all denied political 
asylum applications of Salvadorans and Guatemalans filed subsequent to 1980.”229 While 
international and domestic law did not compel the US to offer temporary refuge, 
Peckham found it worth arguing in court whether the Attorney General can use 
nationality to determine whether someone is eligible for asylum as US refugee law does 
not give him or her that right. Therefore, he declined to issue summary judgment.  
 Finally, Peckham addressed the plaintiff’s charge that the government had 
“wrongfully and willfully” sent Salvadorans and Guatemalans into danger when 
deporting them back to their country of birth. The government responded by saying that 
this claim was a “garden variety tort” and should be treated as such. Therefore, the 
government argued that as the plaintiffs raised issues protected by sovereign immunity, 
that Congress had already addressed the issue of immigration law and did not discuss 
why the court had jurisdiction over the claim, Finally, they claimed that if the tort was 
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treated as a fifth amendment issue, it had already been established in previous court cases 
that immigration procedures, by their very nature, grant due process.      
 Peckham did not agree with the last point, finding that the court did possess 
jurisdiction over the matter and that immigration procedures did not necessarily grant due 
process. Yet, as neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant discussed the issues relevant to 
the case cited (Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics), he would not issue a ruling on the matter.  
 In his first ruling in 1987 Peckham had issued a stay on Raymond Kisor’s 
deposition until after he had ruled on the government’s motions to dismiss. As some of 
the complaint survived the motions, he ordered the deposition to proceed either with Mr. 
Kisor or an official with similar authority and knowledge. In addition, he ordered the two 
parties to confer regarding the request for documents. When first confronted with the 
request, the government claimed it to be too broad. The plaintiffs agreed to narrow their 
request so Peckham ordered the two parties to meet rather than compelling the 
government to produce the requested documents. 
On March 28, 1989 Judge Peckham released an amended order with three 
significant changes to his October 1988 ruling. First, Peckham revisited his reliance on 
the Hotel decision, which he had used when ruling against the government’s motion to 
dismiss the individual refugees’ EVD claims. In the October decision he wrote that the 
court had “summarily rejected (Salvadorans’) contention that the Attorney General had 
violated their right to the equal protection of the laws…”230 but decided that “(a)fter 
further review… we note only that the court did subject the EVD decision to at least 
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some review.”231 This rewording of the decision gave the plaintiffs more latitude in 
asserting their equal protection claims. 
The second significant change reshaped the discussion of the refugees’ claim for 
temporary refuge. In the October decision Peckham wrote, concerning temporary refuge, 
“(f)urthermore, the norm itself has not ripened into a settled rule of international law via 
the general assent of ‘civilized nations.’ Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the 
temporary refuge claim is granted.’” In the amended decision Peckham simply dismissed 
the claim without adding any further discussion of the norm of temporary refuge. Again, 
this gave more room for the plaintiffs, who could now attempt to prove a norm for 
temporary refuge. 
Finally, Peckham repackaged his discussion of the individual refugees’ equal 
protection claims, the same claims that he let stand in October. Peckham again upheld 
those claims but significantly added to the discussion. While most of the language of this 
section remained the same, Peckham split his discussion into two. First, he took up the 
claim that the government had violated its equal protection obligations when it denied 
Extended Voluntary Departure to Central Americans but granted it to Poles. He declined 
to dismiss this claim. Second, he examined the refugees’ complaint that the government 
had violated the equal protection clause when applying the Refugee Act and adjudicating 
asylum applications. He also declined to dismiss the claim. 
Peckham maintained his decision to dismiss the religious and refugee 
organizations’ claims. This marked the end of the first amendment and religious 
harassment claims. Though American Baptist Churches remained the lead and titled 
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plaintiff, the focus of the case shifted entirely to the rights of Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans in the United States.  
3.7 Discovery and the Push for Settlement  
 Neither party received all of what they wanted in Peckham’s ruling, so over the 
next four months they prepared their next motions. The plaintiffs struck first, when on 
February 17, 1989 they filed their second amended complaint.232 While the Second 
Amended Complaint included the religious and refugee organizations, it was a last ditch 
effort that Peckham paid little attention to in his remaining rulings. His October 1988 
order had assured that the only surviving parts of the case involved individual refugees 
and, if the plaintiffs could convince the court, the class(es) of refugees that they 
represent. Barring one significant addition, the Second Amended Complaint looked much 
like the First Amended Complaint. That addition came in the make-up of the plaintiffs.  
Working closely with many of the refugee aid organizations identified in the 
complaint, the plaintiffs selected five new refugee plaintiffs who had applied for asylum 
and been denied. Four of the five new refuge plaintiffs went by the pseudonyms of Jane 
and John Doe. Jane Doe fled from El Salvador to the United States in 1986. Military 
sponsored death squads killed most of her family due to their participation in a 
farmworkers’ union. This included her brother, uncle, sister and mother. Her father 
disappeared in 1985. Like most desaparecidos it is likely that he was killed by the 
military. Similar to Marvyn Perez and John Doe in the previous complaint, Ms. Doe 
never applied for asylum. The next three plaintiffs went by “John Doe.” The first “John 
Doe,” and second new plaintiff, immigrated from Guatemala in 1988 after fleeing the 
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military. The third new plaintiff abandoned the Salvadoran military in 1986, fleeing to 
the US the same year and was denied asylum in 1988. The fourth new refugee plaintiff 
left Guatemala in 1983. The Guatemalan military accused this new plaintiff, a Kanjobal-
Mayan from San Miguel Acatan, of being a collaborator with the guerillas. He received a 
number of death threats from the military prior to fleeing Guatemala in 1983. He applied 
for asylum in the United States in 1986 and was denied in 1988. The final plaintiff, Rosa 
Maribel Fuentes, left El Salvador in 1983 after being jailed for nearly a year and a half 
for her political activities in a textile workers’ union. She applied for asylum and the 
State Department recommended to deny her application. At the time of filing the 
complaint a final verdict on her application had not been reached.  
These five new refugee plaintiffs represented the spectrum of Central Americans 
the lawsuit aimed to help. Some had applied for asylum but been denied, while others had 
not as they thought applying would be futile. The plaintiffs hoped that the court would 
use the four new refugee plaintiffs, as well as the two listed in the first amended 
complaint, as representatives of six subclasses representing all Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan refugees in the United States.233  
 The plaintiffs first moved for class certification on February 17th and then offered 
a corrected copy of the motion on February 27th. The first two subclasses included all 
refugees from, respectively, El Salvador and Guatemala in the United States who had 
applied for asylum and been denied. The third and fourth subclasses comprised of 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees who never applied for asylum because they 
believed that the attempt futile. Refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala who had fled 
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the violence in their countries and wanted to return to their homelands once the violence 
had ceased made up the fifth and sixth classes. 
 The defense replied in two stages. First, it filed another motion to dismiss and a 
request for summary judgment. The motion to dismiss attacked each of the surviving 
claims. It first looked at the constitutional tort claim that Peckham had let stand. The 
government cited two recent court cases (Schweiker v. Chilicky 108 S. Ct 2460(1988) and 
Kotarski v. Cooper 9th Cir. 84-5673 (1989)). It argued that both cases made it clear that 
when “Congress has made a deliberate choice as to the appropriate remedy for the harm 
alleged by plaintiffs, no constitutional tort remedy is to be replied.”234  Congress made 
“deliberate choices” on the treatment of refugees during the debates and passage of the 
Refugee Act and IRCA. Second, in direct response to Peckham’s critique of their failure 
to address the “rational basis” test, the defense pointed to the Hotel decision, as well as 
letters written by the Secretary of State and Attorney General to members of Congress 
regarding extending EVD to Salvadorans, as clear evidence that the Attorney General 
possessed a “rational basis” for denying Salvadorans EVD. Finally, the defense argued 
that the plaintiffs’ request for the court to force reprocessing of asylum applications was 
non-justicable. Citing National Coal Association v. Marshall (510 F. Supp. 803 D.D.C. 
1981), it stated that re-hearing the tens of thousands of asylum applications was simply 
too much for the court and far beyond its expertise. Thus, the court would be unable to 
effectively enforce its order and the claim should be dismissed. 
The second wave of the defense’s reply to the plaintiffs’ flurry of activity came on 
March 13th when it filed a memorandum opposing the motion for class certification. The 
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government argued that the plaintiffs’ motion to certify six classes should be denied as it 
did not meet the requirements for class certification.235 The memo in opposition to class 
certification argued first that the plaintiffs had addressed only the make-up of the class 
while failing to address the type of action to be brought. Both must be satisfied in order to 
bring a class action. In addition, the defense argued that the Central Americans who did 
not apply for asylum because they believed it to be futile did not have enough in common 
to be a class (“the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class”). The lawyers argued that there are many reasons why a refugee 
might decide not to apply for asylum and the only way to determine who should be 
included in the class would be to investigate each claimant. 236 Finally, the defense asked 
to deny the motion for class certification on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ request for 
temporary refuge had already been dismissed. The government noted that in the original 
motion submitted on February 17th the plaintiffs asked for the certification of two 
subclasses of refugees who have been wronged as they have been denied temporary 
refuge, which is given to them under international law. Peckham had forcefully denied 
this claim in his October 1988 ruling. The plaintiffs realized their mistake shortly after 
submitting the motion and in their corrected copy changed the wording to a claim for 
temporary refuge given under federal law. As the government noted, “(t)he change is 
entirely cosmetic. The temporary refuge issue has been adjudicated and cannot be revived 
with a new adjective.”237 
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The plaintiffs responded within a week. In contrast to the dry legal language of 
earlier filings, the plaintiffs submitted a document that, for a legal brief, expressed their 
frustration with the defense. In strong language they accused the government of woefully 
misreading the motion for class certification.238 In response to the defense’s argument 
that they failed to address the type of class action, the plaintiffs asserted that a host of 
documents, including the second amended complaint, motion for class certification and 
more, had repeatedly shown that they met the requirements for a specific class action 
type. Namely, they indicated that the government has “acted or refused to act on the 
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”239 They 
expressed “astonishment” that the government claimed they did not meet it and saw the 
only reasonable explanation to be that the government believed “the plaintiffs must prove 
that 23 (b) (2) has been met. Such a requirement, however, would obligate plaintiffs to 
prove their entire case at the class certification stage.”240 The government’s second 
objection, that the class of refugees who had never applied for asylum as they saw it to be 
futile was overly broad, also came under attack. The plaintiffs referred back to 
Peckham’s October 1988 decision where he recognized that for many Central Americans 
applying for asylum is futile and dangerous. Thus the claims of the refugees named in the 
suit are similar to those they are trying to represent. Finally, they turned to the defense’s 
claim that the court had already rejected the temporary refuge claim. The plaintiffs 
responded by making the distinction the government had mocked in its opposition to 
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class certification: that they were basing their claim for temporary refuge under federal 
law, not under international law, a concept Peckham had already ruled against.  
They also replied to the government’s motion to dismiss and for summary 
judgment.241 The plaintiffs argued that until they have been given a chance to discover 
the reasons why the government was denying EVD to Salvadorans and Guatemalans the 
court could not issue summary judgment. In addition, they argued that the defense’s 
attempt to dismiss their request for new asylum procedures “proceeds from a 
demonstrably false premise, thereby foredooming the entire argument.”242 The plaintiffs 
did not ask the court to oversee the new process but simply “develop a plan that ensures 
that its reprocessing of the applications will be accompanied by the fairness and even-
handedness lacking in their initial review and determination.” 243 They cited previous 
examples of similar processes like Orantes –Hernandez v. Meese (685 F. Supp. 1488 
C.D.Cal. 1988) and Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith (676 F. 2d 1023 5th Cir. 1982).  
Finally, they addressed the defense’s attempt to dismiss the constitutional tort claim, 
arguing that the two cases cited by the defense had no bearing on the present case as they 
had nothing to do with immigration law or discrimination.  
Three weeks later the plaintiffs filed another motion, asking the court to force the 
defense to release documents relating to asylum procedures. The defense replied with a 
request for a protective order. They continued to trade motions over evidence for the next 
six months until Peckham’s ruling on September 11, 1989. Once again, Peckham ruled 
for the defense in part and the plaintiffs in part. He declined to dismiss the EVD and 
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asylum claim, while dismissing the constitutional tort claim. He reasoned that it was 
possible that the plaintiffs could prove the government discriminated against Salvadorans 
and Guatemalans while denying them EVD. It would be difficult to prove and 
“(a)lthough plaintiffs’ burden is a heavy one… we cannot determine on the record before 
us that the plaintiffs will not be satisfied.”244 Using the same cases cited by the plaintiffs 
in their opposition to dismiss memo, Peckham also denied that government’s attempt to 
dismiss the asylum claim, finding that courts had enforced similar orders in the past. He 
then turned to the plaintiffs’ constitutional tort claim, finding that Congress had 
established sufficient procedures to determine who was a refugee, and who was and was 
not deportable. Regarding class certification, Peckham ruled that four of the six sub 
classes were permissible. The two that were not were those based on Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans who never applied for asylum as they thought it would be futile. Peckham 
agreed with the defense’s motion in opposition to class certification that these two 
subclasses were overly broad and it would be impossible to identify such a broad class. 
Finally, Peckham declined to rule on the plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery as both 
parties had, once again, agreed that the rulings would resolve problems with discovery. 
Similar to his March 1989 ruling, he threatened to step in if the government continued to 
hold up the discovery process. He thus ended the ruling by granting the plaintiffs leave to 
amend their complaint for the third time. 
And amend they did, submitting the third amended complaint on January 24, 
1990.245 Unlike the first or second amended complaint, the third complaint looked 
significantly different than the original complaint. The complaint did not contain any 
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details concerning the plaintiff religious and refugee organizations. Instead, the complaint 
only listed six of the seven refugees listed in the Second Amended Complaint. The only 
omission was Marvyn Perez, the Guatemalan teenager who had gone on a speaking tour 
following his arrival in the United States in 1984. During the interval between the Second 
and Third Amended Complaints Perez had been one of the few Central Americans to 
receive asylum. The other six remained in legal limbo and represented the subclasses 
included in the complaint. While the plaintiffs had divided their class action allegations 
into six subclasses in the Second Amended Complaint, in the Third Amended Complaint 
they reduced it down to two sub classes that encompassed all Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
citizens who had either #1: “fled their countries because of internal armed conflict, war 
and gross violations of human rights and have not been granted extended voluntary 
departure by the United States…” or #2: “who meet the eligibility requirements for 
refugee status… namely that they have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
political opinion, race, religion, nationality or social group, and whose status has not been 
recognized…”.246 
The statement of facts was shorter as it did not discuss the religious justifications 
for the Sanctuary Movement nor the government’s prosecutions of the Movement. The 
causes of action also went from five to two. The first surviving cause of action reiterated 
the tenets of the Refugee Act of 1980 and emphasized that the US government is required 
to grant asylum to those who meet the criteria set out in the act, regardless of the 
applicant’s nationality. Specifically, the first cause of action argued that the government’s 
“disregard of the requirements of the Refugee Act, and their pattern and practice of 
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discrimination against Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the asylum adjudication and the 
withholding of deportation processes, constitute a violation of the 1980s Refugee Act, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Fifth Amendment.”247 The second cause of 
action argued that the government’s granting of Extended Voluntary Departure to those 
fleeing communist regimes while withholding it from Central Americans “invidiously 
discriminates against plaintiffs in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights.” 248 
The plaintiffs asked for three forms of relief. First, they requested a declaratory 
judgment from the court granting all Salvadorans and Guatemalans fleeing civil war 
extended voluntary departure. Second, they requested that the Court order the 
government to set up a new and more fair asylum process that would reprocess all of the 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applications turned down post 1980 and all new 
applications made in the future. Finally, they made the standard request for the Court to 
award them any relief that the court saw fit (namely legal fees). 
On February 26, 1990, the defense filed a set of answers to the complaint that 
looked much like their previous submissions. 249 The government argued that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing and neglected to present a justiciable claim. In addition, it 
argued that the court did not have jurisdiction and the case did not meet the requirements 
for standing. Finally, the defense went step by step through the complaint denying the 
vast majority of it as a characterization or lacking in knowledge. These were the same 
defenses made in previous filings. A week later the government amended its answers and 
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presented two new defenses.250 These new defenses argued that the plaintiffs had taken 
too long to assert their claims and they no longer qualified for relief. Yet, neither of these 
defenses was ever resolved as the case took a turn toward settlement that spring.  
Four factors influenced the push for settlement. First, and most important, was the 
discovery process and the future complications it indicated. In his fall 1989 order 
Peckham had re-opened discovery and warned the government that it needed to cooperate 
with the plaintiffs. For the next nine months the two sides traded deposition requests and 
asked the court to deny the requests made by the other side. By July 1990 it was clear the 
plaintiffs had Judge Peckham’s ear and sympathy.251  
For discovery the plaintiffs’ made an immense request for documents that 
included tens of thousands of asylum decisions, training documents for asylum officers 
and much more. Fulfilling the discovery requests would have been a logistical nightmare. 
The government had no central repository for asylum decisions and immigration forms, 
so they lay in boxes scattered across the country. In addition, in keeping with privacy 
laws, the INS would have been required to redact the names of those involved and screen 
the papers for additional privacy and national security concerns.252 This promised to be 
an incredibly laborious and expensive process. In addition, the plaintiffs submitted 
depositions for a host of influential governmental officials, including James A. Baker III 
(Secretary of State), Richard Thornburgh (Attorney General), Ricardo Inzunza (Deputy 
Commissioner of the INS) and others. The government anticipated further depositions 
and foresaw a lengthy and expensive court case, which they could very well lose. Not 
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only would it tie up enormous amounts of time for government lawyers, it could result in 
the government paying what was bound to be the astronomical legal fees for the 
plaintiffs. As Carolyn Patty Blum, a lawyer for the plaintiffs explains: “The then-general 
counsel for the INS, William Cook, pragmatically assessed the situation and determined 
settlement negotiations were appropriate.”253 
Not only was the discovery process expensive, but it had the potential to be 
enormously embarrassing. Allegedly the plaintiffs unearthed a videotape of an official 
from the State Department training asylum officials to be receptive to applications from 
asylum seekers leaving the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua but skeptical of 
those seekers fleeing the right-wing death squads in Guatemala and El Salvador.254 
Discoveries of this sort would have only added to the public pressure activists and 
refugees had brought to bear on the government and its lawyers. As one lawyer explains,  
Every time we went to court, the courtroom was filled with people from the 
sanctuary movement. And they would do prayers out front before hand and be 
there with their habits and collars and everything in court and it was a very 
powerful statement.255 
 
Second, in the early 1990s immigration lawyers around the country began to 
notice a newfound willingness to settle immigration cases, including asylum/refugee 
cases like Haitian Refugee Center v. McNary (1991) and, of course, ABC.  Many 
attributed this change in direction to new INS commissioner Gene McNary and William 
Cook who “is generally credited with advancing settlement talks in ABC… McNary is 
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praised for encouraging the talks and approving the settlements.”256 The INS was in the 
process of crafting a new set of procedures for adjudicating asylum applications. 
Announced in July of 1990, these new regulations set up a new group of “Asylum 
Officers” who would “receive specialized training in the relevant fields of international 
relations and international law…” and would make asylum decisions in a non-adversarial 
setting.257 This stood in stark contrast to how INS officers had previously made asylum 
decisions where they received little training on the conditions in applicants’ home 
countries and were heavily dependent on State Department officials.258 For years refugee 
activists had complained that dependence on the State Department injected politics into 
asylum decisions, as State Department opinions often tracked with partisan US foreign 
policy. During the coming settlement negotiations the plaintiffs would place a great deal 
of stress on the role of the State Department, and the nature of asylum officers’ training. 
The third factor in the push for settlement was the Immigration Act of 1990. 
Signed into law on November 29, 1990, the Act extended family unification measures, 
encouraged high skilled immigration for businesses and granted, in a last minute addition, 
“temporary protected status” (TPS) for Salvadorans seeking asylum for a period of 
eighteen months. If the INS continued to argue the case they would, in effect, be arguing 
against recently passed legislation. President George H.W. Bush’s prominent support for 
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the bill signaled a softening by the administration towards immigration and a desire to put 
much of the immigration and asylum related battles of the 1980s behind. 259 
George H.W. Bush also had a different foreign policy than Reagan. The change in 
foreign policy teams, as well as the shift in the global political climate was the fourth 
factor in the push for settlement. President H.W. Bush held a distinctly different view of 
the Central American revolutions than Reagan. While his predecessor thought of the 
Central American revolutions as an ideological struggle between the forces of good and 
evil (communism and democracy), H.W. Bush had a much more pragmatic view. He saw 
that Congress and the American publics’ dim view of US foreign policy in Central 
America had only been further tarred by the Iran-Contra affair. As the Soviet Union 
began falling apart many of the foreign policy concerns undergirding US hostility to 
Central American asylum applications were beginning to dissipate. The Cold War was 
ending as the Soviet Union was falling apart. Communism was no longer the existential 
threat many political leaders once thought. The ultimately unsuccessful major guerilla 
offensive of 1989-1990 in El Salvador had not been enough to force either side to 
capitulate. Rather, it rekindled peace talks between the leftist guerillas and the rightist 
government that were more promising than any before. In Guatemala the situation 
remained tenuous, but in late 1990 new Guatemalan president Jorge Serrano Eliás began 
peace talks. Though they would ultimately collapse in late 1991, that was after the US 
government and activists reached the ABC settlement.260  
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 By the summer of 1990 the INS and Department of Justice had reached the 
decision to settle, but their willingness to settle came as a surprise to the plaintiffs. After 
Peckham’s discovery order in 1989, the plaintiffs, somewhat daunted by the prospect of 
an enormous and time-consuming discovery, began laying the groundwork for discovery. 
Beginning to sift through the immense amount of data promised by the discovery order, it 
quickly became clear that they needed further assistance. They enlisted lawyers from 
Morrison and Foerster, a top San Francisco Law firm that had defended two of the 
Sanctuary Trial defendants, academics from the UC-Berkley law school and a social 
scientist. Still, they remained unsure how to proceed in a cost effective manner.261 Susan 
Bibler Coutin quotes a member of the plaintiffs’ legal team: 
I remember one day getting a call from someone… and it was real staticky. And I 
asked, “Where are you calling from? “I’m in an airplane.” It wasn’t [INS general 
counsel] Bill Cook. It was an aide. “Give Bill Cook a call. There might be some 
talk you two might want to have regarding settlement.”262 
The months between June 1990 and the initial announcement of the settlement in 
December were consumed by intense negotiations over the settlement between the 
plaintiffs and the government in San Francisco and Washington, DC. The two sides had 
to agree on what remedies they would take to try and end discrimination against Central 
American asylum seekers and who would be eligible to take advantage of those remedies. 
These two issues were among the most contentious of those discussed during settlement 
negotiations. 
One of the plaintiffs’ chief concerns regarding discrimination against Central 
American asylum applications was that those charged with adjudicating asylum 
applications had very little knowledge or experience of the countries applicants came 
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from or the asylum process. The new regulations announced by the INS in July regarding 
asylum promised new “asylum officers” but did not specify how they would be trained. 
Therefore, for the plaintiffs an important part of any settlement was that outside 
organizations be involved in the training of the new asylum officer corps. Initially, the 
government was adamant that all the training being done “in-house” by government 
officials. The plaintiffs demanded a more open training regimen that included experts 
from outside the government. The plaintiffs secured the right for outside groups to get 
involved in in-service training, offering their expertise to new asylum officers on 
conditions in the countries they would be hearing about and cultural sensitivity. Blum, 
one of the lead lawyers negotiating the settlement for the plaintiffs, remembers this as an 
important part of the settlement, as it was a cultural change for the INS to allow outside 
groups to participate in training.263 
Another contentious issue lay in the question of who was eligible for the 
settlement. The government tried to restrict the settlement only to those whose cases had 
been tried and denied by the INS. This would keep those who never applied for asylum 
from benefiting from the settlement, as well as those who had been denied by an 
immigration judge. The plaintiffs replied that two of their class members had never 
applied and immigration judges were far from impartial in their adjudication of asylum 
claims. Therefore, all Salvadorans and Guatemalans should be eligible. The plaintiffs 
won out and all Salvadorans who entered the United States before September 19, 1990, 
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and all Guatemalans who entered before October 1, 1990 received the benefits of the 
settlement.264 
Yet, what exactly what benefits were they eligible for? The negotiated 
settlement265 granted Salvadorans and Guatemalans whose asylum applications had been 
denied de novo hearings in front of the newly trained asylum officers. The new officers 
could not see previous INS decisions denying applicants asylum and the State 
Department could not issue opinions on the likelihood of the country to generate 
refugees. The plaintiffs saw this as a major victory as they firmly believed that the 
politically oriented State Department had an undue influence on asylum policy. Finally, 
workers received work permits while waiting for their hearing. Unbeknownst to the 
framers of the settlement, the new hearings and procedures created a substantial backlog, 
meaning that the work permits lasted for months and then years.266 
In 1992 the National Asylum Project, in conjunction with scholars at the Harvard 
Law School led by Sara Ignatius and Deborah Anker, authored an intense study of the 
United States’ asylum process as led by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS). They found that between 1983 and 1991 the INS accepted less than 3 percent of 
Salvadoran applications for asylum.267 The year after the ABC decision the rate jumped 
to 28 percent, but declined throughout the decade, returning to 3 percent by the year 
2000.268 Undoubtedly this is due, in part, to the decreasing levels of violence over the 
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course of the 1990s, but also may come from the INS’s asylum practice regressing to the 
mean. 
In sum, the ABC settlement led to a raft of changes in US asylum policy. First and 
foremost, it changed the culture of asylum officer training and decisions. By blunting the 
influence of the State Department and including NGOs, the ABC settlement affected 
asylum decisions not just of Central Americans, but of all applicants. In addition, it 
reopened nearly 150,000 cases and let over 100,000 more Central Americans apply for 
new decisions. The changes in training led to a significant spike in asylum acceptance 
rates. Though those rates returned to their pre-ABC levels by 2000, the relatively high 
levels of acceptance during this brief period meant that many more Salvadoran refugees 
were accepted than ever before. Finally, these nearly 300,000 asylum applications added 
to an already understaffed and overburdened asylum system, an event that had a 
cascading set of consequences far outside the intentions of the settlement framers.269 
These consequences are discussed in the final section (3.9) of this chapter. 
3.8 How Participants Transformed and were Transformed by ABC 
When Morton Stavis, Sarah Wunsch, Ellen Yaroshefsky, Marc Van Der Hout and 
Teresa Bright filed their complaint on May 7, 1985, they never, in their wildest dreams, 
could have hoped for the settlement agreement announced on January 31, 1991. 
Originally a case primarily concerned with government prosecution of the Sanctuary 
Movement, it transformed into a landmark settlement that promised to reform US asylum 
policy and procedures. Not only did the ABC settlement give new asylum hearings to 
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hundreds of thousands of Central Americans, the reforms in asylum officer training 
helped applicants from across the world.  
While heretofore this chapter has focused on the legal evolution of the case from 
religious freedom to equal protection, the effect of a few individuals on the formation of 
the settlement needs to be emphasized. First, Judge Peckham’s willingness to allow the 
plaintiffs to revise their complaint time and time again over the course of the six years 
between filing and settlement proved crucial. In contrast, a similar case filed in Phoenix 
was quickly closed and the judge did not permit the plaintiffs to revise their complaint. 
Second, the plaintiffs’ legal team’s persistence to litigate the case on every possible angle 
kept the case alive. Third, the fundraising by refugees and refugee aid organizations 
funded the expensive and complex legal process that lasted six years. Finally, the select 
group of government officials that agreed to settle allowed the benefits of the settlement 
to extend to refugees years before litigation would have been possible. Without the 
actions of this small group of individuals the effects of the ABC settlement either would 
have never have felt or would have come much later. 
Following the January 31, 1991 announcement of the settlement, the various 
participants in the ABC case found them transformed in different ways. The lawyers for 
the plaintiffs had the most direct and long lasting experience. A large legal team made up 
of human rights, immigration and constitutional law lawyers from across the country 
participated in the case as its focus shifted from religious freedom to legal rights. Carolyn 
Patty Blum, who was tangentially involved in the formation of the complaint but took a 
much more active role during the last few months as equal protection issues came to the 
fore, remembers the experience fondly, “This team was the dream team. That was 
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certainly my memory. I loved working with these people….”.270 For Marc Van Der Hout, 
the only lawyer to be consistently involved in the case from its filing to settlement, the 
settlement was the culmination of over a decade of immigration and asylum litigation.271 
The case also led many of the plaintiffs’ lawyers to become further involved in human 
rights and asylum issues. Shortly after the settlement Blum partnered with the Center for 
Justice and Accountability, a non-profit that has brought a variety of human rights 
abusers from Vietnam, to Peru, to Guatemala to justice, including notorious Salvadoran 
Colonel Inocente Montano.  
Mary Beth Uitti, one of the assistant attorney generals assigned to the case, 
remembers her involvement with the case much differently. Overloaded and overworked, 
Uitti took over for Andrew Wolfe, the original assistant attorney general assigned to the 
case, after Wolfe left for private practice. Though notable in the magnitude of the 
settlement, as well as the fact that as the case reached its final stages the office in 
Washington, DC took over, the case itself was simply one among many.272 
Two years after the settlement, Judge Peckham passed away. He left little record 
of his feelings on the ABC case, though it did mesh well with his long record of liberal 
jurisprudence. Many of his most noteworthy cases involved discrimination and equal 
protection issues. Peckham had issued desegregation rulings for the San Francisco Police 
Department and the San Jose Unified School District, as well as rulings forbidding the 
use of discriminatory I.Q. tests that were biased against African-Americans.273 The ABC 
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settlement was one more lasting example of his advocacy on the behalf of 
underrepresented groups. 
When asked to reflect on what the six year long court case meant to them, it is 
clear that the lawyers for the plaintiffs felt the effects of the ABC case far more keenly 
than those from the government. In part, that is likely due to the case’s result. While not 
an outright victory in court, the scope of the settlement was a clear win for refugees, 
activists and their lawyers. While they, like the lawyers for the government, had other 
court cases as well, the ABC case was a cause celebré for the lawyers for the plaintiffs. 
Finally, it validated the years spent toiling in immigration law for some (such as Marc 
Van Der Hout) and pushed others into further human rights work (such as Carolyn Patty 
Blum).  
3.9 Conclusion 
Following the settlement of the case on January 31, 1991, activists went to work 
to notify Guatemalans and Salvadorans of the new benefits to which they were entitled. 
While part of the settlement included government money for radio ads in five major 
markets across the country, it was through the work of Guatemalan, Salvadoran and 
American volunteers that the Central American community felt its effects. Combined 
with the recently passed Temporary Protected Status (TPS) included in the Immigration 
Act of 1990 this meant ABC applicants could avoid deportation for many months, if not 
years.  
Refugee aid organizations, like El Rescate in Los Angeles, put out the word to the 
community, and groups of lawyers and volunteers organized what they called “charlas” 
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(chats) across the country to inform Guatemalans and Salvadorans of the new benefits.274 
Susan Bibler Coutin recounts one lawyer’s memory of the process, where at meetings he 
told prospective applicants, “Hay que quedarse en el barco grande [You have to stay in 
the big boat]. You apply for TPS, and when you finish TPS, what happens? Then you 
apply for ABC.”275 This led to a dramatic increase in asylum applications, and with the 
inauguration of the new asylum officers mandated in the settlement, a sizeable backlog. 
The first group of asylum officers, numbering 82, began to work in early 1991 with more 
than 100,000 applications pending. The INS appointed seventy-two more officers the 
next year, but this did little to help the backlog as the adjudication process took an 
incredible amount of time, and the ABC settlement added over 200,000 new applications 
in one fell swoop.276 
Since pending asylum applicants received work permits the backlog created an 
incentive for all Guatemalans and Salvadorans, regardless of their eligibility for refugee 
status, to apply for asylum. This further exacerbated the backlog. Unlike in Canada, 
where an enormous backlog in asylum applications (discussed in chapter 4) led to 
considerable concern among immigration officials and the public regarding people taking 
advantage of the system, the public and governmental perception of Central Americans 
differed dramatically from that of other undocumented immigrants (like Mexicans). The 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act added teeth to US 
deportation procedure. Yet, the asylum backlog had given Central Americans time to put 
down roots in their communities and make the transition from publicly perceived 
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“underserving immigrants” to “deserving immigrants.” In addition, officials worried that 
a massive influx of deportees, coupled with the loss of remittances, would destabilize 
Guatemala and El Salvador, just as the two countries were staggering towards peace.277 
This led to the passage of Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act 
(NACARA), which, for a fee, extended renewable one-year work permits to most 
Guatemalans and Salvadorans who had registered for TPS and ABC. This means that 
most of those who benefited from the ABC settlement exist in what Cecilía Menjívar calls 
a state of “liminal legality.”278 The settlement activists worked so hard to secure kept 
hundreds of thousands of Central Americans from being deported, but for most it did not 
translate to refugee status and therefore permanent residency. 
Finally, the effects of the ABC settlement extended beyond the legal battle of 
asylum. In May of 1985, ABC had begun as a response to felony smuggling charges 
against 16 clerical and lay workers stemming from government agents’ infiltration church 
services and prayer meetings. Though the plaintiffs dropped the religious freedom 
charges, Sanctuary activists were still felt deeply moved by the case’s conclusion. As 
Hilary Cunningham writes, 
Sanctuary workers seized upon the settlement as a vindication of the movement, 
but more importantly as an indication that progressive religious groups could 
effect positive change in the political realm. The ABC decision asserted that 
churches had a legitimate right (as well as a responsibility) to influence 
government policies, and encouraged churches to take governments to task (even 
to the point of a court suit) for violating moral/religious values.”279 
 
Though the Sanctuary Movement, as an organized entity, ceased to exist in the United 
States by the mid-1990s its spirit lived on. Many former Sanctuary Workers formed “No 
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More Deaths” in 2004, including Sanctuary Movement founder John Fife. No More 
Deaths provides water, food and medical to migrants crossing the harsh Sonoran 
Desert.280  
In sum, the ABC lawsuit had a drastic effect on the Central American Refuge 
Crisis. First, it dramatically changed training procedures for asylum officers, decreasing 
the level of the State Department’s influence on asylum decisions. This was important for 
both the Central Americans named in the lawsuit and all future asylum applicants, 
regardless of national origin. Second, the ABC lawsuit extended another avenue for 
residency that with Temporary Protected Status, Deferred Extended Departure and the 
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act has allowed hundreds of 
thousands of Central Americans to legally stay in the United States, albeit tenuously. 
Finally, the settlement “vindicated” the actions taken by the Sanctuary Movement and 
encouraged activists to keep up their struggle for human rights into the present day. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PLATTSBURGH BORDER CRISIS 
“Turning back 300 people into a community the size of Buffalo isn’t very significant, but 
it’s different in a city the size of Plattsburgh.” – Roger White, Spokesman for Canadian 
Immigration Services, March 7, 1987281 
 
“I truly believe that was Plattsburgh’s finest hour.” – Rose M. Pandozy, Clinton County 
Social Services Commissioner August, 3, 2012282 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Confused and often penniless, hundreds of would-be refugees found themselves 
unexpectedly trapped along the US-Canada border in early 1987. On February 20th, 1987 
Canadian immigration officials barred hundreds of prospective refugees from entering 
Canada until after their asylum applications had been processed, effectively stranding 
them in small communities all along the border. This refusal took most refugee claimants 
from “B-1” countries by surprise. A list of countries composed by the Canadian 
government, nationals from these countries who applied for asylum at a Canadian port of 
entry were automatically admitted to Canada while officials reviewed their asylum 
applications. The rejected refugees’ surprise stemmed from reports on the existence of 
the list and Canada’s previous reputation as a welcoming country for refugees. Just a few 
months prior to Canada’s revocation of the B-1 list, the United Nations’ High 
Commissioner for Refugee Affairs awarded the Canadian people the Fridjof Nansen 
Medal for outstanding service to refugees, the first time it had been awarded to a people 
or government.283 During the 1970s and 1980s nearly 75,000 refugees from Uganda, 
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Chile, Lebanon and Southeast Asia entered Canada, along with the thousands of Central 
Americans who arrived between 1982-1987 as a result of the civil wars in their home 
country. This chapter asks, with such a sterling record in refugee rights, why did Canada 
suddenly change its mind, what happened to the refugees it rejected, and how did the 
arrival of hundreds of refugees transform the communities they were stranded in? 
I argue throughout this chapter that Canada’s change in policy stems from a 
shifting refugee and immigration climate in Canada brought on by shifts in global refugee 
flows, administrative inefficiencies in Canada’s immigration office, and a public fearful 
of an “overwhelming” tide of refugees. One of the most notable consequences of this 
policy was the creation of camps along the US-Canada border. Particularly interesting is 
what I call the “Plattsburgh Border Crisis” in Plattsburgh, NY. This small town of less 
than 30,000 people suddenly found itself in the spring of 1987 hosting hundreds of 
refugees trapped between a border newly sealed by the Canadian government, and the 
United States’ Immigration and Naturalization Service that was threatening to deport 
them. I use the story of the Plattsburgh Border Crisis and the individuals involved in it to 
examine the ways that Canada’s change in policy transformed and was transformed by 
the people who lived the Crisis. 
4.2 Sources and Historiographical Context 
 A few scholars have examined the ways that US and Canadian refugee policy 
shaped each other during the 1980s. Most notable among them is María Cristina García’s 
Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada. 
Discussions of US and Canadian asylum policy occasionally briefly mention Canada’s 
closing of the border in February of 1987. In Transnational Ruptures and other works 
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Catherine Nolin discusses how changes in US immigration legislation in 1986 created 
spaces of “asylum demand” across the US-Canada border.284 Julie Young’s “Seeking 
Sanctuary in a Border City: Sanctuary Movement(s) across the Canada-US Border” 
examines the ways that the Sanctuary Movement developed in the US-Canada 
borderlands during the 1980s and 90s. She pays particular attention to the collaboration 
between Sanctuary groups in Detroit and Windsor during the 1980s and early 90s.285 She 
briefly discusses the Canadian government’s decision to close the border to asylees in 
1987.  Yet, none of these discussions examine in detail the specific effects of that 
decision on the communities, like Plattsburgh, NY, along the border.  
The only book specifically written on the subject is a self-published memoir by 
Fran Ford, an activist who was highly involved in the care for refugees.286 During my 
research I was lucky enough to interview Ms. Ford, other activists and a number of 
government officials. These conversations proved crucial in adding extra context to my 
research. They also opened up a number of private collections for perusal. The bulk of 
the sources used in this paper come from local and national newspapers like the 
Plattsburgh Press-Republican and The Globe and Mail. I also made extensive use of 
Canadian governmental archives in my exploration of the reasons for the border closure. 
Together these sources demonstrate the ways that legislative and policy decisions in 
Canada and the United States affected each other, the ways that a small community 
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banded together with its resident refugees to meet a rapidly developing humanitarian 
crisis, and the long lasting effects of this experience.  
4.3 Outline 
The next three sections trace the creation and consequences of the “Plattsburgh 
Border Crisis. Section 4.4 (“Closing the Border”) begins with a discussion on Canadian 
asylum and refugee policy from 1976-1987 and pinpoints the reasons for Canada’s policy 
changes in February 1987. This section demonstrates the interconnectedness of North 
American immigration policy and the cascading consequences of each country’s actions. 
After 4.4’s analysis of how and why the Canadian government reached the decision to 
close its border, “A Community Responds” (section 4.5) examines the cascading 
consequences of these federal decisions on immigration and refugee policy on 
Plattsburgh, New York. The chapter concludes with “A Community Transformed.” This 
section (4.6) discusses the ways that the “Plattsburgh Border Crisis” temporarily 
transformed Plattsburgh from a small community of less than 30,000 people to a space of 
global import where refugees from countries around the world interacted with changes in 
US immigration law and Canadian refugee policies.  
4.4 Closing the Border 
The Canadian government’s decision to close its country’s border in February of 
1987 emanates from changes in the ways that the country and its citizens perceived and 
interacted with refugees from around the world. During the 1970s and 1980s Canada 
resettled a significant number of refugees from countries like Chile and Uganda that 
Canadian officials selected at its embassies around the world. Seemingly geographically 
isolated from refugee-generating countries, policy makers did not expect significant 
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numbers of refugees to arrive on Canada’s shores or ports of entry. An increase in air 
travel and a number of highly publicized boat landings changed this dynamic as Canada 
suddenly confronted the possibility of welcoming in refugees that it had not pre-screened.  
 These new arrivals seemed small when compared with the growing number of 
refugees coming from the United States. While few American citizens sought refugee 
status in Canada after the Vietnam War, changes in immigration policies prompted 
unrecognized refugees in the United States to leave the country and seek asylum in 
Canada. In particular, during the 1980s Guatemalans and Salvadorans fled north through 
Mexico and across the US-Mexico border to the United States. At first, Canada was 
largely unaffected by Central American immigrants as the majority of refugees stayed in 
the United States. The Canadian government chose to offer assistance to what it believed 
would be a limited number of Central American refugees, including Guatemala and El-
Salvador on the B-1 list mentioned above. Those refugees who did arrive at either ports 
of entry or on its shores were mostly welcomed, and deportation was relatively scarce. 
Throughout most of the 1980s Canada deserved its reputation as a refugee-welcoming 
country. For many refugees this is what made the government’s seemingly sudden policy 
changes in 1987 so shocking.  
In reality, the Canadian government’s change in heart had been building 
throughout the decade. In their sweeping history of Canadian immigration policy, Ninette 
Kelley and Michael Trebilcock argue “(t)he Immigration Department’s inability to handle 
the inland-refugee claim backlog is the dominant theme in Canada’s immigration history 
in the 1980s…”287 The backlog they refer to was made up of pending asylum applications 
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by prospective refugees in Canada. Many applications remained in limbo for months, if 
not years, waiting for the claim to be adjudicated. This led, in large part, to the closing of 
the border in 1987. Three factors exacerbated the backlog in late 1986 and made it into a 
domestic crisis that required action: an ineffective and time consuming adjudication 
system, well-publicized abuses to the system, and the passage of the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act (IRCA) by the United States. 
The first factor, administrative inefficiencies, came from an overwhelmed refugee 
determination system that was never prepared for the high volume of claimants who 
arrived during the 1980s. In 1976 Canada modernized its immigration system and divided 
immigrants into four classes, each of which were admitted under different parameters: 
family, assisted relatives, independents and refugees. An enormous step forward, the new 
immigration system stopped the racist and capricious system through which Canada had 
discriminated against non-white migrants.288 Prior to 1976 Canada had no formalized 
refugee determination system. The refugee class was an attempt by the Liberal 
government to meet Canada’s humanitarian obligations on the world stage. Refugees 
could gain admission to Canada in three different ways. First, if refugees could prove that 
they met the “well-founded fear of persecution” standards set out by the 1951 Convention 
Relating to Refugees,289 he or she could apply at a Canadian consulate abroad for refugee 
status and be granted shelter in Canada. Second, the Act gave the Canadian government 
the power to create a temporary “designated class” status that allowed refugees who did 
not meet the strict criteria set out by the 1951 Convention, but lived in “refugee-like 
situations,” to enter Canada. Finally, the Act created a category for in-land asylum 
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proceedings for those who met the standards for refugee status, but were either in Canada 
or at a US/Canada border crossing.290  
The in-land determination system was a two-step process. First the individual who 
applied for status (applicant) provided a sworn statement to an immigration official. The 
Refugee Status Advisory Committee (RSAC) received and compiled each immigrant’s 
statement. Made up of immigration officials, a representative from the Department of 
External Affairs and a variety of individuals appointed by the Immigration minister, the 
RSAC would read over the sworn statement. From the statement, the RSAC determined 
whether or not the applicant was an actual refugee according to the 1951 Convention. A 
positive decision granted the applicant landed-immigration status as long as s/he passed 
both health and background tests. Applicants who were denied could appeal to the 
Canadian Federal Court under limited parameters. The lack of an oral presentation 
outraged advocates for refugees, who claimed that an inanimate transcript could not 
convey the trauma refugees underwent. It also denied the RSAC an opportunity to ask 
questions of the applicant to fill in holes in his or her application. Opponents countered 
that an in-person interview would be too time consuming and create a backlog. This 
argument proved prescient. Refugee advocates continued to agitate for in-person 
hearings. In April 1984 the Canadian Supreme Court decided Singh v. Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration), a landmark refugee case that transformed Canadian 
asylum policy.291  
The Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) came from the 
claims of seven Indian immigrants seeking asylum. Six of the seven plaintiffs were 
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Indian Sikhs who claimed that their membership in the Akali Dali party opened them up 
to political persecution. The seventh, a woman from Guyana but of Indian ancestry, said 
that deportation would open her up to racial and religious persecution. The Canadian 
government denied asylum to all seven. Each of the prospective refugees appealed their 
decision to the Canadian Federal Court, but did not meet with success. In collaboration 
with the Canadian Council of Churches and the Federation of Canadian Sikh Societies, 
the seven took their cases to the Canadian Supreme Court. The Court chose to combine 
their cases and hear them together. At issue was whether the Immigration Act of 1876 
violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Particularly, the Court was interested in 
whether the Charter granted the seven asylum applicants the right to an oral hearing. It 
decided that the lack of oral hearings, where officers could talk to and assess asylum 
applicants’ verbal and non-verbal cues, violated the Charter’s promise of justice. The 
decision went even further, finding that the Charter protected all people present in 
Canada, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status. This gave all asylum 
applicants, not just the seven in the case, the right to an oral hearing.292 
In response, the Canadian Parliament enacted legislation that gave in-person 
hearings to denied applicants and enlarged the RSAC committee that heard appeals. This 
failed to solve the backlog of applications. The officials who designed the refugee 
process in 1976 believed that in-land applications would be the least used form of refugee 
aid. After all, Canada’s only land border was with the United States, considered to be a 
non-refugee producing nation. The 1980s proved both of these calculations false. In the 
first five years of the decade more than 17,000 individuals claimed refugee status in 
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Canada, at its borders or at its airports. In 1985 the backlog was at 3,710 applications. 
The understaffed RSAC could not deal with the high volume of applications.293 The 
Singh decision exacerbated the problem, as it added time-consuming oral interviews to 
the process. In spite of a partial amnesty granted to over 20,000 applicants in May 1986 
the backlog remained at over 3,500 applications at the end of 1986.294 Both Canadian 
government officials and the media worried about the development and persistence of the 
backlog, as it reinforced the image of an overwhelmed and incompetent immigration 
system. Most importantly, in the minds of many policy makers, the backlog prompted 
abuse of the system by “bogus refugees,” people who fraudulently applied for refugee 
status knowing they could live and work in Canada while waiting up to three years for 
their application to be adjudicated.295  
This concern was the second factor in the closing of the border. Notable abusers 
included the 2,000 Turkish immigrants who arrived in 1986, most making blatantly 
fraudulent refugee claims. The same was true of the Portuguese, 1,000 of whom arrived 
in six months claiming to be Jehovah Witnesses and therefore persecuted for their 
religion.296  The majority of these immigrants arrived in Canada by air. In response, the 
Canadian government started warning airline carriers that unaccepted asylum applicants 
would be sent back to their countries of birth at the airlines’ expense.  
The most public “abuse” of the system, as it generated copious media attention, 
was the arrival of a group of immigrants hailing from southern Asia. Fishermen off the 
coast of Newfoundland rescued 155 Tamils from Sri Lanka on August 11, 1986. The 
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fishermen found the Tamils in lifeboats, who told their rescuers they fled civil war in Sri 
Lanka via a freighter that had left directly from the country and had been forced out into 
lifeboats. Sri Lanka, like Guatemala and El Salvador, was on the “B-1 list,” a list of 
sixteen countries where atrocities were so widespread that Canada did not deport refugees 
claiming asylum. Refugee advocates had successfully convinced policy makers that if 
sent back to these sixteen countries deportees would be in danger of their lives. Not only 
did the B-1 list bar deportations to the countries on the list, it also automatically entitled 
the nationals of those countries entrance into Canada and asylum hearings. 
 As a result, the government gave “minister permits” to the Sri Lankans to stay in 
the country for one year to wait for the violence to die down in their home country. They 
were eligible to reapply for the following year.297 This ignited a minor firestorm in the 
media with charges of “queue jumping” over other immigrants trying to gain status and 
worries that the welcome of the Tamils would inspire others to follow suit. Yet, the 
official response to the Tamil refugees was relatively forgiving, even after it emerged that 
the Sri Lankans had not come directly to Canada. Instead they had stopped in West 
Germany, which would not accept them, and then proceeded to Canada. For the rest of 
the year Canadian papers obsessed over this story, first focusing on the dramatic rescue 
of 155 people huddled in lifeboats by picturesque fishermen. After the Tamils confessed 
where they came from, the papers hosted a raging debate over whether the Tamils should 
be allowed to stay in the country or not. Finally, the media closely followed the attempt 
to prosecute Wolfgang Blindel, the unscrupulous captain of the ship that brought the 
Tamils to Canada. After charging the Tamils for passage to Canada, Blindel forced them 
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off his ship off the coast of Newfoundland into the lifeboats where they were found. By 
the end of the year newspapers like the Toronto Star were publishing articles like 
“Immigration at Crossroads Over Refugees: 155 Tamils Set Adrift Near Newfoundland 
May Have Triggered Backlash for Review of Canada’s Policies” and “Canadian Agents 
in Turkey Probe Record ‘Refugee’ Influx”.298 Thus the arrival of refugees continued to 
loom large in the public eye for most of 1986 and into 1987. While many Canadians 
remained concerned about Tamil, Turkish and Portuguese refugees continuing to slowly 
arrive by sea and by air, these could be construed as isolated events that improved airline 
policies or the better equipped, albeit still understaffed, Canadian Coast Guard could 
control. It took one final event to prompt the Canadian government to close its land 
border with the United States to incoming refugees. This final event was the United 
States’ passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act. 
 The third factor in the Canadian government’s closure of its border came from US 
legislation. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was the first major 
overhaul to the US immigration system since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. 
The product of a growing anti-immigrant groundswell within the country, the IRCA 
attempted to calm Americans who feared that their country was no longer able to police 
its borders. In particular, Americans publicly worried over the “illegal” immigration 
across the US-Mexico border of undocumented immigrants from Latin America. 
Politicians hoped that IRCA would stem this flow of immigrants. Though originally 
conceived as a restrictive measure that would enforce American immigration law, the 
lasting legacy of IRCA was its amnesty provisions that gave approximately three million 
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illegal aliens legal residency.299 The law, as passed, required any amnesty recipients to be 
able to prove that they had entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and 
maintained continuous residence in the country while being “known to the government.” 
In addition, they had to prove that they would not become a “public charge.” At the 
outset the Immigration and Naturalization Service read these restrictive qualifications 
very narrowly, as “known to the government” meant “known to the INS.”300 Many 
immigrant and immigrant advocates argued that “known to the government” could mean 
a wide range of actions, including applying for a drivers license, parking tickets, tax 
filings etc. The INS’ interpretation of “known to the INS” took on a much more narrow 
definition as it meant people who had formal dealings with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services. 
Understandably many aliens were unable to prove that they met these criteria, as 
they had avoided the INS during their time in the United States and/or not retained the 
necessary documentation to prove their continuous residency. For undocumented 
refugees from Central America, the law was particularly concerning. Since many of them 
had fled quickly, leaving behind their files, they did not have the requisite material. As 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3 asylum approval rates for Salvadorans and Guatemalans 
hovered between three and seven percent throughout the decade, prompting most to avoid 
application in fear that it would result in deportation. Though the Sanctuary Movement 
offered some protection, most Central Americans sought to live an anonymous life 
outside of a church or synagogue. Lawyers for the American Baptist Churches case had 
yet to file their first amended complaint and the settlement was years away. Finally, 
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Central Americans needed to be able to support themselves and were fearful of the tough 
new employer sanctions embedded in the IRCA.  
Prior to IRCA it was not a crime to employ illegal aliens, only to “harbor and 
transport them.” IRCA retained penalties for these crimes but also made employers of 
undocumented aliens liable for fines, injunction orders and even criminal proceedings 
with escalating penalties for repeat offenders.301 Though the government never enforced 
the employment sanctions to the extent they were envisioned, the prospect intimidated 
employers and employees. Thus thousands of undocumented immigrants were either 
fired or fled their jobs. Undocumented refugees in the United States were faced with a 
vexing issue. Unwilling and unable to return to their countries of birth, they still needed 
to support themselves and their families. Thousands turned to Canada as a potential safe 
haven. Many had heard of Canada’s more liberal asylum policies, and therefore they 
streamed into the country. Between December 1986, one month after the passage of the 
IRCA, and February 1987, when Canada closed its borders, over 10,000 would-be 
refugees crossed the border into Canada.302 
For refugees the three main routes from the United States to Canada went through 
Seattle to Vancouver, Detroit or Buffalo to Toronto, and Plattsburg to Montreal. Montreal 
acutely felt the influx of refugees. Its airport was already a primary destination for 
Turkish and Portuguese refugee applicants. Local and national newspapers ran headlines 
such as “Central Americans Pour Into Canada Seeking New Homes,” and “Quebec Feels 
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Budget Pinch As Refugees Keep Arriving”303 The Globe and Mail cited a government 
estimate that over 1,100 new refugees had arrived during a 10-day span in late December 
and early January.304 The Toronto Star added another government estimate: over 600 of 
the year’s recent arrivals were Central Americans who had crossed the border by bus 
from the United States to Quebec.305 This only added to the fears of an overwhelmed 
refugee-determination system already established by the Tamil, Turkish, and Portuguese 
controversies.  
Canadian newspapers continued to publish refugee related articles with 
inflammatory headlines like “More than 700 Ask for Refugee Status in Three Day Rush,” 
and “Canadians Fear Asian Influx, Minister Says.”306 Op-eds, letters to the editor and 
radio shows pled with the government to “do something” about the assumed refugee 
flood as Canadians wondered what to do about the “Bus People” showing up at the 
border.307 Anti-refugee feeling manifested itself in small anti-refugee protest in 
downtown Montreal and a number of bomb threats against a hotel temporarily housing 
over 500 refugee applicants in Montreal.308 Pressure came from other minority groups as 
well. On January 30th Peguis First Nation Chief Louis Stevenson accused Canada of 
neglecting people at home, “We feel betrayed when Canada tells us there is not assistance 
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to resolve our distressing situation, yet is prepared to pour millions of dollars into other 
countries and give royal treatment to refugees.”309  
The government listened to these concerns. On January 15th Benoit Bouchard, the 
Minister for Employment and Immigration, told reporters that “The law allows the 
minister, while waiting to find the personnel necessary to deal with these cases quickly, 
to leave those people on the other side of the border. Are we going to use this method? It 
is too soon to say.”310 A month later Gerry Weiner, the Minister of State for Immigration, 
spoke further about the need to adjust Canadian border policies to new realities that 
pushed applicants into Canada. He promised changes that will guarantee “the orderly 
control of refugee claimants through the country.”311 On February 20th the government 
released its changes in refugee policy. They included visa transit requirements and ended 
the “minister’s permits” system. In addition, the government abolished the “B-1 List,” 
stopping immediate entry across the border for Central Americans after nearly 3,000 
Salvadorans and 600 Guatemalans had crossed since the start of the year.312  
A combination of an overwhelmed refugee determination system, media coverage 
of “foreign refugees” arriving on Canadian shores and a sudden influx of refugees 
brought on by US immigration policy ended Canada’s policy of allowing Guatemalans, 
Salvadorans, Sri Lankans and nationals from thirteen other countries immediate entrance 
into Canada. Instead, the hundreds of refugees streaming weekly from the United States 
to Canada found themselves halted at the line between the two countries. At crossing 
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stations along the border Canadian officials interviewed, processed, and then sent 
prospective refugees back to the United States to wait for a hearing date four to six weeks 
in the future. For those living in the United States without legal permission this meant 
being sent back into the arms of the US Border Patrol that was legally bound to deport 
them. Plattsburgh, NY, 20 miles south of the main border crossing to Montreal, QC, was 
on the verge of transforming from a sleepy community near the border to a makeshift 
refugee camp. 
4.5 A Community Responds 
In late February 1987 at the Champlain border crossing, just 20 miles north of 
Plattsburgh, NY and 38 miles south of Montreal, Greg Ledges, Supervisor and 
Immigration Inspector for the United States’ Immigration and Naturalization Service had 
heard Canada was about to close the border but was unsure of the consequences. Multiple 
Greyhound busses passed through the border checkpoint every day on their way to 
Montreal. For weeks they were carrying prospective refugees on their way to apply for 
asylum in Canada. Going north the busses never concerned him or his colleagues. Their 
jobs were to monitor those who entered the United States, not those leaving it. Most of 
those who entered the United States were quickly waved by as they possessed the 
necessary forms of identification and were either Canadian or U.S. citizens. Occasionally 
nationals from countries besides the United States or Canada would cross the border, 
some legally and others illegally. Yet, this was relatively rare compared to normal 
U.S./Canada traffic.313  
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This changed dramatically following Minister Brouchard’s announcement on 
Friday February 20, 1987. When prospective refugees tried to enter Canada without the 
proper paperwork Canadian immigration officials stopped them at the border. After an 
interview and general processing, refugees were sent back to the United States to wait for 
their hearing. Though the exact number turned away by Canadian officials at the 
Champlain border crossing over the weekend is unknown, one refugee relief activist in 
Plattsburgh (where most of those turned away at the Champlain border crossing went) 
estimated it at over 200.314 At the border refugees met with US immigration officers who 
initiated another round of interviews and processing designed to determine their legal 
status. If refugees still had documents like a visa or temporary permit authorizing them to 
remain in the United States INS officers immediately released them. Those without legal 
status were processed for deportation, and assigned either voluntary or involuntary 
departure. Migrants usually received involuntary departure if they had a criminal record 
or an outstanding deportation order. This procedure highlighted some of Canadian 
activists’ biggest fears concerning the change in policy.  
Canadian activists charged that refugees forced to wait in the United States by 
Canada’s policy change were in danger of deportation back to their home country. When 
first announcing the change in policy, Brouchard told both the press and members of the 
opposite party that migrants would be safe from deportation, but a few days later, after a 
letter from the head of the INS was made public, Brouchard was forced to walk back his 
comments. The INS head said that if someone was eligible for deportation he or she 
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could still be deported, but local officials could use their discretion on when to set 
deportation dates if someone was eligible for voluntary departure.315 
The US Border Patrol sent involuntary deportees to prison to await transit back to 
their home countries, while those eligible for voluntary deportation were given papers 
and told to leave the United States by a certain date. As Mr. Ledges remembered it, the 
entire process from crossing the border into Canada through Canadian processing and 
U.S. processing, to either release or imprisonment, could take longer than 10 hours.316 
After being processed migrants, were no longer undocumented and this meant that it was 
no longer illegal under U.S. immigration law to provide them assistance. For the 
churches, organizations, government agencies and volunteers in Plattsburgh who offered 
prospective refugees protection this was an incredibly important distinction as the 
recently passed Immigration Reform and Control Act, which most of the refugees were 
fleeing, had made it a penalty to “conceal, harbor, or shield from protection” 
undocumented immigrants.317 
 The village of Champlain, a small cluster of houses and businesses just south of 
the Canadian/US border, had no place for the rejected refugees to stay so those who did 
not go to jail were given a bus ride back to Plattsburgh, NY, the nearest US town to 
Champlain, As law enforcement officials wanted to conserve jail space for dangerous 
criminals, most of the rejected refugees were released.318 While Plattsburgh was larger 
than Champlain, it was still a small town of less than 30,000 people. Its economic 
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mainstays came from the Plattsburgh Air Force Base (part of the Strategic Air Command) 
and one of the State University of New York’s campuses (SUNY Plattsburgh). In 
addition it was and remains the closest US city of any size to Montreal. Canadians in 
search of US goods or services often crossed the border at Champlain to shop in 
Plattsburgh. In turn, Plattsburgh residents often took trips north to Montreal for a “big 
city” experience or to watch the Major League Baseball’s Montreal Expos. Plattsburgh 
was, in many ways, a quintessential border town where Canadians and Americans 
interacted distinctly. Yet, because the border was not militarized, the border did not loom 
large in the city’s imagination. Plattsburgh saw itself as a decidedly “All-American” city, 
and the residents prided themselves on the hospitality of their community, a virtue that 
the “Border Crisis” tested tremendously in early 1987. 
For the first few months after IRCA’s passage residents had seen the number of 
immigrants and refugees passing through the town increase, but the numbers remained 
small and their stay very short. Though Plattsburgh did have some experience with 
refugees and was considerably larger than Champlain, it was ill prepared for what was to 
come. On February 21, 1987 refugees began to arrive in Plattsburgh in numbers the town 
had never seen before. Instead of proceeding through the town and across the border, 
refugees were trapped with nowhere to go. Within days the small border town of 
Plattsburgh transformed from a sleepy community to the meeting place of a host of global 
networks.  
The first to respond was the Plattsburgh Community Crisis Center. Founded in 
1970, the Plattsburgh Community Crisis Center, headed by Brian Smith, offered 
assistance to homeless, impoverished and mentally-ill Plattsburgh residents. It proved to 
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be a crucial part of Plattsburgh’s refugee relief effort. As the Border Crisis evolved other 
organizations involved included the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, Clinton County 
Social Services, Catholic Charities and the Ecumenical Food Shelf. Within the first week 
Rose Pandozy, the Clinton County Social Services Commissioner, formed a committee 
with the department heads of the various services. Yet, on the Crisis’ first few days the 
Plattsburgh Community Crisis Center took the lead. On February 21st and 22nd, 
Greyhound workers told Brian Smith that refugees were stranded at the bus station. The 
Center swung into action, housing the refugees at local motel rooms and providing them 
with food. On Monday the 23rd the Plattsburgh Press-Republican, the local newspaper, 
printed a front-page story about the refugees’ arrival, announcing the onset of the Crisis 
and the actions taken up to that point. It was quickly becoming clear that the Center did 
not have the resources for the emerging crisis. Most importantly, it did not have the space 
to house or money to provide hotels to incoming refugees. Plattsburgh community 
leaders decided to set up an emergency shelter at the Salvation Army to both provide 
more space for refugees and to conserve fast dwindling resources.319 
The new shelter at the Salvation Army had the capacity to house approximately 
100 refugees. While that was enough for the first few days of the crisis, it would soon 
become too small. Brian Smith, Rose Pandozy and other leaders of the refugee relief 
effort began looking for other options.  On the 27th they found a temporary solution at a 
local building called “The Office,” which was able to house 90 more. While the building 
provided a place for people to sleep, it lacked beds, showers or a kitchen. Thus volunteers 
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were forced to transport sheltered refugees back and forth for showers and bring food. 
Clearly, this was not a permanent solution. Smith and Pandozy kept looking.320 
Both volunteers and local government officials began to publicly express anger 
over the lack of state and federal support. One unnamed charity head complained in the 
local newspaper: “It’s a sad thing. The government created this problem, but they’re 
dumping all the responsibility on the poor people of a small community.”321 Legislation 
and policy formulated in Ottawa and Washington, DC created a crisis along the border, as 
nation-less refugees waited for admission into Canada, and the governments responsible 
were taking no actions to alleviate the issue. As the chapter’s opening quotation 
demonstrates, Canadian officials recognized the strain that de facto refugee camps placed 
on small communities, but they refused to change their minds regarding policy that 
initiated the crisis, the revocation of the B-1 list.322 
 For refugees the Plattsburgh shelter offered a liminal space as they waited to 
transition from illegal immigrants in the United States to welcomed refugees in Canada. 
The same day the article complaining of a lack of support appeared, the National Guard, 
as if by magic, offered its assistance in temporarily housing the refugees. In this first sign 
of outside support, the National Guard volunteered a local armory as a shelter. Refugees 
could only stay in the armory while the unit could guarantee the site’s security. 
Therefore, when the unit left for military maneuvers in two weeks the community had to 
find alternative housing. Though they were grateful for help from the state, the refugee 
relief leaders were desperate to secure permanent assistance. To make matters worse, the 
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leaders had no way of ascertaining the scope of the crisis. As William Donnell, the 
coordinator of Plattsburgh’s Office of Emergency Preparedness, explained, “(w)eeks 
from now we could have 200 or even 300 (refugees). We have to stay prepared.”323 
Three days later the National Guard at Saranac Lake, a village over 50 miles away 
in neighboring Franklin County, extended an invitation for refugees to stay at its armory. 
After long deliberation, the relief leaders rejected its offer. They looked at the facilities at 
the Saranac Lake armory, as well as its location and deemed them unsuitable. The armory 
did not have sufficient facilities to safely house refugees. In addition, the armory was far 
away from the Red Cross and Salvation Army, making it a logistical nightmare to 
provide food and care for the refugees housed there.324  
On March 4th leaders finally secured a semi-permanent solution that lasted 
through May. The Association for Retarded Children (ARC) offered its new building just 
west of the city in the county’s Air Industrial Park as a shelter, saying that it could stay in 
its former offices for the next few months. The 30,000 square foot building could house 
over 150 refugees and had facilities for showers and cooking. Yet, it was little more than 
an empty shell. The cavernous main room needed to be divided into separate spaces for 
refugees and their families. The activists decided to set up “privacy cubicles” throughout 
the main room. Three walls with a sheet in the front, these privacy cubicles did not mean 
too much, but at least they offered some relief from the massive room. In addition, the 
refugee relief needed to build showers, additional toilets, washers and dryers.  While 
imperfect, the ARC meant an end to the shuttling of refugees back and forth and a more 
manageable situation. Yet, the new improvements came at a cost. All in all, they came to 
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approximately $60,000, a significant sum of money that the county social services 
organizations did not have. Rose Pandozy, who by this time had taken the lead in the 
refugee relief effort, believed that she could secure assistance from the state.325  
On March 5th Pandozy traveled down to Albany to meet with the New York’s 
Department of Social Services and asked for help. The commissioner told her there was 
no assistance available. Pandozy asked for the decision in writing so she could share it 
with the local, state and international reporters who were already starting to come to 
Plattsburgh. Though Pandozy never released a statement to the media, this threat had the 
desired effect. On the next day New York State Governor Mario Cuomo released 
$177,000 in emergency funds to Clinton County to help provide for the refugees.326 
Two days later the refugees, with the help of the National Guard and Salvation 
Army, moved into the ARC shelter. For the next three months the ARC building served 
as the sole shelter for the refugees in Plattsburgh awaiting their hearing. Three days 
before closing Joachim Henkel, the head of the liaison office for the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, toured the ARC shelter. While there he expressed his 
admiration of the community’s response to the refugee crisis and drew attention to the 
ways that the Plattsburgh Border Crisis demonstrated the ways that refugee crises have 
impacts on communities worldwide.327 On June 10th the housing situation for the refugee 
relief effort went full circle. The ARC moved into its new building, and most refugees 
returned to local motels. A few temporarily moved in with host families who housed the 
refugees while awaiting their hearing. The closure of the shelter did not mean the end to 
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Plattsburgh Border Crisis. Refugees on their way to Canada continue to enter Plattsburgh 
to this day, but at a lower rate than during those first few months after the border’s 
closure. The remainder of this chapter focuses on that three-month period when 
Plattsburgh operated a virtual refugee camp. It is fascinating in many ways, most of all 
because of the interactions between three groups: refugees, volunteers and local 
government officials. Due in large part to their positions, each of the three groups had 
varying, though overlapping, views of the ways that the community should respond to the 
Plattsburgh Border Crisis. 
The three leading government/semi-government officials, Pandozy, Brian Smith, 
and Captain Jack Holcomb of the Salvation Army, saw the shelter as the answer to a 
humanitarian crisis that needed support. Largely bereft of assistance from state or federal 
authorities, Pandozy and Smith took the lead in determining how to pay for shelter, food 
and medical assistance for an unknown number of refugees. It was not an easy task, as 
the number of refugees fluctuated wildly over the first few months, as did their medical 
needs. At one point Captain Jack Holcomb was predicting an influx of 500 refugees.328 
Nonetheless, Smith and Pandozy found the funds through a skillful use of political 
persuasion (see Pandozy’s trip to Albany above), cooperation with local charities and 
fundraising. 
As the leader of the local Salvation Army chapter, Holcomb was in charge of the 
day-to-day operations of the shelter. Holcomb set the rules and procedures for the shelter 
and gave broad outlines of the expectations for behavior. Notable among them was his 
ban on alcohol. One of the most quoted figures in the media reports concerning the relief 
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effort, some volunteers expressed unhappiness with his brusque demeanor and supposed 
tendency to spend more time with reporters than at the shelter. 329 Holcomb was, without 
a doubt, a formidable presence. A number of my interviewees recalled an incident at the 
shelter in late May when Holcomb called the entire building for a meeting. He sternly 
excoriated unnamed individuals for presence of alcohol in the shelter, general rowdiness 
and invasions of privacy. The most memorable part was when he halted his address to 
search a young man’s cubicle, where Holcomb found a quart of liquor. In stony silence 
he marched across the main room into the men’s bathroom where he poured the alcohol 
into the drain. He reemerged and dramatically threw the empty bottle into the trash.330 
Following the closure of the shelter in June 1987, Holcomb’s role in the refugee relief 
effort shrunk as he was no longer responsible for the day-to-day care of the refugees. A 
little over a year later Holcomb fled Plattsburgh due to a sexual abuse complaint filed 
against him in August 1988. The complaint charged Holcomb with rape, sodomy and 
sexual abuse of a young girl under the age of 14. He remained at-large for months until 
he turned himself in on January 16, 1989.331 One month later he pleaded guilty to second-
degree rape, and in April was sentenced to 1-3 years in prison. Holcomb’s guilty plea, 
which resulted in a lightened sentence, meant that the victim was never forced to publicly 
testify or reveal her identity.332 Holcomb’s decreased involvement in the refugee relief 
effort probably meant that the victim was not a refugee, but his crimes likely negatively 
effected Salvation Army fundraising during the months he was at-large.  
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While government officials oversaw the setup and then overall operation of the 
shelter, Plattsburgh residents, the group that made up the largest group of volunteers, 
tried to understand exactly who the refugees were and where they came from.333 During 
the months under examination here the largest group of refugees came from Central 
America, fleeing recent changes in U.S. immigration law and caught unawares of the 
changes in Canadian asylum policy. Individuals from around the globe, South America, 
South Asia and East Africa, soon joined them. All of them hoped for asylum in Canada. 
Refugees arrived in varying socio-economic circumstances, some able to provide for 
themselves, while others came with little more than the clothes on their back.334 
Language skills varied widely. While many of the refugees were fluent in English, others 
only spoke Spanish, French, Arabic, Tamil, Amharic or other languages. Similarly, many 
refugees entered the shelter in desperate need of medical attention. One Salvadoran 
woman arrived in Plattsburgh six months pregnant. Other medical issues included lice, 
malnutrition, pneumonia and ulcers.335 The one thing in common for those arriving in the 
first few weeks was that they did not expect to be in Plattsburgh. An invisible line, 
manned by Canadian immigration officials, kept them in the United States. Waiting at the 
shelter for their applications to be adjudicated they were forced to negotiate a space that 
had been created in great haste on a shoestring budget. Frustrated, confused and 
desperate, refugees nonetheless began to work with volunteers and government officials 
to create temporary routines in their new lives. 
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These new routines included card games, sports, cooking and cleaning. Cooking 
presented a unique challenge due to the diversity of refugees as many had dietary 
restrictions or preferences that did not match. Yet, it provided a diversion from the 
monotony of sitting around the shelter. Three of the most notable activities refugees 
undertook were security patrols, putting on special events and language classes. As the 
shelter population grew to over 150, security became a concern. Initially volunteers from 
the Salvation Army and local community did patrols through the shelter, but the refugees 
quickly took control of this themselves.336 One Salvadoran, “Oscar,” took a lead role in 
the organization of security patrols. Well respected by the other refugees, Oscar came 
from a middle class background and had extensive business experience, as well as a 
Master’s from Michigan State. For the month that he lived in the shelter Oscar drafted the 
lists for the work crews and help set up security patrols.337  
Refugees also worked with volunteers to organize a series of special events and 
classes. These included talent shows, picnics and a Mother’s Day celebration. At the 
conclusion of a talent show on March 19th the refugees sang “God Bless America,” an 
interesting choice given that they were being forced out of the United States.338 While 
most of the refugees in Plattsburgh were bound for Francophone Quebec, few knew how 
to speak French. Walid Houri, a Lebanese refugee, taught French to those unfamiliar with 
what, to many refugees, was an exotic language.339  
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In addition to the chores, cooking, classes, games and performances, many 
refugees gave interviews to the press. Newspaper reporters and television crews from 
across the United States, Canada and the rest of the world discovered the charm of this 
small part of the world and found themselves fascinated by both Plattsburgh residents and 
the refugees who were forced to temporarily call it home. Immediately after the crisis 
began, the Montreal Gazette published a front-page story called “Dreams of new life 
shattered at border,” complete with a picture of two young Salvadorans and the subtitle: 
“My life is in danger and I can’t go back.”340 The Gazette continued its coverage and was 
joined by other national and international outlets including the Globe and Mail, Toronto 
Star, New York Times and Philadelphia Inquirer, as well as distributors like the 
Associated Press and United Press International. Through games, chores, talent shows 
and interviews refugees transformed the space from a shelter born out of necessity into a 
sanctuary and a site of political action. 
While refugees provided stirring images and heartbreaking quotes, reporters were 
also interested in the plain-speaking volunteers who staffed the refugee relief effort. They 
had good reason to be. One of the most fascinating parts of the Plattsburgh border crisis 
is the way that a relatively conservative rural community responded to an unforeseen, 
and, for many, unwelcome, emergency. At first the unknown aspects of the crisis 
intimidated many Plattsburgh and Clinton County residents, even those who agreed to 
volunteer. Fran Ford, author of a memoir of the crisis, remembers on her first day of 
volunteering taking two refugees to the doctor’s office, “I took a seat across the room, the 
farthest chair I could find. Why? Was I embarrassed to be seen with these women that 
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were different in language and appearance? Yes I was!”341 Within a few weeks Mrs. Ford 
would become one of the most important volunteers in the refugee relief effort. She 
began by answering phones, but quickly transformed into a “jack-of-all trades,” running 
errands with refugees, counseling deeply scarred women who feared for their families’ 
lives, inviting refugees over for dinner, and serving as a go-between for volunteers and 
government officials.342 Other Plattsburgh residents, like Mike Bressard, answered the 
call as well. The owner of a muffler shop, Bressard donated his time and money, while 
other local businesses donated food and clothing.343  
 The academic community got involved as well. Professors from SUNY 
Plattsburgh offered translation and paralegal services. A variety of Plattsburgh 
undergraduates, members of the Alpha Phi Omega fraternity, as well as high school 
Model U.N. students, raised money for the refugees. For some Plattsburgh 
undergraduates this represented a unique opportunity as they were participating in a 
Model Organization of the American States (OAS) and had just been chosen to represent 
El Salvador. The faculty leader of the Model OAS, Stuart Voss, was one of the paralegals 
for the refugee relief effort. At the shelter students could meet and interact with 
Salvadorans to supplement their learning.344 For volunteers the shelter was a 
transformative space that opened their eyes to a wider world, proved the hospitality of 
Plattsburgh and created new opportunities for learning. 
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In addition, volunteers from outside the immediate community responded to the 
crisis. Over the first weekend of the crisis residents of Hemmingford, Quebec, a little 
village less than 5 miles north of the border, drove a Volkswagen bus stuffed with food 
and clothing down to the Crisis Center. Disagreeing with their government’s policy 
change, they continued their support the following weekend, driving down to provide 
entertainment and religious services.345 The interviews and media coverage of the 
refugees and volunteers and Plattsburgh touched concerned citizens across the United 
States. They took to the media, writing letters to the editor and publishing articles in an 
attempt to raise money and awareness for the Plattsburgh volunteer groups. Nancy 
Murray, president of the Syracuse Interreligious Council, issued an explicitly religious 
appeal for financial support, asserting that like the Israelites wandering in the desert after 
fleeing Egypt, “today’s strangers in a foreign land need our manna to survive.”346 
Carolyn Patty Blum, one of the lawyers in the ABC case covered in chapter 3, wrote an 
opinion piece in the Christian Science Monitor, that tries to draw attention to the crisis 
along the border. Excoriating the United States’ treatment of Central American refugees, 
she praises Canada’s treatment of refugees throughout the decade but expresses worry 
about the consequences of recent changes.347 Articles like these, along with the combined 
efforts of volunteers and refugees raised the profile of the crisis. Donations began 
streaming in; first they came from around the region and then the country.  
 Of course not all responses in the community or around the country to the crisis 
were positive. Various citizens voiced concerns similar to those in Canada that had led to 
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the closing of the border. Some members of the Plattsburgh community questioned the 
wisdom of spending so many resources on refugees while Plattsburgh residents went 
hungry and homeless. One letter to the editor claimed that,“(t)he refugee problem could 
easily be solved by taking the money for one day’s maintenance and buying each refugee 
who can’t afford one a one-way ticket to Albany along with a map (to the) State Campus 
and the South Mall.”348 Other letters echoed the sentiment. Not only was the crisis 
draining the resources of county and city social services, it also became the focus of 
volunteer activity at the expense of other volunteer-driven services. Nonetheless, future 
events proved that though the refugee relief effort came with some initial costs, it came 
with some unexpected benefits. 
4.6 A Community Transformed 
The most tangible benefit came a little more than seven months after the letter to 
the editor quoted above. Tiny Clinton County secured a $1 million grant from New York 
State’s Homeless and Housing Assistance Program. It was the third largest grant for the 
program, only behind the much more populated regions of New York City and 
Westchester County. Brian Smith and Rose Pandozy, the authors of the grant proposal, 
credited in large part Plattsburgh’s response to the refugee crisis to their acquisition of the 
grant.349 Three years later Smith, Pandozy and other community leaders dedicated the 
Evergreen Townhouse Community, an innovative new low-income housing complex 
built with the grant secured in 1987. The amount had been increased by $700,000 to 
make, in the words of State Social Services Commissioner Cesar A. Perales, “a little 
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community of its own.”350 The Evergreen Townhouse Community remains a crucial part 
of Clinton County’s and Plattsburgh’s social services. 
Other, less tangible, effects on the community included a broadening of horizons 
by area churches and residents who had raised funds, clothing and food during the relief 
effort. Prior to the Border Crisis people of the community thought of themselves as 
friendly and neighborly, but the refugee relief effort was demonstrable proof of those 
virtues to both themselves and the world. Today the First Presbyterian Church in 
Plattsburgh has extensive outreach programs both at home and abroad. Mission of Hope, 
a charity centered in Plattsburgh, makes yearly visits to Nicaragua for both humanitarian 
and missionary work.351 
In this chapter’s second opening quotation, Rose Pandozy calls the response to the 
Plattsburgh Border Crisis the community’s “finest hour.”352 Various members of the 
community, when interviewed, remember the experience fondly. They believed that the 
willingness of the town’s and county’s various social service organizations to band 
together to meet a staggering crisis proved the area’s hospitality.  
For many of the volunteers, the most important effect the crisis had on the 
community was the friendships community residents formed with each other and with 
refugees. They were formed while spending long hours at the shelter, grieving the fate of 
family members, laughing over the inanities of everyday life and inviting refugees over 
for dinner. These friendships still last today. While conducting interviews in Plattsburgh, 
many of the activists encouraged me to talk to each other. They mentioned recent dinners 
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or coffee meetings between activists turned into old friends. Each activist interviewed 
remember her or his time fondly.353 
A little over a year after the closing of the shelter many of the refugees, 
volunteers, and local government officials reunited in Montreal for a picnic. Organized 
by Fran Ford, Margot Zeglis and the Kiwanis Clubs of Plattsburgh and Montreal, the 
August 21, 1988 picnic was, for many refugees and volunteers, the first they had seen of 
each other since Canada’s acceptance of each refugee’s application. The day was filled 
with song, laughter, feasting and a special visit from Santa Claus. Ron Wood, a 
Plattsburgh volunteer, reprised his role as St. Nicholas, which he had played at a party for 
the refugees last Christmas.354 
 That picnic in September of 1988 was not the end of Plattsburgh’s interactions 
with refugees. To this day, Plattsburgh remains a way station for prospective refugees 
intent on applying for asylum in Canada. Yet, the picnic is a powerful reminder that the 
crisis was, in many ways, overcome by the generosity of and cooperation between 
refugees, volunteers and local government officials. While they did not end the refugee 
flow or change Canadian policy, these three groups found a way to transform a desperate 
situation into a negotiable one. None of the refugees who came knocking at Plattsburgh’s 
door starved or went homeless. The “tide of refugees” never overwhelmed Plattsburgh’s 
social services. Rather, it helped lead to the construction of top-of-the line low-income 
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housing. And while some of the citizens were unsure of the aid given to refugees, in the 
end the experience became one of civic pride that the community still remembers fondly. 
 The Plattsburgh Border Crisis also temporarily transformed Plattsburgh, as a 
space, into the hub of a host of global networks. Civil wars in Central America, Southeast 
Asia, Afghanistan and Africa pushed refugees out of local camps and into western 
countries. Policy and legislation in Canada and the United States pushed refugees out of 
their homes across the United States and into a collection of border zones in Seattle, 
Detroit, Buffalo and Plattsburgh where they waited for the Canadian government to 
decide their fate. As these border zones struggled to deal with the ramifications of these 
changes brought on by an ineffective refugee adjudication system, repeated abuses of the 
asylum system and IRCA, the Canadian government tabled its new proposal for refugee 
adjudication, C-55, supplemented by an anti-smuggling bill (C-84) in early summer of 
1987.  
Another landing of South Asians, and the resultant histrionics of the Canadian 
press, helped push these new bills. This time 174 Tamils arrived just off the coast of 
Nova Scotia, triggering another panic among Canadians in favor of restrictive 
immigration policies. Continuing fears about the arrival of new boats from foreign lands 
and rushes of refugees from the United States, coupled with extensive protests by 
Canadian refugee advocates, kept the asylum issue an important one in Canadian politics. 
Noteworthy among Bill C-55’s statutes was the “safe third country” provision, which 
barred applicants from approval if they had already passed through what was deemed a 
safe third country. Refugee advocates feared that for foreign policy reasons the United 
States would be considered a safe third country, thereby making the vast majority of 
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Salvadoran applicants ineligible. Though Bills C-55 and C-84 passed in July 1988, the 
Canadian government never compiled the safe third country list, thus sparing Canadian 
officials the embarrassment of excluding the United States.355 This further proved that 
Canada’s government needed to take a global, rather than domestic, approach to its 
immigration, refugee and asylum policy. It was forced to respond to hemispheric and 
global realities. The local and international forces that caused the Plattsburgh border 
crisis continued, just like the friendships and goodwill that it created.  
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CHAPTER 5 
"IN THE MIDDLE OF TWO GREAT POWERS" 
“We are in the middle of two great powers, the U.S. and Canada. The U.S. doesn’t want 
us here. Canada doesn’t want us – now anyway. I can’t go back to Salvador. So we wait 
here.” 
– “Carlos,” March 1, 1987356 
 
“We will continue to provide sanctuary services openly and go to trial as often as is 
necessary to establish… that the projection of human rights is never illegal.” – Jim 
Corbett, July 1, 1986357 
 
5.1 Introduction 
On March 1, 1987, Carlos found himself trapped along the border due to the 
recent changes in US and Canadian immigration and asylum policies discussed in chapter 
4. After his arrest and torture in El Salvador, Carlos sought refuge in the United States, 
but the US’s new Immigration Reform and Control Act threatened to deport him back to 
his captors. When Carlos tried to flee north, Canadian officials stopped him at the border, 
informing him of a new policy and telling Carlos to wait in the United States, where he 
was in danger of being deported, until they processed his application for asylum. I chose 
to conclude this study’s introduction, and introduce this study’s conclusion, with Carlos’s 
complaint about being trapped along the border because it illustrates the seemingly 
impossible situation Central American refugees in the United States, and then Canada, 
found themselves in during the 1980s. Roving death squads in El Salvador and 
Guatemala, a government-sponsored genocide in Guatemala and a generalized climate of 
violence had made life untenable in their home countries for hundreds of thousands of 
Central Americans. So they went north in the pursuit of a better life. Many could not find 
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the opportunities to support themselves or their families in Mexico or other surrounding 
Central American countries, and decided to make their way first to the United States and 
then to Canada.  
In spite of an ambivalent at best, hostile at worst, reception from the two 
countries’ governments, over a million Central American immigrants took refuge in the 
United States and Canada during the decade. They did so through wit, ingenuity, 
resourcefulness and cooperation. This dissertation analyzed the Central American 
Refugee Crisis in the United States and Canada during the 1980s by taking a social 
approach to policy history that emphasized the importance of “ground-level” actors on 
the formation, implementation, negotiation and reformulation of asylum policy.  
Using three case studies I examined how refugees, activists and government 
officials (“ground-level” actors) transformed and were transformed by the CARC, finding 
that they often had a pivotal role in the Crisis. Public and private organizations 
cooperated in an attempt to deal with the consequences of the Crisis. Activists and 
refugees brought pressure on policy makers that constrained their options. Activists also 
sued the government in an attempt to maintain their ability to shelter refugees from the 
United States’ Immigration and Naturalization Service. Though their lawsuits did not 
protect their ability to offer aid to refugees, activists reshaped asylum policy and thereby 
transformed the CARC. Yet, the ability of activists and refugees to influence policy had 
its limits. In spite of impressive public relations campaigns, activists and refugees were 
unable to secure the substantial legislative changes to refugee and asylum law that they 
sought. These experiences had tremendous personal and public consequences. As a result 
of their involvement in the CARC participants questioned their religious beliefs, chose 
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new careers, formed long-standing connections and re-invigorated the dormant concept 
of Sanctuary, giving new life to their religious beliefs. In these ways, and the others 
discussed in the dissertation, “ground-level” actors transformed and were transformed by 
the Central American Refugee Crisis. 
5.2 Research Findings 
 A chapter-by-chapter discussion of my dissertation best summarizes my research 
findings. Building on each other, these chapters demonstrated the tremendous importance 
of “ground-level” actors to the development of the Central American Refugee Crisis in 
North America, as well as the ways that their experiences in the Crisis affected them. 
First, I addressed the linguistic complexities of the word “refugee,” and the difference 
between its legal and popular meanings. Refugees and activists used the public’s broader 
understanding of the term to their advantage in political and fundraising campaigns, even 
as they battled the government’s legal interpretation of “refugee.” An overview of the 
civil wars in Central America that generated the CARC highlighted the ways that US 
Cold War foreign policy led it to contribute millions of dollars in aid to the hard-right 
Central American governments fighting leftist guerillas. This prompted a US State 
Department unwilling to recognize that it supported refugee-creating regimes to 
overwhelming recommend against asylum status for Guatemalans and Salvadorans. In 
the United States political convictions heavily influenced whether Americans perceived 
Central Americans as undeserving economic immigrants or refugees fleeing persecution.  
Canada’s involvement in the Crisis started slowly and evolved differently than 
that of its southern neighbor. Central American refugees did not begin to arrive in 
statistically significant numbers until the mid-1980s. Rather than seeing Central 
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Americans as a distinct group, many Canadians viewed Guatemalans and Salvadorans as 
part of a larger refugee flow that they feared would overwhelm Canada. In addition, the 
Canadian government had a much different foreign policy than that of the United States. 
Therefore, the Central American Refugee Crisis unfolded in the United States and 
Canada within a complicated social, political and legal context where the very meaning 
of the word “refugee,” as well as Central American refugees themselves, were open to 
interpretation, contestation and negotiation. 
 With this foundation I began with the stories of a refugee, activist and government 
involved in the Sanctuary Movement Trial (discussed in chapter 2). A nine-month long 
covert investigation of the Sanctuary Movement by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, codenamed “Operation Sojourner” culminated in charges that led to the 
Sanctuary Movement Trial.358 The Sanctuary Movement, a national network of churches, 
synagogues, private homes and cities, was an attempt by people of conscience to resist 
the US government’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Central American refugees. 
Those involved smuggled Central American refugees across the US-Mexico border north 
into Canada, hid them from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and held press 
conferences where refugees in Sanctuary told the media about the conditions in Central 
America and the injustice of the US immigration/refugee system. In 1985 the government 
attempted to end the Movement with the Sanctuary Trial by bringing many of its most 
prominent members, including its two founders, to court on multiple felony counts of 
breaking immigration law. Throughout the case “ground-level” actors had a tremendous 
effect on the Trial and the public’s perception of it. The government’s attorney 
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successfully applied for a motion in limine that excluded any evidence of religious 
motivations for Sanctuary activities, unintentionally pushing Sanctuary Movement 
members to take their case outside the courts. The press conferences, writings and 
interviews given by Sanctuary Movement members generated an enormous amount of 
publicity and introduced the issue of Central American refugees to a wide spectrum of 
Americans who had never heard of it before. In addition, far from ending the Sanctuary 
Movement, the stresses of the Trial temporarily patched over a fractured relationship 
between different Sanctuary Movement sites. It also brought a host of new churches and 
synagogues into the Movement. Finally, the Trial inspired a series of countersuits by 
activists furious over what they took to be the government’s blatant violation of their free 
exercise of religion. 
 Throughout the Sanctuary Movement’s existence, as well as the Sanctuary Trial’s 
duration, a series of ground-level actors shaped the outcomes of the Movement and Trial. 
The stories of individual refugees prompted two Arizona religious activists to formalize 
the Movement in March of 1982. A concerned government official pushed for an 
investigation of the Movement in 1984 by a veteran INS agent. The actions of the judge 
and prosecutor during the Trial pushed the activists to make their case outside of the 
courtroom. Finally, the Trial itself prompted activists across the country to file 
countersuits against the government. 
 The most influential of the Sanctuary Trial countersuits, American Baptist 
Churches et. al. v. Meese (later changed to American Baptist Churches et. al. v. 
Thornburgh et. al. and popularly known as the ABC case)359 transformed US asylum 
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policy (discussed in chapter 3). This court case initially began as a response to the INS’s 
covert investigation of churches in the Sanctuary Movement but eventually transformed 
into a landmark settlement between churches, refugees and refugee aid groups, and the 
government. On May 7, 1985, lawyers affiliated with the Center for Constitutional 
Rights, National Lawyers Guild and religious organizations filed a lawsuit against the 
directors of the Immigration and Naturalization Services (Alan Nelson) and Justice 
Department (initially Edwin Meese III and later Richard Thornburgh), alleging that they 
had infringed on the religious freedom of Sanctuary Movement members, neglected their 
legal duties to Central American Refugees, violated the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution, and recklessly deported Central Americans back into dangerous situations. 
The primary focus of the initial lawsuit lay in the first claim, that the government had 
violated Sanctuary Movement members’ religious freedom. After nearly two years of 
legal wrangling between government and activist lawyers, the judge dismissed all of the 
suit’s claims but permitted the activists to resubmit their complaint after making major 
and important changes to its arguments. This complaint placed more importance on the 
government’s mistreatment of Central American refugees. Over three and a half years 
this process twice repeated itself with the activists finally completely dropped their 
religious freedom claims, and focusing exclusively on a class action lawsuit regarding the 
government’s civil rights violations towards Central American refugees. The case 
resulted in an out of court settlement with far reaching implications including stays of 
deportations of Central Americans, de novo asylum adjudications, new training for 
asylum officers and more. The ramifications of the ABC settlement are still felt today 
throughout the US immigration system.  
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My research into the ABC case’s legal filings, media coverage and oral interviews 
with participants uncovered the importance of a sympathetic judge, tireless activists and 
administrative changes in the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The ABC 
settlement would have been impossible without the relentless focus of the activist 
lawyers, the judge’s willingness to let the activists repeatedly rework their complaint, and 
the eventual willingness of INS officials to settle. The effects on participants varied 
widely based on their role in the ABC case. Activist lawyers remember ABC with 
fondness, seeing it as the high point in their careers and a pivotal moment in their 
professional development. The one government official willing to reflect on her role in 
the case saw it a one case among many. 
As the Sanctuary Movement and the ABC case attempted to fight the widespread 
denial of Central Americans’ asylum applications, most Central Americans in the United 
States lived in the shadows, working “under-the-table” in undocumented jobs to provide 
for themselves and their families. While best remembered for its “amnesty” provisions, 
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)360 also contained strict provisions 
against employing “undocumented immigrants.” Fearful of the prospective fines and jail-
time threatened by the Act, employers around the country cut ties with tens of thousands 
of immigrants lacking sufficient documentation. 
In need of a safe space, many refugees turned to Canada (as discussed in chapter 
4). Needing a job and unwilling to return to Central America, thousands of Central 
Americans fled north to Canada. In the midst of this northern migration, the Canadian 
government passed a series of provisions that dramatically altered its refugee and asylum 
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policy. The most notable for those fleeing from IRCA was the removal of immediate 
acceptance into Canada at all ports-of-entry for asylum seekers from a set of refugee 
generating countries on the “B-1 List.” The February 1987 revocation of the “B-1 List,” 
which had included Guatemala and El Salvador, meant that Canadian officials turned 
back Central American asylum applicants at the US-Canada border and told them to wait 
for the completion of their asylum hearings in the United States, where they were subject 
to deportation. Due to a sizeable backlog these hearings often did not take place for 
weeks or months. Many did not know where to go and de facto refugee camps emerged 
up and down the US-Canada border. Carlos, discussed in the chapter’s opening 
paragraph, hoped to cross the Niagara Falls Bridge to Canada. Instead, the law forced 
him to temporarily take up residence in a shelter for refugees at the St. Mary of the 
Angels convent in a Buffalo, NY suburb. A popular route to Canada for asylum seekers 
ran from New York City to Montreal. Those who took the route found themselves forced 
to return to the small border town (25,000) of Plattsburgh, NY. 
 Unprepared for the entrance of hundreds of impoverished refugee seekers, the 
social services of Plattsburgh, NY were quickly overwhelmed. A variety of local, 
regional and international private and public partnerships formed in response to the 
refugee influx, some of which last to this day. My research examines the reasons for, and 
consequences of, Canada’s changing policies towards asylum seekers, placing the 
creation of asylum policy in a comparative and transnational context. I particularly focus 
on the ways that “ground-level” actors in Plattsburgh, NY dealt with the creation almost 
overnight of a refugee camp in their midst and the transformative effect of this “border 
crisis” on “ground-level” actors and the town of Plattsburgh. Here I stress the importance 
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of activists, refugees and government officials in creating a safe space for refugees 
awaiting adjudication, while discussing the inability of a vigorous public relations 
campaign to change Canadian asylum policy. The Border Crisis had a series of long-term 
effects on refugees, Plattsburgh and its residents. It led to greater interaction between the 
volunteer community in Plattsburgh and the local government. Due in large part to its 
impressive response to the Crisis the area received substantial funding for a low-income 
housing community that still stands as a model for public assistance. Finally, Plattsburgh 
residents formed long-standing friendships between themselves and refugees. 
Thus ground-level actors, and the public visibility which they brought to the 
United States’ complicity in the horrors of the civil wars in Central America, shaped the 
realities of the CARC by changing asylum policy, igniting a public debate on US/Central 
America foreign policy, and providing a safe space for hundreds of refugees while 
awaiting Canada’s asylum courts. In the process, ground-level actors saw themselves 
transformed. Their experiences led many to reflect on their religious beliefs. Others found 
a new calling as volunteers for social justice. The city of Plattsburgh found itself thrust on 
the world’s stage, using that opportunity to broaden its horizons and secure the funds 
necessary to create a network of social services that is still in use today. Together, 
refugees, activists and some government officials found ways to shelter refugees from the 
INS and the dangers of deportation. 
5.3 Research Implications 
 These findings suggest a number of implications for the study of the Central 
American Refugee Crisis, refugee and asylum policy history, and the history of public 
policy in general. Many scholars of the CARC already integrate the study of separate 
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groups of “ground-level” actors361 into their work, but without a holistic study of all three 
groups (activists, refugees and government officials), it is impossible to fully understand 
how the overlapping actions, consequences and motivations of the three groups 
transformed the Crisis. One example lies in the tremendous effect the litigation brought 
by activists and refugees against the government had on the CARC. The ways that these 
three groups interacted inside and outside the courtroom led to massive changes in 
asylum policy and needs to be further studied.362 
While the consequences of changes in asylum and refugee policy towards 
applicants remains a logical area of research, my research indicates that participation in 
refugee crises had a number of long-term effects on activists and government officials. 
Refugee relief efforts have been, and continue to be, crucial to the humanitarian treatment 
of refugees all over the world. More research is needed into this important subject as 
refugee relief efforts depend on educated and engaged “ground-level” actors. By further 
studying the effects of participation, scholars will be able to recommend better support 
services for those on the front-lines of refugee relief, ensuring a more healthy work force 
that is able to stay engaged for long periods of time, rather than burning out from the 
stress. 
 There is no reason to believe that the tremendous effect of “ground-level” actors 
on the CARC was an aberration from other refugee crises. All historians of refugees 
should pay attention to the ways that activists, refugees, and government officials shaped 
                                                
361 For refugees see the work of Norma Chinchilla, Jacqueline Hagan, Nora Hamilton and Cecilia Menjívar; 
for activists see Susan Bibler Coutin, Hilary Cunningham, Randy Lippert and Christian Smith; for 
government officials see Carl Bon Tempo, Valerie Knowles, and Gil Loescher.  
362 In Legalizing Moves, Susan Bibler Coutin provides an impressive guide to how this can be done, but her 
study of Central American refugees’ use of the courts and legal process primarily examines the 1990s, 
falling outside of the heart of the CARC. 
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refugee issues, asking how did understudied groups like activists, government officials 
and refugees shape refugee policies or crises? After the “crisis” or push to reform policy 
was over, what happened to participants? In particular, what happened to participants 
one, five, ten or twenty years after their involvement? Also, just as litigation proved 
critical to the unfolding of the Central American Refugee Crisis, how have the courts 
shaped refugee and asylum policy in general? A heightened focus on the importance of 
litigation to the shape and outcomes of policy would serve general studies of refugee and 
asylum policy history well.  
 These same questions can be expanded to general policy histories. Further 
exploration into the ways that “ground-level” actors interacted with policy of all different 
types will likely reveal their tremendous importance. “Ground-level” actors’ 
interpretation, mediation and resistance to public policy means that policy history should 
go beyond the legislative level and look at the way policy is worked out. As public policy 
is implemented “ground-level” actors consciously and unconsciously reformulate the 
wishes of the elites legislating it and create a counteracting force from below. While the 
focus of my research was on the historical evolution and consequences of the CARC, my 
research does indicate the importance of “ground-level” actors on public policy. Current 
policy makers should take the effects of “ground-level” actors into account when 
formulating policy. Though difficult to forecast, the intended and unintended 
consequences of policy are often determined by the behavior of those implementing, 
navigating and resisting it. 
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5.4 Future Research 
 Discussed in part in section 5.3, my study indicates a number of avenues for 
future research. The 1982 lawsuit of Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese (later changed to 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh)363 resulted in a far-reaching court order that 
dramatically altered INS apprehension, detention, processing and removal of Salvadoran 
immigrants. Much like the ABC case, the effects of the lawsuit are well documented but 
the development of the case is not. Further research into the Orantes-Hernandez case 
using legal documents and oral interviews would provide an important part of our 
understanding of the CARC.  
 My research into Canadian asylum policy for chapter 4 revealed a number of 
differences between the United States and Canada over the evolution of their asylum and 
refugee policies during the 1980s. Following the 1980 Refugee Act, litigation largely 
drove changes in US asylum policy. In contrast, Canada’s change in asylum policy after 
the 1976 codification of the UN Convention on Refugees into Canadian law, stemmed 
primarily from the Prime Minister’s office, which held enormous power to admit and 
deny refugee groups. An historical comparison between the approaches, formation and 
consequences of asylum policy in the two countries could explore why activists in the 
United States were so successful in the courts while Canadian activists, outside of Singh 
v. Minister of Employment,364 were largely unsuccessful.  
While not a significant part of this study, Mexico had a critical role in the Central 
American Refugee Crisis. Though Maria Cristina Garcia’s Seeking Refuge (2006) 
                                                
363 Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh No. 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990). Discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 3. 
364 Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration 1 S.C.R. (1985) 17904. Discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 4. 
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examines the asylum policies of the three North American countries during the CARC in 
concert, a further analysis of the role of “ground-level” actors in Mexico during the 
CARC is needed. How were their experiences during the CARC along the Mexico/US 
and Mexico/Guatemala borders similar and different to those along the US/Mexico and 
US/Canada borders? 
 “Operation Sojourner,” discussed in chapter 2, deserves further investigation. 
Full of colorful characters, this covert operation of the Sanctuary Movement has the high 
drama of a “cloak and dagger” infiltration of churches, religious fervor, courtroom 
denunciations and secret agents. Richly documented, much of the source material for the 
operation is contained and readily available for further research in University of 
Arizona’s Special Collections.  
Individual members of the press are another group of “ground-level” actors 
worthy of further study. Activists and refugees explicitly designed their press conferences 
and Sanctuary Movement testimonials to appeal to the press, convinced that media 
attention to their governments’ treatment of Central Americans would convince an 
indifferent public to force their representatives to make legislative and administrative 
changes. As evidenced by the articles cited throughout this dissertation, at major 
newspapers like the New York Times, Globe and Mail, Los Angeles Times, and 
Philadelphia Inquirer a handful of journalists drove coverage of the CARC. How did 
activists and refugees connect with these reporters? Why did they choose to continue to 
cover the CARC? What effect did their coverage have on their personal and professional 
lives? 
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Finally, future research is needed on the experiences of other towns along the 
US/Canada border following the Canadian government’s closure of the border to 
refugees in 1987.365 The three other primary ports of entry lay close to the major cities of 
Buffalo (Niagara Falls/Toronto), Detroit (Windsor/Toronto) and Seattle (Vancouver). 
How did their response differ from that of Plattsburgh? Did the “border crisis” also 
transform their communities? 
5.5 Conclusion 
This study took a social approach to policy history, emphasizing “ground-level” 
actors’ importance on the development of the Central American Refugee Crisis in Canada 
and the United States, and the ways that the Crisis affected them. Previous studies of the 
CARC have either focused on separate groups of actors or taken a more top-down 
approach to the Crisis. Three case studies on the Sanctuary Movement Trial, the 
American Baptist Churches lawsuit, and the crisis along the US/Canada border in 1987 
revealed that through implementation, negotiation and resistance to asylum policy 
“ground-level” actors transformed the Crisis from the bottom-up while simultaneously 
being transformed themselves. Yet, they proved unable to pass significant legislative 
reforms to asylum law and end US financial support to the Central American 
governments generating hundreds of thousands of refugees. Still, they formed 
public/private partnerships in response to the Crisis that endure today. Through refugee 
testimonials and press conferences “ground-level” actors pressured the government and 
constrained its options. They brought lawsuits that transformed US asylum policy and 
had a lasting effect on the entire US immigration system.  
                                                
365 Some of this has already begun. On Detroit-Windsor see Julie Young, “Seeking Sanctuary in a Border 
City,” 232-245.  
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While pushing, negotiating and resisting the laws of the Canadian and American 
governments, “ground-level” actors went through a metamorphosis of their own. 
Participation in the CARC prompted some to disavow, question, or renew their religious 
beliefs. Others found new callings in social justice volunteer work or new paths for their 
careers. Public involvement in the Central American Refugee Crisis often had enormous 
legal consequences. Some activists received felony convictions for their participation. 
Sanctuary Movement testimonials raised the public profile of Central American refugees, 
placing them in danger of arrest, deportation and death. The CARC also forced an 
international role on the Plattsburgh community, and further developed a set of social 
services that endures today.  
In this chapter’s second opening quotation Jim Corbett, one of the original 
members of the Sanctuary Movement, stood in front of the press on the final day of the 
Sanctuary Movement Trial. He declared that the government’s attempts to stop them 
were bound to fail. Members of the Sanctuary Movement had a religious and moral 
calling to a power higher than the law of man. The Sanctuary Movement forged ahead. 
The combined efforts of activists, refugees and well-meaning government officials inside 
and outside the Sanctuary Movement saved thousands of refugees from deportation and 
death. Jim Corbett continued to work for Sanctuary, albeit in a limited capacity. Right 
before passing away in 2001 he began discussions on the need for a “New Sanctuary 
Movement” to protect immigrants from deportation.366 Six years later houses of worship 
across the country launched the New Sanctuary Movement. The ideas of collaboration, 
                                                
366 Douglas A. Martin, “James A. Corbett, 67, is Dead; A Champion of Movement to Safeguard Illegal 
Refugees,” New York Times, 8/12/2001. 
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testimonials, and resistance formulated by “ground-level” actors during the Central 
American Refugee Crisis continue to be used and contested today.367 
                                                
367 For a more detailed discussion of the New Sanctuary Movement see: Gregory Freeland, “Negotiating 
Place, Space and Borders: The New Sanctuary Movement,” Latino Studies 8:4 (Winter 2010), 485-508.  
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GLOSSARY 
ABC: American Baptist Churches et. al. v. Thornburgh et. al. 
 
Asylee: An asylee is someone seeking refugee status (asylum) within her or his country 
 
CARC: Central American Refugee Crisis 
 
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service 
 
Refugee: In US and Canadian law a refugee is someone outside of her or his territory 
possessing a “well-founded fear of persecution” based on her or his race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. See chapter 1 for 
a more detailed explanation. 
